Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Tucson - Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl (Article 1: In General § 4-3) | Tucson Code § 4-3 |
This Tucson ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to commit a crime of cruelty or neglect on an animal. Anyone found guilty of committing a crime of neglect of cruelty faces fines between $100 to $2,500, up to 6 months in jail or 3 years on probation, restitution for the victim, and may not be able to own or control an animal for up to 3 years. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Settle v. Commonwealth | 55 Va.App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182 (Va.,2009) | 2009 WL 4030930 (Va.App.) |
The defendant-appellant, Charles E. Settle, Jr., was convicted of two counts of inadequate care by owner of companion animals and one count of dog at large under a county ordinance, after Fauquier County Sherriff's officers were dispatched to his home on multiple occasions over the course of one calendar year in response to animal noise and health and safety complaints from his neighbors. Consequently, all of the affected dogs were seized from Settle and relocated to local animal shelters. The trial court also declared three of the animals to be dangerous dogs pursuant to another county ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that: (1) because the forfeiture of dogs was a civil matter the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction and was not the proper forum to decide the case; (2) that Settle failed to join the County as an indispensible party in the notice of appeal from conviction for the county ordinance violation; and (3) that the evidence was sufficient to identify Settle as the owner of the neglected companion animals. |
Case | |
| MI - Emergency - 333.20925. Emergency transport of police dog | M.C.L.A. 333.20925 | This law, effective in March of 2019, states that the provisions of the Emergency Medical Services Act does not prohibit an ambulance from providing emergency transport of a police dog that is injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar facility, if the police dog is in need of emergency medical treatment and there are no individuals who require transport or emergency assistance at that time. | Statute | ||
| MD - Spay/neuter - § 2-1602. Spay/Neuter Fund | MD Code, Agriculture, § 2-16021 - 1605 | This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires. | Statute | ||
| RI - Hunting - § 20-13-16. Harassment of hunters, trappers, and fishers prohibited | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-13-16 | RI ST § 20-13-16 | This law reflects Rhode Island's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent the lawful taking. The language states that the listed actions must be done intentionally or knowingly. Violation results in a "civil violation" with a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more $500. | Statute | |
| MT - Horse Slaughter - Chapter 9. Slaughter. | MCA 81-9-240, 241 | MT ST 81-9-240, 241 | This Montana statute limits the ability of a court to issue an injunction aimed at delaying or stopping the construction of an equine slaughter or processing facility. Additionally, the law provides that if a person files an action against the operation of an equine slaughter or processing facility and does not prevail, the person is liable for all financial losses the facility suffers if the court issues an injunction that halts operations while the action is pending. | Statute | |
| Tulloch v. Melnychuk | 1998 CarswellAlta 573 |
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants for trespass to chattels. She alleged that the Defendants shot her valuable dog. The Defendants countered that they were justified in shooting the dog since it was on their land chasing and worrying their cattle contrary to the Stray Animals Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-23, Part 3. Here, the court found credible the testimony from the defendant cow-operator that the dog was chasing a lame cow to the point where the cow was exhausted. The action by plaintiff was dismissed. |
Case | ||
| Newport v. Moran | 721 P.2d 465 (Or.App.,1986) | 80 Or.App. 71 (Or.App.,1986) |
In this Oregon case, an action was brought to recover damages for injuries after defendant's dog ran into plaintiff and knocked her down. The lower court entered a verdict against the defendant and she appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was find no evidence that would put defendant on notice that the dog had a potentially dangerous propensity to run into people. Further, without some reason to foresee that the dog was likely to run into people, there was no common-law duty to confine the dog. The evidence also did not warrant submission of the case to the jury on the theory of negligence per se for violation of the dog control ordinance because this risk was not one anticipated by the ordinance. Reversed. |
Case | |
| VA - Horse Transport - Chapter 160. Rules and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Horses (repealed 2016) | 2 VA ADC 5-160-10 to 90 | 2 VAC 5-160-10 to 90 | [Note: these regulations were repealed in 2016 and are provided for historical context only.] These previous Virginia regulations address the transportation of loads of more than six horses being transported to a commercial slaughter facility in a vehicle. Vehicles that have more than one tier holding horses are allowed only if the tier is designed, constructed, and maintained to withstand the weight of the horses held by it. | Administrative | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. USDA APHIS Wildlife Services | 320 F.Supp.3d 1137 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) | 2018 WL 3097016 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) | This action considers motions for summary judgment by both parties. At issue here is a plan by a branch of the USDA called Wildlife Services (WS), which is responsible for killing or removing predators and other animals that prey on wild game animals, threaten agricultural interests, or pose a danger to humans. The decision to kill the animals comes from requests from individuals or other state and federal agencies rather than a decision by WS. For this case, the facts center on an expanded operation to kill game animals and protected species in Idaho (mainly coyotes and ravens) known as PDM. As part of this process, WS prepared and circulated a draft Environmental Assessment (EA) to other federal agencies, stakeholders, and the public seeking comment to the expanded plan. However, instead of taking the criticisms and suggestions from the EA and then undertaking a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), WS instead rejected most responses and labeled them as unconvincing or invalid. This led plaintiff to file suit against WS, arguing that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not preparing the EIS after comments to the EA. For example, the BLM, the Forest Service, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG), found that the EA was not an "objective analysis" and instead sounded "like a pre-decisional defense of lethal methods." These agencies warned WS that the predator control methods were "likely to be futile over the long-term" and did not consider cascading effects on both cyclic and non-cyclic prey populations. In analyzing the factors, this court found that WS failed to consider "several federal agencies with long experience and expertise in managing game animals and protected species" when proposing to expand the expanded PDM program. There was a lack of crucial data to support WS' assumptions in its modeling that was exacerbated by use of unreliable data, according to the court. In addition, the court found that WS failed to "explain away scientific challenges to the effectiveness of predator removal." Not only was the court troubled by the lack of reliable data used by WS, but the WS’ “unconvincing responses” to agencies that had substantial experience managing wildlife and land-use concerns demonstrated to the court that the PDM is controversial and the environmental impacts were uncertain. This in and of itself necessitated an EIS under NEPA. The court held that the lack of reliable data, the unconvincing responses from WS, combine to trigger three intensity factors that combine to require WS to prepare an EIS. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied (the motion by plaintiff to supplement the administrative record was deemed moot). | Case |