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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
People v. Arcidicono 75 Misc. 2d 294 ((N.Y.Dist.Ct. 1973) 347 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y.Dist.Ct. 1973)

The court held the bailee of a horse liable for failing to provide necessary sustenance to the horse, even though the owner of the horses had refused to pay for the necessary feed.  

Case
Gilreath v. Smith 797 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App., 2017) 340 Ga. App. 265, 2017 WL 660590 (Ga. Ct. App., 2017)

While pet sitting for Defendants Bruce and Jodi Smith, Plaintiff Josephine Gilreath was attacked and injured by the Smiths' rooster, which caused a serious infection with long-term consequences. Plaintiff Gilreath filed suit, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the ground that Gilreath assumed the risk. Gilreath appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and reasoned that Gilreath assumed the risk of injury based on the state statutes of owners of land under OCGA § 51-3-1, as keepers of a vicious or dangerous animal under OCGA § 51-2-7, and as required by a Roswell city ordinance. The Court reasoned that at prior pet-sittings at the Defendants home, Gilreath had been warned that the rooster would attack and that a garbage can lid was useful for controlling the rooster. Second, Gilreath has not raised an issue of fact regarding whether the Smiths had superior knowledge of the risks associated with the danger. Gilreath, a professional pet sitter with at least nine years of experience, admitted that she had a responsibility to educate herself about the animals she takes care of yet she failed to do so for roosters. Third, Gilreath admitted that she chose to take the job knowing that she had been told that the rooster would attack. Gilreath also contends that the Smiths violated a Roswell city ordinance, but she failed to introduce a certified copy of the ordinance and thus failed to prove this claim.

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VA - Liens - § 43–32 Lien of keeper of livery stable, marina, etc. Va. Code Ann. § 43-32 VA Code Ann. § 43-32 Every keeper of a livery stable, hangar, tie-down, or marina, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses or other animals, boats, aircrafts, or harness, will have a lien for the amount that would be due for towing, storage, recovery, keeping, supporting, and care. The lien will be removed once the amount is paid. Statute
Habitat for Horses v. Salazar 745 F.Supp.2d 438 (S.D.N.Y., 2010) 2010 WL 4151863 (S.D.N.Y.)

Prior to October 2010, the North Piceance Herd Area served as a home to approximately 60 wild horses. The horses, however, were removed by the BLM, giving rise to this litigation. Plaintiffs assert that the BLM’s decision to remove the wild horses violates the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, NEPA, the Information Quality Act, and the FLPMA. The District Court concluded that, while Plaintiffs did establish irreparable harm, they were not likely to succeed on the merits.

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NE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws Neb. Rev. St § 14-102; § 15-218 - 220; § 16-206; 16-235; § 17-526, 17-547; § 25-21,236; § 37-525; § 37-705; § 54-601 - 616; § 54-617 - 624; § 54-625 - 650; § 71-4401 - 4412 NE ST § 14-102; § 15-218 - 220; § 16-206; 16-235; § 17-526, 17-547; § 25-21,236; § 37-525; § 37-705; § 54-601 - 616; § 54-617 - 624; § 54-625 - 650; § 71-4401 - 4412 These Nebraska statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include the municipal authority to regulate dogs at large and licensing, rabies control, and dangerous dog laws. The set of laws relating to commercial pet dealers and breeders is also provided. Statute
Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska App., 2007) 2007 WL 2965781 (Alaska App.)

Krystal R. Allen pleaded no contest to two counts of cruelty to animals after animal control officers came to her home and found 180 to 200 cats, 3 dogs, 13 birds, and 3 chickens in deplorable conditions. She was sentenced to a 30-day jail term and was placed on probation for 10 years. One of the conditions of Allen's probation prohibits her from possessing any animals other than her son's dog. In first deciding that its jurisdictional reach extends to claims not just based on the term of imprisonment, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by restricting Allen's possession of animals during the term of her probation.  

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KY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes KRS § 525.125 - 137; KRS § 436.600 - 610 KY ST § 525.125 - 137; KY ST § 436.600 - .610 These Kentucky statutes represent the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Under the law, animal cruelty in the first-degree (a class D felony) occurs when a person causes four-legged animals to fight for pleasure or profit. Exclusions under this section include, among others, the killing of animals when hunting, fishing, or trapping; as incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes; or for veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes. Statute
MN - Hospitals and pets - § 144A.30. Pets in nursing homes M.S.A. § 144A.30 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144A.30 (West) This Minnesota statute states that animal nursing homes must be "reasonable" in their care, type, and maintenance of pets. Statute
Velzen v. Grand Valley State University 902 F.Supp.2d 1038(W.D. Mich. 2012) On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff and the Fair Housing Center of West Michigan (“FHCWM”) brought suit against Defendants, a university, alleging unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Federal Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), for denying Plaintiff’s request to keep an emotional support animal in on-campus housing. All claims brought against the individual defendants were brought against them in their official capacities as university administrators. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive and compensatory relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court decided the following would be dismissed: (1) all claims under the PWDCRA against all defendants; (2) all claims for compensatory damages under the FHA brought against all defendants; (3) all claims for injunctive relief under the FHA brought against the institutional defendants; (4) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by the FHCWM; and (5) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by Plaintiff that depended on disparate treatment. The following claims remained: (1) Plaintiff and the FHCWM's claims under the FHA seeking injunctive relief from the individual defendants; and (2) Plaintiff's claims against all defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the failure to accommodate theory. Case
UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Young 380 F.Supp.2d 1166 (2005, D.Hawai'i) 2005 WL 1907675 (D.Hawai'i)

Some parasail operators brought an action against state officials challenging validity of a state law that banned parasailing in navigable waters. Defendants argued that the court's order should be reconsidered in light of an intervening change in federal law that they say allows for the seasonal parasailing ban.  After vacation of summary judgment in favor of operators, 2005 WL 1910497, the state moved for relieve from final judgment.  The District Court held that the federal law permitting Hawaii to enforce state laws regulating recreational vessels for purpose of conserving and managing humpback whales did not violate separation of powers doctrine, and federal law did not violate Equal Protection Clause.

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