Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK - Dangerous - Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 ("DWAA") | 1976 c. 38 |
The Dangerous Wild Animals Act ("DWAA") was originally enacted in 1976 and amended in 2010. The act ensures that individuals who keep wild animals do so in a way that minimizes the risk to the public. In particular, the act provides that no person may keep any dangerous wild animal except under the authority of a licence granted by a local authority. The local authority that holds the licence may enter the premises where the animal is being kept at all reasonable times to determine whether an offence has been committed in violation of the act. Zoos, circuses, and pet shops are exempt from the act. The act has an accompanying Schedule that specifies the kinds of dangerous wild animals for which a person must obtain a licence under the act. |
Statute | ||
| Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc. | 131 P.3d 1248 (Kan.App., 2006) | 2006 WL 908691 (Kan.App.), 35 Kan.App.2d 458 (2006) |
This Kansas case presents an issue of first impression as to the proper measure of damages recoverable for injury to a pet dog. The plaintiff's dog, a 13-year old dog of negligible market value, suffered a dislocated hip after being groomed at defendant's establishment. The appellate court found the lower court's award of damages based on the veterinary bills was proper where the bills were not disputed and represented an easily ascertainable measure. Specifically, the court held that when an injured pet dog with no discernable market value is restored to its previous health, the measure of damages may include, but is not limited to, the reasonable and customary cost of necessary veterinary care and treatment. The court was unconvinced by defendant's "hyperbolic" claim that such an award would lead to a floodgate of high-dollar litigation on behalf of animals with low market values. |
Case | |
| Taft v. Taft | 433 S.E.2d 667 (Ga.App.,1993) | 209 Ga.App. 499 (Ga.App.,1993) |
In this Georgia case, an adult son, who was business invitee, brought an action against his father to recover for injuries sustained when he was attacked by his father's bull while attempting to corral it for market. The lower court entered judgment for son, and father then appealed. The Court of Appeals, held that it for the jury to determine questions as to proximate cause, viciousness of bull, assumption of risk, superior or equal knowledge, contributory negligence, and negligence of the plaintiff. The failure of the trial court to charge adequately on proximate cause required a reversal, notwithstanding appellant's lack of a timely and proper request for a specific proximate cause charge. Judgment reversed.
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Case | |
| Colombia - Slaughter - LEY 9, 1979, Health Code | LEY 9, 1979 | This law lays out the general rules that are the basis for “the provisions and regulations necessary to preserve, restore and improve sanitary conditions in relation to human health. It also contains the procedures and measures that must be adopted for the regulation, legalization and control of the discharges of waste and materials that affect or may affect the sanitary conditions of the Environment.” In its Article 307, Ley 9 establishes that the slaughter of animals for human consumption can only be done in authorized slaughterhouses. | Statute | ||
| US - AWA - Animal Welfare; Transportation of Animals on Foreign Air Carriers | 2004 WL 724205 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-7738 |
There has been a regulation update where a decision has been made to regulate the transportation of animals in commerce to all foreign air carriers, to or from any point within the United States. If an animal is protected by the AWA, it will continue to be protected when being transported within or from the United States. This update essentially increases the level of protection that animals protected under the AWA will receive. |
Administrative | |
| US - Dogs at Large - Part 2. Resource Protection, Public Use and Recreation. § 2.15 Pets. | 36 C.F.R. § 2.15 | This rule outlines the prohibitions for pets in designated Park Service areas. Pets or feral animals that are running-at-large and observed by an authorized person in the act of killing, injuring or molesting humans, livestock, or wildlife may be destroyed if necessary for public safety or protection of wildlife, livestock, or other park resources. Pets that do not pose a direct risk to wildlife may be impounded. | Administrative | ||
| Balelo v. Baldridge | 724 F.2d 753 (1983) |
Defendants, secretary and government agencies, appealed the decision fo the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in favor of plaintiff captains invalidating an agency regulation pertaining to the taking and related acts incidental to commercial fishing. |
Case | ||
| RI - Vehicle - § 31-26-3.1. Duty to stop in accidents resulting in death or injury to domesticated animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 31-26-3.1 | RI ST § 31-26-3.1 | This Rhode Island statute states that the driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to a domesticated animal, shall immediately stop the vehicle and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver renders all possible assistance to the injured animal. The driver shall immediately and by the quickest means known, give notice of the accident to the owner of the animal or to a nearby office of local or state police. Any person failing to stop or comply with the requirements of this section shall upon be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00). | Statute | |
| Kuehl v. Sellner | 2016 WL 3429679 (unpublished) (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2016) | Five Plaintiffs Tracey K. Kuehl, Lisa K. Kuehl, Kris A. Bell, Nancy A. Harvey, John T. Braumann, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund filed a complaint against Defendants Pamela Sellner, Tom Sellner, and Cricket Hollow Zoo, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by holding captive endangered species specifically the lemurs and tigers housed at Cricket Hollow Zoo. The United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division ordered the Defendants, to transfer the lemurs and tigers in their possession “to an appropriate facility which is licensed by the USDA and is capable of meeting the needs of the endangered species.” The Defendants proposed transporting the lemurs to Special Memories Zoo in Hortonville, Wisconsin, and transporting the tigers to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center in Centerpoint, Indiana. The Plaintiffs claimed that the proposed placements did not comply with the Court's Order and proposed that the lemurs be placed with the Prosimian Sanctuary in Jacksonville, Florida, and the tigers be transported to the Wild Animal Sanctuary in Keenesburg, Colorado. The Court held that the Special Memories Zoo was capable of meeting the lemurs' needs and should be transported there as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that even if the Court found Special Memories incapable of meeting the lemurs' needs, the Prosimian Sanctuary as proposed by the Plaintiff's was not licensed by the USDA. The Court also held that the endangered tigers should be transferred to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that the center was capable of meeting of the needs of the tigers. Therefore the Court approved the Defendants' proposed placement of the lemurs and tigers. | Case |