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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
CT - Facility - § 51-10d. Judicial Branch Internet web site. Notice and information re animal-assisted therapy C.G.S.A. § 51-10d CT ST § 51-10d This Connecticut law enacted in 2017 states that the Judicial Branch shall maintain on its Internet web site (1) notice that the court may exercise its discretion to permit a dog to provide comfort and support to a testifying witness, (2) a hyperlink to the Internet web site of an organization that provides information regarding animal-assisted therapy resources, and (3) if applicable, a hyperlink to information regarding such resources on the Internet web site of the Division of Criminal Justice. Statute
Stanton v. State 395 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2013) 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013)

The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.

Case
CO - Vehicle, animal - § 13-21-108.4. Persons rendering emergency assistance from a locked vehicle C.R.S.A. § 13-21-108.4, C.R.S.A. § 18-1-706.5 This Colorado law allows the rescue of animals and "at-risk persons" from locked vehicles under certain conditions. "Animal" defined as cat or dog and specifically excludes livestock. A person is immune from civil or criminal liability for property damage resulting from forcible entry into locked vehicle if all of the following occurs: (1) an animal is present and the person has a reasonable belief that the animal is in imminent danger of death or suffering serious bodily injury; (2) the person determines the vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary; (3) the person makes reasonable effort to locate the owner as outlined in the law; (4) the person contacts law enforcement/911/emergency responders prior to forcibly entering vehicle; and he or she remains with vehicle until law enforcement/responders arrive. Statute
VA - Equine - Chapter 62. Equine Activity Liability/Chapter 63. Ox Activity Liability Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6200 - 6302 VA ST § 3.2-6200 - 6302 This Virginia section provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or death of a participant resulting from the intrinsic dangers of equine activities. Liability is not limited where the equine professional intentionally injures the participant, commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence for the safety of the participant, or knowingly provides faulty equipment or tack that causes injury. The statute seems to imply that a waiver should be executed when a participant engages in equine activities to adequately insulate the equine professional. Statute
SD - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 42-11. Equine Activities. S D C L § 42-11-1 to 5 SD ST § 42-11-1 to 5 This act stipulates that an equine sponsor, equine professional, doctor of veterinary medicine or any other person, is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: a person will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, a person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person. Statute
Goodell v. Humboldt County 575 N.W.29 486 (Iowa 1998)

The issue of county versus local control over livestock regulations came to a head when the Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a series of ordinances that had been enacted by the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors to add additional regulations to the livestock industry and to address problems created by confined animal feeding operations in the county. The court ruled that the ordinances were inconsistent with state law and invalid under the doctrine of implied preemption. 

Case
State ex rel Del Monto v. Woodmansee State ex rel Del Monto v. Woodmansee, 72 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1946).

In an action in mandamus, relator property owner sought a writ ordering respondent building commissioner of the City of Euclid to issue a building permit for the construction of a store building.  The store building would be used for the slaughter of chicken.  The state tired to oppose the building by stating the use would be against Ohio's cruelty to animal statute.  The Court ruled that the term "animals" as thus used meant a quadruped, not a bird or fowl.  Thus, the court ruled in favor of the property owner in his mandamus action against the commissioner.  

Case
Wales - Dogs - The Animal Welfare (Breeding of Dogs) (Wales) Regulations 2014 2014 No. 3266 (W. 333) Regulations to license persons breeding dogs in Wales. Statute
Coy v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd. 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 756 2005 Ohio 773

A veterinarian's license was revoked by the Ohio Veterinarian Medical Licensing Board and the vet challenged the revocation of his license.  The trial court found the vet guilty of gross incompetence and he appealed claiming there was no definition of gross incompetence in the statute.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding no specific definition was required.

Case
OK - Dangerous - § 717. Owner of mischievous animal which kills person 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 717 OK ST T. 21 § 717 This Oklahoma law states that an owner of a "mischievous animal" who knowing its propensities allows it to go at large or does not exercise ordinary care in keeping it, will be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree if while at large it kills a human. Statute

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