Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Grosee Pointe Woods - Breed - Sec. 6-94. - Vicious dogs and other vicious animals prohibited. | GROSSE POINTE WOODS, MI., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6-94 |
The municipal code of Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan, makes it unlawful for any person to own, harbor or keep any pit bull terrier (as defined in the law including certain mixed breed dogs). Any dog determined to be a pit bull terrier by a court shall be destroyed or removed from the city. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Haines v. Hampshire County Commission | 607 S.E.2d 828 (W.V. 2004) |
A dog was impounded and adopted after being picked up by animal control officers. The owners of the dog brought suit over the adoption of their dog. The trial court dismissed the suit and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the dog's owners failed to state a claim. |
Case | |
| Northern Ireland - Zoo Licensing - The Zoo Licensing Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2003 | 2003 No. 115 | Regulations licensing the conduct of zoo facilities in Northern Ireland (similar to the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 that applies to England, Wales and Scotland). Covers permanent establishments where animals are on display to the public, for seven days a year or more. License requirements address matters of animal welfare, conservation and public education. | Statute | |
| SD - Endangered Species - Chapter 34A-8. Endangered and Threatened Species | S D C L § 34A-8-1 - 13; 34A-8A-1 - 9 | SD ST 34A-8A-1 to 13; 34A-8-1 - 9 | These South Dakota statutes provide the definitions and regulations related to endangered and threatened species in the state. Under statute, state agencies shall establish and conduct control programs at state expense on private lands that are encroached upon by prairie dogs from contiguous public lands. It is a misdemeanor to take, possess, transport, import, export, process, sell or offer for sale, buy or offer to buy (nor may a common or contract carrier transport or receive for shipment) a listed species as defined by statute. | Statute |
| Ruden v. Hansen | 206 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973) |
This appeal stems from an action against a defendant veterinarian for the alleged negligent vaccination of plaintiff’s pregnant hogs (gilts). The court articulated the standard of care: "As a veterinarian defendant was duty bound to bring to his service the learning, skill and care which characterizes the profession generally. In other words, the care and diligence required was that as a careful and trustworthy veterinarian would be expected to exercise. . . We are convinced the correct standard of the veterinarian's care should be held to that exercised generally under similar circumstances." |
Case | |
| State v. Siliski | 238 S.W.3d 338 (Tenn.Crim.App., 2007) | 2007 WL 1425479 (Tenn.Crim.App.) |
The defendant operated a dog breeding business, “Hollybelle's Maltese,” in which she bred purebred Maltese dogs in her Franklin home, advertised the resulting puppies on an Internet website, and shipped the puppies to buyers located around the country. She was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of eleven counts of animal cruelty. The main issue on appeal concerned the imposition of sentence, which included both consecutive terms of probation and a permanently prohibition from engaging in any commercial activity involving animals. The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions but concluded that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive periods of probation in conjunction with concurrent sentences. However, the court found that the trial court's permanent prohibition against her buying, selling, breeding, or engaging in any commercial activity involving animals was authorized by the animal cruelty statute. As the court stated, "Given this proof and the court's findings, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in ordering that the defendant be permanently barred from engaging in commercial activity with respect to dogs." |
Case |
| United States v. Carrano | 340 F.Supp.3d 388 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018) | 2018 WL 6314123 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018) | Defendant Thomas Carrano was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. In 2016, Carrano, who was president of the United Gamefowl Breeders Association (“NYUGBA”), became the subject of an investigation by NYPD officers, ASPCA agents, and USDA agents for suspected cockfighting activities. In that investigation, these officers eventually searched Carrano's property and seized extensive animal fighting paraphernalia, some of which was covered in chicken blood. Defendant was indicted on a single count of conspiring to violate the AWA and was subsequently convicted by jury. In this appeal, defendant contends that the government failed to prove he joined a conspiracy to violate the AWA and failed to prove the interstate commerce requirement for the conspiracy. Defendant argues that the "substantial evidence against him, including the training videos, the vitamin supplements, the gaffs and postizas, and the dubbed birds" are consistent with showing chickens at a poultry show, rather than cockfighting. The court noted that the jury made permissible inferences as to the evidence that were consistent with cockfighting, and that a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that judgment. In addition, Facebook and text messages from defendant evidence the furtherance of a conspiracy. While defendant contends that the government failed to prove that he actually engaged in cockfighting during the relevant time period, the court stated that the conspiracy charge only required sufficient evidence showing defendant agreed to deal in chickens for a fight through interstate commerce. The court also found defendant's argument as to a defect in the superseding indictment was waived and meritless. Even considering the substance of the argument, the court found proof that defendant's conduct impacted interstate commerce. The court also held that defendant failed to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new trial was denied. | Case |
| Evelyn Alexander Wildlife Rescue Ctr. Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation | Slip Copy, 2017 WL 4868956 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2017) | Petitioners, licensed wildlife rehabilitators with New York Wildlife Rehabilitation Licenses (WRL), challenged two statewide modifications to the WRL pertaining to white-tailed deer, which became effective in 2016. Petitioners contend these actions violated the state Administrative Procedures Act (SAPA). Additionally, they argue the modifications were irrational, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and WRLs were improperly modified without a prior State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The first modification limits the time white-tailed fawns can be held for rehabilitation to a period of only April 15 to September 15 (absent prior written approval). The second modification limits the maximum holding period for an adult white-tailed deer (before release or euthanization) to 48-hours. This court did not find either modification was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In response to the challenges, the state, through a wildlife biologist, contends they are intended to prevent habituation and the spread of chronic wasting disease (CWD). The explanatory statements provided for the modifications support reasonable and rational interpretations of rehabilitation and do not violate the SAPA. The September 15th cut-off day for fawns was based on scientific research conducted by the state's "Big Game Team" that sought to address issues of disease as well as "a documented pattern of licensed wildlife rehabilitators in New York who have been reluctant to either euthanize or release white-tailed deer." As to the modification for adult deer, there was a rational basis since that time period allows the care of a temporarily stunned deer in need of a short rehabilitation period balanced against disease and habituation concerns. The court also found that the issuance of WRL is a ministerial action exemption from environmental review under SEQRA. The petitions in this consolidated action were denied in their entirety and the proceeding dismissed. | Case |