Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Williams | 898 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1990) |
Kenneth Ray Williams appealed his conviction for the illegal hunting of moose in violation of the Lacey Act. Williams claimed that his conviction should be overturned because the government failed to establish the validity of use of the wildlife law against a tribe member. The United States argued that there is no need for the government to establish the validity of the law's use against a tribe member. The court affirmed the conviction and held that the government must establish the validity of the use of wildlife laws against tribe members but that similar laws enacted by the tribe can establish this validity. |
Case | |
| NY - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 108, 110, 118, 123-b; McKinney's General Obligations Law § 11-107; McKinney's Civil Rights Law § 47, 47-a to c; McKinney's Penal Law § 195.11 - 12; § 242.00 - .15; McKinney's Public Housing Law § 223-a, b | McKinney's Executive Law § 296; McKinney's Social Services Law § 303-a; McKinney's Transportation Law § 147; McKinney's Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1153 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| MI - Equine Liability - Chapter 691. Judiciary. Equine Activity Liability Act | MCLA 691.1661 - 1667 | MI ST 691.1661 - 1667 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or professional, or any other person, is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: a person will be held liable for injuries if he or she commits a negligent act or omission that results in the proximate cause of injury or death, and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, a person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person. | Statute |
| Galgano v. Town of North Hempstead | 41 A.D.3d 536 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 840 N.Y.S.2d 794, 2007 WL 1704612 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 05223 |
In this New York Case, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for personal injuries and damages due to a dog bite. The court reaffirmed New York law that to recover in strict liability in tort for a dog bite or attack, the plaintiff must establish that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner knew or should have known of the dog's propensities. The fact that the subject dog was brought to the animal shelter because another dog in the owner's household did not get along with it is not indicative that it had vicious propensities. |
Case |
| Topical Introductions | Welcome to our Topical Introductions Page! Topical Introductions function as portals to more information on specific topics from "ag-gag" to zoos. Each topic introduction contains a collection of legal materials (cases, laws, and articles) for a specific issue with a short summary and detailed legal analysis. Topics range from companion animal issues (like dog bite laws, lost pets, and custody issues involving pets in divorce) to complex federal laws such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act or the Animal Welfare Act. Are you looking for a specific topic? Go to our Purple Navigation Bar and select "Search Materials." From there, go to "Legal Materials Type" and scroll down to "Topical Introductions" to select one of our 90+ different topics. Each topic is listed in alphabetical order. | Policy | ||
| People v. Williams | 15 Cal. App. 5th 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), reh'g denied (Sept. 20, 2017) | 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) | In this case, defendants were convicted of felony dog fighting and felony animal cruelty. On appeal, defendants sought to suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the search warrant that led to their convictions. Police officers responding to a report of a thin, loose, horse near the defendants' home entered the property in order to make reasonable attempts to secure the loose horse and determine if there was a suitable corral on the property. The officers knew there had been prior calls to the property in response to reported concerns about the conditions of horses and pit bulls on the property. Further, one officer heard puppies barking inside the home when she knocked on the door trying to contact defendants, and another officer heard a dog whining from inside the garage. There were strong odors of excessive fecal matter reasonably associated with unhealthful housing conditions. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to be concerned there was a dog in distress inside the garage and possibly in need of immediate aid, and the court found there was nothing unreasonable about one officer standing on the front driveway and simply looking through the broken window in the garage door to determine whether the dog he heard making a whining bark was in genuine distress. Nor was it unreasonable for the officers to then proceed to the back yard after having looked in the garage. As a result, the court ruled that the information the officers had justified the issuance of the search warrant, and thus the order denying the motion to suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the warrant was affirmed. The defendants' judgments of conviction were also affirmed. | Case |
| Jones v. Butz | 374 F.Supp. 1284 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) |
This action involves a challenge, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to the Humane Slaughter Act and in particular to the provisions relating to ritual slaughter as defined in the Act and which plaintiffs suggest involve the Government in the dietary preferences of a particular religious (e.g., Orthodox Jews) group. The court held that there is no violation of Establishment Clause because no excessive governmental entanglement and by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other. |
Case | |
| Animal Hospital of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco | 418 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1979) | 100 Misc.2d 406 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1979) |
In this New York case, defendant presented his puppy to plaintiff-animal hospital for treatment. After discussions between about the cost of the care, defendant apparently felt that he would not be allowed to retrieve the puppy from the hospital's possession. As a consequence, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant describing the balance owed, and stating that the hospital would retain the puppy for 10 more days after which it would "take care of the dog in accordance with the legal methods available to dispose of abandoned dogs." The issue on appeal is whether this letter qualified as noticed required by the Agriculture and Markets Act, Sec. 331. The court found that it did not comply with the statutory requirements and thus, plaintiff was responsible for defendant's loss of his puppy valued at $200 at trial. Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on its complaint for the costs of care amounting to $309. |
Case |
| Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth | 484 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) | 2007 WL 1227559 (9th Cir. 2007) |
This case concerns the practice of catching yellowfin tuna by encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets. The dispute centers over whether tuna sellers may label tuna as dolphin-safe if caught with such nets. An environmental group brought suit against the Secretary of Commerce after he concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that tuna purse seine fishing harmed depleted dolphin stocks in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the action by the Secretary was arbitrary and capricious where the agency's decision-making process was influenced to some degree by foreign policy considerations rather than science alone. Further, the finding of no significant impact (FONSI) was not rationally connected to the best available scientific evidence. |
Case |
| NE - Predators - Article 5. Regulations and Prohibited Acts. (e) Damage by Wildlife | Neb. Rev. St. § 37-559 to 563 | NE ST § 37-559 to 563 | This statute provides that a farmer or rancher may kill a predator that threatens agricultural or livestock interests without first having obtained a permit. The provision does not allow a farmer or rancher to destroy those species protected under the federal Endangered Species Act, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and other listed federal wildlife acts. | Statute |