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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | 33 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ass'n des Éleveurs de Cananards et D'oies du Quebec v. Bonta, 143 S. Ct. 2493, 216 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2023) | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. | Case | |
| TX - Fighting - § 42.10. Dog Fighting. | V. T. C. A., Penal Code § 42.10 | TX PENAL § 42.10 | Texas criminal statute that prohibits dog fighting. Actions ranging from causing a dog to fight with another to attending a dog fight as a spectator are prohibited. To constitute an offense, one must demonstrate the requisite intent of intentionally or knowingly. | Statute |
| VT - Endangered wildlife - Chapter 124. Trade in Covered Animal Parts or Products | 10 V.S.A. § 5501 - 5508 | VT ST T. 10 § 5501 - 5508 | This Vermont chapter, enacted in 2022, relates to the trade in certain animal products. Under the law, a person shall not purchase, sell, offer for sale, or possess with intent to sell any item that the person knows or should know is a covered animal part or product. A covered animal part includes certain big cat species, elephants, giraffes, hippopotamuses, mammoths, mastodons, pangolins, endangered rays, rhinoceroses, sea turtles, endangered sharks, certain whales, and certain ape species. Exceptions exist for activities authorized under federal law, parts with "antique status" as defined, among others. For a first offense, a person shall be assessed an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000.00 nor less than $400.00. | Statute |
| Posnien v. Rogers | 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975) |
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community. |
Case | |
| Archer v. State | 309 So. 3d 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) | 2020 WL 7409970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2020) | Defendant Tim Archer pleaded no contest to felony animal cruelty in Florida. Archer's dog Ponce apparently made a mess in Archer's house and, when Archer "disciplined" Ponce, the dog bit him, leading to Archer violently beating and stabbing the dog to death. Public outcry over mild punishment in the state for heinous acts of animal abuse led to "Ponce's Law," which enhanced penalties (although it did not retroactively apply to Archer). As a condition of Archer's plea agreement, both parties stipulated to a restriction on future ownership of animals as part of Archer's probation. On appeal here, Archer argues that the trial court erred in imposing these special conditions of probation. With regard to special condition 34 and 35, which prohibits him from owning any animal for the duration of his life and prohibits him from residing with anyone who owns a pet, Archer seeks clarification whether this prohibits him from residing with his ex-wife and children who own two cats, respectively. The court found that condition 35 would only be in effect for his three-year probationary term. Additionally, the court found condition 34 that imposes a lifetime ban on ownership exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction regardless of the open-ended language of Ponce's law. The animal restriction is not "a license to exceed the general rule that prohibits a court from imposing a probationary term beyond the statutorily permissible term, which in this case is five years." The case was remanded to the trial court to modify the conditions of probation to be coextensive with the probationary term. | Case |
| WI - Chickens, transport - 134.52. Shipment of chickens | W. S. A. 134.52 | WI ST 134.52 | This Wisconsin statute requires that poultry not be overcrowded and the shipping container must be at least 13 inches in high on the inside and covered at the top in a way that prevents the chickens from getting caught in the top. | Statute |
| PA - Ordinances - § 23144. To tax and destroy dogs | 53 P.S. § 23144 | PS ST 53 P.S. § 23144 | This briefly worded Pennsylvania statute presumably gives municipalities the authority "[t]o regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and to destroy dogs found at large contrary to any ordinance." | Statute |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE ANDHRA PRADESH PROHIBITION OF COW SLAUGHTER AND ANIMAL PRESERVATION ACT, 1977 | 11 of 1977 | The legislation, specific to the South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, prohibits the slaughter of cows and the calves of female buffaloes. Other animals may not be slaughtered without a certificate from a competent authority. Slaughter may be carried out only in specified places. Offences under the Act are punishable with imprisonment or fines. The law protects acts done in good faith under this Act or its rules. The Act provides for the establishment of institutions taking care of cows. | Statute | |
| RSPCA v O'Loughlan | [2007] SASC 113 |
The appellant, the RSPCA, relied on the fact that a horse, once in RSPCA care, had a significantly improved condition in comparison to that described as 'emaciated' while in the respondent's care. The respondent claimed that the horse's condition fluctuated depending on the presence of mares in heat during summer and that she had tried several changes to the feed to counter a loss in weight. On appeal, the appellate judge did not disturb the trial judge's finding and confirmed that the respondent's conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. |
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| Mangy Curs and Stoned Horses: Animal control in the District of Columbia from the beginnings to about 1940 |
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