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Displaying 6051 - 6060 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. | Case | ||
| NJ - Education - 18A:35-4.25. Right of pupil to refuse participation in dissection activities | N.J.S.A. 18A:35-4.25 | This New Jersey law allows a public school pupil from kindergarten through grade 12 to refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of a course of instruction. The school must notify pupils and parents at the beginning of each school on the right to decline participation. Any pupil who chooses to refrain from participation in or observation shall be offered an alternative education project for the purpose of providing the pupil with the factual knowledge, information or experience required by the course of study. A pupil shall not be discriminated against, in grading or in any other manner, based upon a decision to exercise the rights of this act. | Statute | ||
| United States v. Place | 462 US 696 (1983) |
This case addressed issues relating to searches and seizures and violations of Fourth Amendment rights. |
Case | ||
| WV - Equine Activity Liability - Article 4. Equestrian Activities Responsibility Act. | W. Va. Code, § 20-4-1 to 7 | WV ST § 20-4-1 to 7 | This West Virginia section expressly recognizes the value of equestrian activities to the state. Thus, in order to limit liability to those who provide equine services, the duties of both the horsemen who provide such services and the participants who engage in such activities are stated. Each participant in an equestrian activity expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury, loss or damage to person or property which results from participation in an equestrian activity. Horsemen are required to ensure the safety of the participants and the equipment provided. | Statute | |
| People of the State of New York v. Mary Dawn Sitors | This action is an appeal from dismissal of criminal charges against a woman accused of acts of cruelty on her horses. The Town Court dismissed the criminal charges, finding that since the Catskill Animal Sanctuary's petition seeking the posting of security to care for the horses was dismissed (which had a lower standard of proof than in a criminal action), this necessarily meant it would be impossible to obtain a criminal conviction under the higher standard. Essentially, the Town Court's decision reflected a determination that one cannot violate New York's state cruelty law unless the animal dies due to lack of sustenance or care. The County Court found this reasoning erroneous; a violation under the law occurs when one fails to provide necessary sustenance, not only those acts or omissions that result in an animal's death. The criminal actions were thus, reinstated against defendant. | Pleading | |||
| Barnard v. Evans | [1925] 2 KB 794 |
The expression "cruelly ill-treat"" in s 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911 means to "cause unnecessary suffering" and "applies to a case where a person wilfully causes pain to an animal without justification for so doing". It is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the animal was caused to suffer unnecessarily, and the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant knew that his actions were unnecessary. |
Case | ||
| England/Wales - Animal Welfare - Animal Welfare (Service Animals) Act 2019 | 2019 c.15 | This Act amends the Animal Welfare Act of 2006 (England and Wales). It makes it an offence to be cause unnecessary suffering to a service animal whilst in service, removing the defence to human safety from the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Also known as 'Finn's Law.' | Statute | ||
| US - Great Apes, Sanctuary - Part 9. Standards of Care for Chimpanzees Held in the Federally Supported Sanctuary System | 42 C.F.R. § 9.1 to .13 | This set of regulations sets minimum standards of care for the chimpanzees that are maintained in the Federal Chimpanzee Sanctuary System, which was established by the CHIMP Act. | Administrative | ||
| State ex rel. Griffin v. Thirteen Horses | Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 1828459 (Conn.Super.) |
Defendant's horses were seized on December 14, 2005 pursuant to a search and seizure warrant signed by the court. The warrant was sought, in part, on affidavits that alleged possible violations of the Cruelty to Animals statutory provisions. Defendant Rowley filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction because the state has failed to comply with the provisions of § 22-329a and because the search and seizure warrant is invalid. Specifically, defendant maintains that the phrase in subsection (a) authorizing the chief animal control officer to "lawfully take charge of any animal found neglected or cruelly treated" merely allows the officer to enter the owner's property to care for the animal, but does not authorize seizure of the animal without a prior judicial determination. This court rejected Rowley's interpretation of the phrase "lawfully take charge." The court found that, as a practical matter, it is inconceivable that animal control officers, having found animals that are neglected or cruelly treated, would then leave them at the property. |
Case | ||
| England, Wales & Scotland - Sales, live animal - The Welfare of Animals at Markets Order 1990 | 1990 No. 2628 | Rules covering the treatment of animals in markets, which make it an offence to cause or permit any injury or unnecessary suffering to an animal at a market. The Order also sets out specific arrangements in respect of penning, food and water and the care of young animals. | Statute |