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Displaying 6631 - 6640 of 6649
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AL - Hunting - Article 8A. Interference with Legal Hunting or Fishing. | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-270 - 275 | AL ST § 9-11-270 to 275 | This section of law reflects Alabama's hunter harassment provisions. Under the section, no person shall willfully and knowingly prevent, obstruct, impede, disturb, or interfere with, or attempt to prevent, obstruct, impede, disturb, or interfere with any person who is legally hunting or fishing. Prohibited activities include creating a visual, aural, olfactory, or physical stimulus intended to affect the natural behavior of the wild animal being hunted or fish for the purpose of fishing, or affecting the condition or location of personal property intended for use in the hunting or fishing. Any person violating this article is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| PetConnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas | Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2020 WL 2832468 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) | No. 20-CV-00527-H-KSC (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) | PetConnect Rescue, Inc., Lucky Pup Dog Rescue.com and Sarah Gonzalez (“Plaintiffs”) alleged that the Defendants fraudulently represented dogs that the Defendants sold as rescue animals in order to circumvent California law prohibiting the sale of non-rescue dogs in pet stores. On April 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the Defendants alleging trademark infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act, unfair business practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), fraud, and accounting. Several Defendant filed motions to dismiss and to strike sections of the amended complaint. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that Plaintiff PetConnect alleged a cognizable injury in fact in that the Defendants’ use of an infringing mark harmed Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue’s reputation and caused consumer confusion. The Defendants’ Pet Connect Rescue, Inc. brokered the sale of dogs from puppy mills rather than rescue dogs which affected Plaintiff PetConnect’s reputation. The Court also found that Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue raised a claim within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests because the Lanham Act’s protections extended to non-profit organizations’ use of marks, even when those marks do not accompany a sale. The Court refused to dismiss Plaintiffs claims regarding trademark infringement. The Court also refused to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims under the Lanham Act because the matter of whether Plaintiff’s mark was distinct and had acquired a secondary meaning was a matter more appropriate when the evidentiary record becomes further developed. As for the Unfair Competition claim, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a UCL violation. The Court subsequently rejected the Defendants’ motions to strike thirty-four lines or phrases from the amended complaint because Plaintiff’s use of the terms “puppy mill,” and the allegations that Defendants operate “fake” entities that “induce” purchases, reflected Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. The Court found that the Plaintiffs’ references were pertinent to the Plaintiff’s allegations. The Court ultimately denied each of the Defendant’s motions to dismiss and strike. | Case | |
| CA - Service Animal - § 600. Horses or dogs used by peace officers or volunteers; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 600 | CA PENAL § 600 | This statute makes it an offense to willfully, maliciously and with no legal justification harm, injure, obstruct, or interfere with a horse or dog under the supervision of law enforcement in the discharge of official duties or a volunteer under the direct supervision of a peace officer. Violations are punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Punishment depends on the seriousness of the injury to the animal. Upon conviction, a defendant must also pay restitution for damages. | Statute | |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton | 240 F.Supp.2d 1090 (D.Ariz. 2003) |
This lawsuit arises out of the Fish and Wildlife Service's ("FWS") designation of approximately 30% of the critical habitat originally proposed for the Mexican spotted owl (Strix occidentalis lucida ) under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). In analyzing the FWS's decision under both the standard of review for the APA and the deference afforded by the Chevron standard, the court found that the FWS's interpretation of "critical habitat" was "nonsensical." It is not determinative whether the habitat requires special management, but, pursuant to the ESA, it is whether the habitat is "essential to the conservation of the species" and special management of that habitat is possibly necessary. Thus, defendant's interpretation of the ESA received no deference by the court and the court found defendant's application of the ESA unlawful, as Defendant and FWS have been repeatedly told by federal courts that the existence of other habitat protections does not relieve Defendant from designating critical habitat. The court found that the FWS's Final Rule violated both the ESA and the APA in implementing its regulations. |
Case | ||
| EU - Transport - Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 of 25 June 1997 concerning Community criteria for staging points | Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 |
The European Union lays down common criteria applicable to control posts (or "staging points") at which animals must be unloaded during long journeys. These rules are designed to ensure the health and welfare of the animals during such stops. |
Statute | ||
| LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, LLC | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3538951 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2019) | No. 1:18-CV-00384-BLW | Plaintiffs, Robert and Iva LaRosa filed this action in August of 2018, alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The Court dismissed the complaint and the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The Plaintiffs had applied to live at River Quarry Apartments in August of 2017. They requested a reasonable accommodation to keep their dog at the apartment without paying a fee. The Plaintiffs provided a copy of a note from a nurse practitioner stating that the companion dog helps manage Mr. LaRosa’s post-traumatic stress disorder. The Plaintiffs were approved for the apartment but told that their reasonable accommodation request was still being processed and received forms to fill out regarding the reasonable accommodation. River Quarry required Mr. LaRose’s doctor to fill out a form verifying the need for an assistance animal. Rather than completing the form, the plaintiffs provided a letter from Mr. LaRosa’s primary care physician which stated that in the doctor’s opinion, an emotional support animal would help mitigate the symptoms that Mr. LaRose was experiencing. River Quarry insisted on speaking with Mr. LaRose’s doctor directly to verify the information that the plaintiffs had given. After Kirk Cullimore, an attorney on behalf of River Quarry, spoke with the doctor, River Quarry wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs denying their request for a reasonable accommodation stating that the doctor declined to verify that Mr. LaRosa met the two prong test that one must be handicapped and there must be a nexus between the handicap and the need for the animal. Soon after this, Mr. LaRosa saw his primary care physician and had the actual form completed by his doctor and turned it in to River Quarry. Kirk Cullimore believed that the doctor’s signature on the form was forged and called Mr. LaRose’s doctor to speak with him again. The doctor’s secretary informed Cullimore that the signature was genuine. Mr. and Mrs. LaRosa argued that they were injured by the discrimination of the Defendants in violation of the FHA. The Court denied the Plaintiffs claim under the FHA because they did not sufficiently allege that the Defendants refused to make the requested accommodation. River Quarry allowed the dog to stay in the apartment while their request for an accommodation was reviewed. The Court stated that housing providers are granted a meaningful opportunity to investigate a request for an accommodation. Housing providers do not have to immediately approve a request for an accommodation right away. River Quarry ended up approving the request within 45 days after the initial request. The Court held that this was not an unreasonable delay considering that River Quarry did not have sufficient information to make a determination until after Mr. LaRosa’s doctor completed the verification form. Prior to that the doctor’s letter and the phone call between Cullimore and the doctor did not reveal enough information for River Quarry to make a determination on the accommodation. The Plaintiffs, however, succeeded on their interference claim. The LaRosas were engaged in a protected activity when they applied for a reasonable accommodation and they sufficiently alleged that they were subjected to adverse action and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. The Defendants misrepresented the contents of Mr. Cullimore and Mr. LaRosa’s doctor’s conversation. The Court ultimately denied in part and granted in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss claims against Kirk Cullimore and his law office. | Case | |
| US - Air travel, service animals - Guidance Concerning the Carriage of Service Animals in Air Transportation Into the United Kingdom | 2007 WL 555627 (F.R.) | FR Doc. E7-3195 |
This notice publishes guidance concerning the carriage of service animals in air transportation from the United States (U.S.) to the United Kingdom (U.K.). These guidelines address the differences between U.K. laws regulating the transport of service animals on flights into the U.K. and U.S. law with respect to the carriage of service animals in air transportation. U.K. laws affecting the transport of service animals in air travel differ significantly from the requirements of the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 41705, and its implementing regulation in 14 CFR Part 382, resulting in uncertainty for carriers and persons with disabilities about the requirements that apply on flights into or transiting the U.K.
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Administrative | |
| Gonzalez v. Royalton Equine Veterinary Services, P.C. | 7 N.Y.S.3d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03632 | Veterinarian contacted State Police after allegedly observing deplorable conditions in Plaintiff's barn. The premises were subsequently searched, and a horse and three dogs were removed and later adopted. Plaintiff commenced an action in City Court for, inter alia, replevin, and several defendants asserted counterclaims based on Lien Law § 183. The Lockport City Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of owner and ordered return of animals. On appeal, the Niagara County Court, reversed and remanded. Owner appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York. The Court found the Niagara County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. (SPCA) was not required to bring a forfeiture action to divest Plaintiff of ownership of the seized animals because the animals were kept in unhealthful or unsanitary surroundings, the plaintiff was not properly caring for them, and the plaintiff failed to redeem the animals within five days before the SPCA was authorized to make the animals available for adoption. The city court’s order was affirmed as modified. | Case | |
| Tunisia - Cruelty - Animal Transport (in French) | Journal officiel de la République tunisienne nº 6, 19 janvier 2007, p. 189 à 191. | This Order, in French, establishes the technical and sanitary requirements for the transport of animals subject to the procedures of identification. These conditions are designed to ensure the comfort of the animal. | Statute | ||
| AZ - Pet Trusts - Honorary trusts; trusts | A. R. S. § 14-2907; A. R. S. § 14-10408 | AZ ST § 14-2907; AZ ST § 14-10408 | This Arizona statute allows for the creation of a trust for a designated domestic or pet animal, and must be performed in 21 years or less. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust; the remaining property is distributed according to statute and cannot be converted by the trustee. | Statute |