Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AL - Sterilization - Chapter 9. Sterilization of Dogs and Cats. | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-9-1 to 4 | AL ST § 3-9-1 to 4 | These statutes require animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies to sterilize dogs and cats acquired from other animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies. For purposes of this statute, the term "sterilization" refers to the surgical removal of the reproductive organs of a dog or cat in order to render the animal unable to reproduce. Adoptive animals must be sterilized by a licensed veterinarian before the animal is released to the new owner, or the new owner must enter into a written agreement with the facility certifying that sterilization will be performed by a licensed veterinarian within 30 days after acquisition of the animal or within 30 days of the sexual maturity of the animal. | Statute |
| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) | 286 Ga.App. 235 (2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
Case |
| American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus | 317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003) | 55 ERC 1904, 354 U.S.App.D.C. 432 |
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits. |
Case |
| Cantore v. Costantine | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 7560690 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2023) | No. 2022-00077, 622356/19, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 05708 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Nov. 15, 2023) | This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted. | Case |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE WEST BENGAL ANIMAL SLAUGHTER CONTROL ACT, 1950 | 22 of 1950 | The law, specific to the state of West Bengal, regulates the slaughter of bulls, bullocks, cows, calves, male and female buffaloes, buffalo calves and castrated buffaloes. Persons may not slaughter these animals without a certificate stating that the animal is over fourteen years of age and unfit for work or breeding, or that the animal has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or incurable disease. Animals under this Act may be slaughtered only in specific places. | Statute | |
| Knaust v. Digesualdo | 589 Fed.Appx. 698 (5th Cir. 2014) | Appellant operated a USDA-licensed exotic animal business in Texas. In February 2010, a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service agent visited the business on a routine inspection and cited Appellant for several USDA regulation violations. After several subsequent inspections, several other violations were discovered and Appellant was presented with a Notice of Intent to Confiscate Animals. The next day, the animals were confiscated. Using Bivens, Appellant argued the agents violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by (1) seizing her property without providing a method for challenging the seizure and (2) not allowing sufficient time to cure the cited violations prior to seizing her property. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because the Appellant failed to assert factual allegations showing how each defendant, by his or her own individual acts, violated her constitutional rights. | Case | |
| CA - Slaughter - § 599f. Nonambulatory animals; slaughter houses, stockyards, auctions, market agencies, or dealers; transaction | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 599f | CA PENAL § 599f | As used in this section, "nonambulatory" means unable to stand and walk without assistance. This statute prohibits a slaughterhouse that is not inspected by the United States Department of Agriculture, stockyard, or auction shall buy, sell, or receive a nonambulatory animal. Effective July 2008, the law also states that no slaughterhouse shall sell meat from non-ambulatory animals for human consumption. The penalty was also increased from an unspecified misdemeanor to a penalty of up to one year in jail or a fine of up to $20,000 or both. | Statute |
| EU - Farming - 78/923/EEC: Council Decision of 19 June 1978 concerning the conclusion of the European Convention for the protect | 78/923/EEC |
This EU council decision approves the European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes on behalf of the European Economic Community. It has the aim of protecting animals kept for farming purposes, particularly in modem intensive production systems. |
Statute | |
| Robinson v. U.S. | 718 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1983) |
Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that a cease and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future. |
Case | |
| Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr. | 322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11) | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11) |
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules. |
Case |