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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Newsome v. Erwin | 137 F.Supp.2d 934 (S.D. Ohio 2000) |
Plaintiff brought § 1983 action against county sheriff and others alleging that defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they shot and killed his pet lioness. |
Case | |
| Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. | 972 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) | Plaintiff Cisneros purchased a Shih Tzu puppy named "Giant" from Petland Kennesaw, a Kennesaw, Georgia franchise of Petland, Inc. She received a certificate of "veterinary inspection" and a limited health guarantee at the time of purchase. Several days later, problems arose with the puppy and she brought the dog back to the Petland affiliated veterinarian who prescribed antibiotics without making a diagnosis. Shortly thereafter, an emergency pet visit revealed the dog suffered from parvovirus. Cisneros called Petland who told her to take the dog back to the Petland vet if she wanted a refund. She did so and the dog died several days later. Because the State of Georgia requires reporting of parvovirus, Cisneros received a report after the dog died, but she learned the dog's organs had been removed (an uncommon post mortem practice). As a result, plaintiff alleged that actions were the intended result of a nationwide conspiracy involving Petland and its affiliates to sell unhealthy puppies from "puppy mills" where health conditions are rubber stamped by a network of "preferred veterinarians" and buyers are deceived by sales documents that distract from the fraud. Plaintiff broadly asserted three claims: (1) a violation of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (2) a conspiracy to violate the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and (3) with respect to a Georgia subclass of persons who purchased a cat or dog from a Petland franchise in Georgia from July 2013 to the present, a violation of Georgia's state RICO statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4. The district court dismissed Cisneros's federal causes of action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). After applying the six-fold test for a private plaintiff suing under the civil provisions of RICO, this Court found chiefly that Cisneros has alleged no facts that plausibly support the inference that the defendants were collectively trying to make money in pet sales by fraud, which is a common purpose sufficient to find a RICO enterprise. Cisneros was required to allege not just that Petland Kennesaw had a fraudulent purpose, but that it was a common purpose, formed in collaboration with Petland, PAWSitive, and the preferred veterinarians. In the end, Cisneros has alleged only that Petland operates a franchise business like any other franchisor. Even assuming that Cisneros has adequately pled fraud on the part of Petland Kennesaw, she has not alleged that its predicate acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. The action was affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. | Case | |
| NV - Bestiality - 201.455. Bestiality; penalties | N.R.S. 201.455 | NV ST 201.455 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2017, prohibits bestiality. Convicted violators face the relinquishing and permanently forfeiting ownership or possession of all animals which are in the same household as the person to an animal shelter, an organization that takes into custody animals which have been abused or neglected, or a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. The court may also impose a possession ban on owning or keeping any animal for a period determined by the court. Those convicted must undergo a psychological evaluation and any recommended counseling and must pay all reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance of the animal involved in the crime and any other animal relinquished by the person. If the person convicted of the crime of bestiality is not the owner of the animal involved in the crime, reimbursing the owner of the animal for all medical expenses incurred for treating the animal. | Statute |
| WY - Eagles - § 23-3-101. Taking eagle prohibited | W.S.1977 § 23-3-101 | WY ST § 23-3-101 | This Wyoming statutes prohibits the taking of an eagle unless the taking is authorized by federal law. Such a taking constitutes a high misdemeanor. | Statute |
| SC - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal Laws | Code 1976 § 31-21-70; Code 1976 § 2-7-35; Code 1976 § 47-3-910 - 990; Code 1976 § 43-33-10 - 70; Code 1976 § 56-5-3200 - 3220; Code 1976 § 43-26-80 | SC ST § 31-21-70; SC ST § 2-7-35; SC ST § 47-3-910 - 990; SC ST § 43-33-10 - 70; SC ST § 56-5-3200 - 3220; SC ST § 43-26-80 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. | Statute |
| In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon | This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order." | Pleading | ||
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NSF | LEXSEE 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22315 |
The Center for Biological Diversity sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the National Science Foundation from continuing its acoustical research in the Gulf of California. The scientists who conducted the acoustical research in the Gulf of California, which was an environmentally sensitive area, used an array of air guns to fire extremely high-energy acoustic bursts into the ocean. The sound from the air guns was as high as 263 decibels (dB) at the source. The government had acknowledged that 180 dB caused significant injury to marine mammals. The court found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), governed the activities of the scientists on the research vessel, and that any injury or harassment to marine mammals in the course of the research project in the Gulf of California, outside the territorial waters of Mexico, would violate the MMPA. |
Case | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 1 |
Animal Law Index Volume 21, Part 1 (Fall 2014)ARTICLES
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Policy | ||
| FL - Initiatives - Amendment 13, Ban on Wagering on Dog Races | Amendment 13 | A proposed revision relating to ending dog racing; creating new sections in Article X and Article XII of the State Constitution to prohibit the racing of, and wagering on, greyhounds and other dogs after a specified date. | Statute | |
| VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6543. Governing body of any locality may adopt certain ordinances | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6543 | VA ST § 3.2-6543 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns of the Commonwealth are hereby authorized to adopt, in their discretion, ordinances which parallel statutory sections dealing with licensing of dogs, taxation, impoundment, and regulation of dangerous dogs. It also provides that nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prevent or restrict any local governing body from adopting local animal control ordinances which are more stringent than the relevant state statutory sections. It further outlines how ordinances may impose civil penalties for violations of the above. | Statute |