Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute | |
| MI - Exotic Pets - Chapter 287. Animal Industry; Large Carnivore Act | M. C. L. A. 287.1101 - 1123 | MI ST 287.1101 - 1123 | This Michigan law bans acquisition and possession of large carnivores (big cats and bears), though it grandfathered animals already owned as pets at the time of the law's enactment. In order to maintain public safety and animal welfare, the state created a strict permit system for those owners who were allowed to keep their already-existing pets. The statute also outlines minimal care requirements, transportation guidelines, and procedures for when a large carnivore suspected of carrying rabies bites a human or livestock. | Statute | |
| FL - Ecoterrorism - Florida Animal Enterprise Protection Act | West's F. S. A. § 828.40 - 43 | FL ST § 828.40 - 43 | This set of laws comprises the Florida Animal Enterprise Protection Act. Under the Act, a person who intentionally causes physical disruption to the property, personnel, or operations of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any property, including animals or records, used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes economic damage, commits a felony of the third degree. | Statute | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case | ||
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
Case | |
| IN - Veterinary - Article 38.1. Veterinarians. | I.C. 25-38.1-1-1 to 25-38.1-5-5 | IN ST 25-38.1-1-1 to 25-38.1-5-5 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| CO - Impound - Article 4. Disease Control | C. R. S. A. § 25-4-610 | CO ST § 25-4-610 | This Colorado statute provides that it is unlawful for any owner of any dog, cat, other pet animal, or other mammal which has not been inoculated as required by the order of the county board of health or board of health of a health department to allow it to run at large. The health department or health officer may capture and impound any such dog, cat, other pet animal. | Statute | |
| CT- Pet Shops - Sec. 22-344-21a. Prohibited sales | CT ADC § 22-344-32 - 94 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 22-344-32 - § 22-344-94 | This Connecticut regulation lists the animals of which the exhibition, sale or offer for sale by a pet shop is prohibited. The condition in which commercial kennel facilities, pet shops, grooming facilities, training facilities, and animal shelters must be kept are described including sanitation, health requirements, ventilation, and other structural requirements. | Administrative | |
| Midcoast Fishermen's Ass'n v. Gutierrez | 592 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C.,2008) | 2008 WL 5401534 (D.D.C.) | Plaintiffs filed suit seeking review of the Department of Commerce’s (the “Agency”) decision to deny their petition for emergency action to address continued overfishing in the Northeastern multispecies fisheries by excluding midwater trawl vessels from groundfish closed areas. After the administrative record was filed, and the Agency certified that it was the administrative record for the decision, Plaintiffs moved to compel completion of the administrative record. The United States District Court, District of Columbia denied Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs failed to show that the Agency blatantly ignored specific readily available information, the fact that the Agency based its decision on data from a two year chronological time span did not render the record incomplete, supplementing the record with bycatch data from an earlier time period would not provide any background information useful to the resolution of the case, and that the record contained sufficient information to allow the Court to determine what process the Agency followed in making its decision. | Case | |
| Monell v. Department of Social Services | 436 US 658 (1978) |
Female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York brought an action challenging the policies of those bodies in requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before those leaves were required for medical reasons. The decision of this case addresses issues of immunity. |
Case |