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Displaying 6561 - 6570 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Washington Cty. | 163 A.3d 146 (Md., 2017) | 454 Md. 1, 2017 WL 2774606 (Md. June 27, 2017) | In this Maryland appeal, appellant Rohrer questions the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615 (the law that allows an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner). Rohrer also challenges the legal ownership of the animals in state custody. The seizure of Rohrer's animals began in 2014, when an anonymous tip led humane investigators to Rohrer's farm. Field officers and a local veterinarian observed cattle that were "extremely thin" on Rohrer's farm. These concerns led to a search warrant of appellant's property. Due to the presence of dead animal bodies intermingled with the living, high piles of animal feces, and goats with hooves so overgrown they could not walk, the Humane Society (HS) and Sheriff's office seized all the animals under the warrant. The actual "seizure" resulted in a transfer of some animals to foster farms and an agreement between HS and Rohrer to adequately care for remaining animals on the property. Rohrer was charged with 318 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty, eventually being found guilty on only 5 counts and sentenced to supervised probation. During the initial proceedings, Rohrer filed a "petition for return of seized animals" under CR § 10–615(d)(2). When the District Court gave conclusions on the petition, it lamented on the "lack of guidance" in the statute and noted that that the "statute really doesn't say" whether Rohrer would lose ownership of the animals. After the criminal trial, Rohrer again sought return of the animals after negotiations with the HS failed. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's denial of the Petition for Return, finding the ruling was not clearly erroneous and it was not in the best interests of the animals to return to Rohrer. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Rohrer raises three issues: (1) can the HS seize an animal already in state custody from a search warrant; (2) must the seizure by the HS be justified by the conditions at the time of seizure or may it be based on previously observed conditions; and (3) how does a denial of a petition to return the animals affect the owner's property rights in the animals? In looking at prior codifications of the law as well as surrounding legislative history, the court first held that a HS officer may notify the owner of animal seized by the state in connection with a criminal warrant of its intent to take possession of the animal upon its release from state custody. Secondly, a HS officer may rely on previously-observed conditions to justify seizure under Section 10-615. The court noted that, similar to a search warrant, the factors justifying seizure can become weaker with time. So, when an owner files a petition for return, the HS has the burden of showing the court the seizure was necessary under the statute. In Rohrer's case, this Court found the District and Circuit Courts did not reach the question of whether the necessity supporting HS' possession of the animals continued. Since the animals were released after the criminal trial concluded, this Court stated that the District Court may now consider this question. Finally, the Court weighed in on whether the denial of a Petition for Return affects ownership interests. This Court declined to adopt the standard of "best interests" of the animals. Instead, the Court found that the function of the Petition for Return is to determine who has the right to temporarily possess an animal in question and this does not vest ownership rights in the animal if the petition is denied. This case was remanded to Circuit Court so that court can determine whether the final disposition of the criminal case and subsequent release of the animals held under the search warrant affects the disposition of Rohrer's Petition for Return of this animals. | Case |
| Neita v. City of Chicago | 830 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3905604 (7th Cir., 2016) | Vaughn Neita brought this suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, alleging false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment arising from an animal cruelty arrest. He was ultimately found not guilty on all counts by an Illinois judge. In 2012, Neita owned a dog-grooming business and rescue shelter. He brought two dogs to the Chicago Department of Animal Care and Control because one dog had attacked another dog in Neita's care and another dog had become ill after whelping a litter of puppies. When Neita arrived with the dogs, an animal control employee contacted police officers who then arrested Neita and searched his business premises, resulting in 13 counts of animal cruelty. With regard to this § 1983 action and Illinois state claims, while Neita amended his complaint twice, it was ultimately dismissed with prejudice for failure to adequately plead any constitutional violation. This appeal then followed. The Seventh Circuit held that to prevail on a false arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his or her arrest. Neita arrived at Animal Control to surrender two dogs that showed no signs of abuse or neglect without evidence that he mistreated either dog. Those statements in the amended complaint are sufficient to permit a false arrest claim to proceed. As to the claim of illegal searches, the court found that a plausible claim for false arrest also allowed his claim for an illegal search incident to his arrest to move forward. The dismissal of Neita's claims was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Case |
| ME - Humane Slaughter - Subchapter IV. Slaughter. | 22 M. R. S. A. § 2521 to 2521-C | ME ST T. 22 § 2521 to 2521C | The Maine humane slaughter provisions begin with a statement of policy that a method of slaughtering or handling in connection with slaughtering does not comply with the public policy of the State unless it is humane. A humane method is defined as one which renders animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective before they are shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast or cut. Additionally, slaughtering and handling in accordance with the ritual requirements of a religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is allowed. The section applies only to "livestock" and does not list a penalty for noncompliance (although the associated regulations may define both). | Statute |
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
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| Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 932 N.E.2d 448 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2010) | 2010 WL 2266081 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), 402 Ill.App.3d 62 |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation per se claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations. |
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| MD - Circus - Subtitle 2c. Traveling Animal Acts | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-2C-01 | MD NAT RES § 10-2C-01 | This Maryland subtitle is entitled, "Traveling Animal Acts." Covered animals include big cat species, bears, nonhuman primates, and elephants. Under this subtitle, a person may not allow for the performance of a covered animal in a traveling animal act. A person who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $2,000 per violation. | Statute |
| MI - Hunting, Internet - 750.236a. Engaging in, providing or operating facilities for, or providing or offering to provide equipment | M. C. L. A. 750.236a, 236b, 236c | MI ST 750.236a, 236b, 236c | A person in Michigan is not allowed to: (1) engage in computer-assisted shooting; provide or operate, with or without remuneration, facilities for computer-assisted shooting; or (3) provide or offer to provide, with or without remuneration, equipment specially adapted for computer-assisted shooting. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. | Statute |
| IN RE: LANCELOT KOLLMAN RAMOS | 2015 WL 6561874 (U.S.D.A., 2015) | Respondent Lancelot Kollman Ramos has worked as a circus performer and animal trainer his entire life. Ramos acquired Ned the elephant from William Woodcock, who was retiring from the circus. Ramos was aware of rumors that something was wrong with Ned, and he was aware that the animal was thin, but he did not know that it had any health problems. Despite the animal's emaciated condition, Ramos exhibited him in a circus. An Administrative Law Judge found Ramos willfully violated the Animal Welfare Act. $1,650 in fines were imposed on Ramos for violating a cease and desist order and another $5,000 was imposed on him for wilful failure to handle an animal as carefully as possible. | Case | |
| IL - Domestic Violence - Article 112A. Domestic Violence | 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 | IL ST CH 725 § 5/112A-14 | This Illinois law allows a court to issue an order of protection if the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a family or household member. It also allows for the protection of animals in domestic violence situations. Under Section (b)(11.5), the court can "[g]rant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal." | Statute |
| State v. Gerard | 832 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.App.,2013) | 2013 WL 3155477 (Minn.App.,2013) |
This case considers whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the felony count of unjustifiably killing an animal based on lack of probable cause. The incident stems from the killing of the neighbors' cat with a shotgun by defendant-respondent. At trial, he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause that was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of the responding police deputy stating the shooting of the cat was "justified." The trial court dismissed the complaint finding insufficient evidence that respondent had unjustifiably killed the cat. On appeal, the court found the district court's reliance on the deputy's lay opinion was improper. The court found it was within the jury's province to determine whether respondent's actions were justified or unjustified based on the evidence at trial. |
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