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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
Larry BARD et al., Appellants, v. Reinhardt JAHNKE, Individually And Doing Business as Hemlock Valley Farms, Respondent, et al., Defendant. 848 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y., 2006) 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03440, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 2006 WL 1148098 (N.Y.)

The accident underlying this litigation occurred on a dairy farm owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, arrived at the farm to meet defendant John Timer, another self-employed carpenter to repair of the dairy barn. While working, Bard was seriously injured by a bull. Bard, with his wife suing derivatively, commenced an action against both Jahnke and Timer to recover damages for his personal injuries, alleging causes of action sounding in strict liability and negligence. In affirming the Appellate Division's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, this court found that Jahnke was not liable for Bard's injuries unless he knew or should have known of the bull's vicious or violent propensities. The Court noted that the record contained no such evidence.

Case
Wrinkle v. Norman 242 P.3d 1216 (Kan. App., 2010) 2010 WL 4539371 (Kan.App.,2010), 44 Kan.App.2d 950 (2010)

Wrinkle filed a negligence action against his neighbors (the Normans) after he sustained injuries on thier property. The injuries stemmed from an incident where Wrinkle was trying to herd cattle he thought belonged to the Normans back into a pen on the Normans' property. The lower court granted the Normans' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, this court found that the question comes down to Wrinkle's status (invitee, licensee, or trespasser) to determine the duty owed by the Normans. This Court found that the district court properly determined that Wrinkle was a trespasser. Finally, the court addressed the K.S.A. 47-123 claim as to whether the Normans are liable for their cattle running at large. The court found that Wrinkle could not meet the burden under the statute.

Case
US - Wolf - Reinstatement of Protections for the Gray Wolf in the Western Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains FWS–R6–ES–2008–008; 92220–1113–0000; C6

Reinstates the listing of the Western Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains gray wolf populations in accordance with court orders.

Administrative
In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER 48 N.E.3d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct., 2015)

In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights.

Case
Swanson v. Tackling 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. Case
NE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 10) Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1001 - 1020 NE ST § 28-1001 to 1020 This Nebraska statutory section comprises the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty provision provides that a person who abandons or cruelly neglects an animal is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. Intentional animal cruelty results in a Class I misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class IV felony for any subsequent offense, unless such cruel mistreatment involves the knowing and intentional torture, repeated beating, or mutilation of the animal where such an act automatically results in a Class IV felony. Animal means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, but does not include an uncaptured wild creature (which appears to exclude otherwise heinous, intentional acts to wildlife). Statute
KY - Impound - Chapter 258. Animal Control and Protection. KRS § 258.215 KY ST § 258.215 This Kentucky statute provides that peace officers, dog wardens, or animal control officers shall seize and impound any dog which does not bear a proper license tag or other legible identification which is found running at large. Interestingly, if an officer after diligent effort to do so, should fail to seize the dog, it is his or her duty to destroy the dog by any reasonable and humane means. The statute specifically exempts actively engaged hunting dogs from the "loose dog" prohibition. Statute
Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Lenoir County SPCA, Inc. 168 N.C. App. 298, 607 S.E.2d 317 aff'd on other grounds, 360 N.C. 48, 619 S.E.2d 494 (2005) 2005 WL 221226 (N.C. 2005)

An animal control facility's practice of euthanizing feral cats without holding them for 72 hours was challenged by a non-profit organization.  The animal control facility's method for determining if a cat is feral consisted only of poking the animal and gaging its reaction.  The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Case
Pet Fair, Inc. v. Humane Society of Greater Miami 583 So.2d 407 (Fl. 1991) 16 Fla. L. Weekly D1986 (1991) The owner of allegedly neglected or mistreated domestic animals that were seized by police could not be required to pay for costs of animals' care after it was determined that owner was in fact able to adequately provide for the animals, and after the owner declined to re-possess the animals. The Humane Society can require an owner to pay it costs associated with caring for an animal if the owner re-claims the animal, but not if the animal is adopted out to a third party.
Case
IL - Restaurant - 5/11-20-14. Companion dogs; restaurants 65 ILCS 5/11-20-14 IL ST CH 65 § 5/11-20-14 This law provides that a municipality with a population of 1,000,000 or more may, by ordinance, authorize the presence of companion dogs in outdoor areas of restaurants where food is served, if the ordinance provides for adequate controls to ensure compliance with other Illinois health laws. An ordinance enacted under this Section shall provide that: (i) no companion dog shall be present in the interior of any restaurant or in any area where food is prepared; and (ii) the restaurant shall have the right to refuse to serve the owner of a companion dog if the owner fails to exercise reasonable control over the companion dog or the companion dog is otherwise behaving in a manner that compromises or threatens to compromise the health or safety of any person present in the restaurant. Under this law, "companion dog" means a dog other than one who is assisting a person with disability. Statute

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