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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ley N° 371 de 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Law 371, 2023 | Ley 371, enacted in March 2023, is the law by which Panama promotes the conservation and protection of Sea Turtles and their habitat. Relying on Law 287, 2022 (which recognized Nature as a subject of Rights), this law recognizes sea turtles are subjects of rights in Panama. More specifically, Article 29, "Protection of the Rights of Turtles and their Habitat," establishes that sea turtles have "the right to live and have free passage in a healthy environment, free of pollution and other anthropocentric impacts that cause physical damage and damage to their health, such as climate change, contamination incidental capture, coastal development, and unregulated tourism, among others." | Statute |
| Houk v. State | 316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) | Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty). | Case |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. | M. C. L. A. 750.51 | MI ST 750.51 | This Michigan law provides that no railroad company shall permit the confinement of animals in railroad cars for longer than 36 consecutive hours without unloading for rest, water, and feeding of at least 5 consecutive hours unless prevented by a storm, or other "accidental causes." Any company, owner or custodian of such animals, who does not comply with the provisions of this section, can be fined between $100 and $500 for each and every such offense. However, when animals are carried in cars where they have proper food, water, space and opportunity for rest, the provisions of this section that require unloading do not apply. | Statute |
| Keith v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture | 116 A.3d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 2214849 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2015) | This case focuses on the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's preliminary objection that Petitioners' had taxpayer standing to request injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that regulations promulgated by the Department were in conflict with the mandates set forth in the Pennsylvania Dog Law Act. Petitioners asserted that the Department was not authorized to exempt nursing mothers from the statutory ban on metal strand flooring and from the statutory requirement of unfettered access to exercise areas. Department argued that Petitioners had not pled sufficient facts to show that those directly and immediately affected by the regulations were beneficially affected. The court found Petitioners were at least as well inclined and situated as any other entities to challenge regulations that might be in conflict with those provisions. The court therefore overruled the Department's preliminary objections to Petitioners' standing. | Case |
| HI - Endangered Species - Chapter 195D. Conservation of Aquatic Life, Wildlife, and Land Plants | H R S § 195D-1 - 32 | HI ST § 195D-1 to 32 | Hawaii endangered species law prohibits any taking, transport or commerce in designated species. It further outlines conservation programs that mandate continued research on listed species. Broad arrest and search and seizure provisions are given to law enforcement officials to enforce these acts. Violation of the regulations result in a misdemeanor conviction with both criminal fines and administrative fines that graduate for subsequent convictions. | Statute |
| Bailey v. Veitch | 814 N.Y.S.2d 459 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2006) | 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03192 |
In this New York memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that fact issues remained as to whether injuries sustained by child were caused by dog, and whether defendants knew or should have known of dog's vicious propensities. At the time of the alleged bite, the four-year-old child was alone in a room with the dog and sustained a gaping laceration on her nose and multiple puncture wounds on her face. The court also determined there was an issue of fact as to whether the dog previously displayed vicious tendencies where the dog bit its owner's grandson on the hand two weeks prior to the instant incident. |
Case |
| Sri Lanka - Cruelty - Chapter 573 Cruelty to Animals (English) | Ordinances Nos 13 of 1907, 19 of 1912, 43 of 1917, Y of 1919, 33 of 1921, 16 of 1927, 17 of 1970, 12 of 1945, 22 of 1955 | This Ordinance, in English, details Sri Lanka's animal cruelty laws. It also provides provisions for starving animals, using disabled or ill animals for labor, killing animals with unnecessary cruelty, and permitting diseased animals to die in the street. This ordinance also gives the Minister the power to appoint infirmaries to treat and care for animals that are the victims of offenses committed under this ordinance; the owner of the animal is liable for the cost of caring for the infirmed animal. Any Magistrate, Superintendent, or Assistant Superintendent of Police, Judge of primary Court or the divisional Assistant Government Agent of a division may direct the immediate destruction of an animal who was a victim of an offense if in that person's opinion the animal's sufferings are such as to render such a direction proper. Offenders shall be fined or jailed depending on the seriousness of the offence. | Statute | |
| ID - Ordinances - § 50-319. Animals at large--Regulation | I.C. § 50-319 | ID ST § 50-319 | This Idaho law gives the authority to the mayor and city council to do things like regulate the running at large of domesticated animals, to impound animals running at large, and to manage pounds for such animals. | Statute |
| ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, SHY 38, INC. & HOPE SANCTUARY, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA KELLY & DEREK SCHMIDT, Defendants | Slip Copy, No. CV 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), Center for Food Safety (“CFS”), Shy 38, Inc. and Hope Sanctuary are interest groups that aim to protect and advocate for animals and the environment. These interest groups filed suit on December 4, 2018 against the Governor and Attorney General of Kansas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act was unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime to damage or destroy an animal facility or an animal, exercise control over an animal facility or animal from a facility, take photos or videos at an animal facility that that is not open to the public, and remain at an animal facility against the owner’s wishes. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ALDF desired to conduct an undercover investigation in Kansas but refrained from doing so out of fear of criminal prosecution under the Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. To be subject to criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 47-1827, the ALDF investigator had to cause physical damage to an animal or the animal facility or its property. The Plaintiffs did not allege that the ALDF investigator intended to cause such physical damage so the ALDF investigator was not at risk of criminal prosecution under the provision and, therefore, ALDF did not demonstrate standing to challenge subsection (a). ALDF alleged sufficient injury to support standing to challenge subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. CFS, Shy 38, and Hope Sanctuary also had standing to challenge those subsections. The Court found that subsections (b), (c), and (d) regulated speech rather than conduct and was content-based rather than neutral-based. The Court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that subsections (b), (c), and (d) violated the First Amendment. The Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their lack of standing claim for subsection (a) and K.S.A. 47-1828. | Case | |
| LA - Leash - Chapter 18. Animals Running at Large | LSA-R.S. 3:2771 | This Louisiana law states that no person shall permit any dog in his or her possession to run at large on any unenclosed land, or trespass upon any enclosed or unenclosed lands of another. | Statute |