Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Mallis | 964 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio App. 7 Dist.,2011) | 196 Ohio App.3d 640 (2011); Ohio- 4752 |
Appellant, Cheryl Mallis, appealed the judgment of the Youngstown Municipal Court convicting her on one count of failure to confine a vicious dog and one count of failure to confine a dog. She was originally charged with two counts of violating the vicious-dog statute, R.C. 955.22(D)(1), and she moved to have those charges dismissed prior to trial. The motion was overruled, and appellant now challenges that ruling on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the state could not prosecute the dog owner for failure to confine a vicious dog under the vicious dog statute since the statute had previously been declared by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional on its face and had not been amended or modified thereafter. |
Case |
| Daul v. Meckus | 897 F. Supp 606 (D.C. 1995) |
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has brought this Bivens action seeking to hold government agents liable in their individual capacities for alleged constitutional violations under the AWA. Plaintiff lost his Class A license of a dealer under the AWA, due to failure to submit the required license fee and annual report. The court held that, even construing plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, Mr. Daul appears merely to allege without proof that each of these defendants exceeded the scope of his authority. Thus, plaintiff's conclusory allegations failed to show that any defendant violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right. The named defendants from the USDA were also granted both absolute and qualified immunity in the decision. |
Case | |
| SD - Vehicle - 41-1-5.7. Disposition of deer and antelope killed by motor vehicle | S D C L § 41-1-5.7 | SD ST § 41-1-5.7 | This South Dakota statute states that if any deer or antelope is killed by a motor vehicle on a public highway, the person who desires to possess that animal shall notify a conservation officer. The conservation officer may give a dated and written authorization allowing possession of the animal at no fee. However, no part of an animal so obtained may be sold, bartered, or traded. | Statute |
| RI - Dogs at campgrounds, beaches - § 42-17.1-45. No prohibition on pets | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 42-17.1-45 | RI ST § 42-17.1-45 | This law provides that the Department of Environmental Management shall not promulgate or enforce any rule or regulation that would prohibit a pet dog or cat from accompanying its owner or caretaker at any state owned campground. | Statute |
| NM - Impound - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-17 | NM ST § 77-1-17 | This New Mexico statute provides that the owner or operator of a veterinary clinic or hospital, a doctor of veterinary medicine, a kennel, grooming parlor or other animal care facility is not liable for disposing of abandoned animals after proper notice has been sent to the owner of record. | Statute |
| ME - Domestic Violence- Title 19-A. Domestic Relations. | 19-A M. R. S. A. § 4108 - 4110 (formerly 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 4006, 4007) | ME ST T. 19-A §§ 4108 - 4110 (formerly ME ST T. 19-A §§ 4006, 4007) | This Maine law concerning personal protection orders in cases of abuse was amended in March of 2006 to include companion animals in protection orders. The new language specifies that a court may enter an order directing the care, custody or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household. In 2013, the statute was amended to allow the court to enter an order directing the defendant to refrain from injuring or threatening to injure any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household. | Statute |
| Altieri v. Nanavati | 573 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super., 1990) | 41 Conn.Supp. 317 (1990) |
This is an action against a veterinarian for negligence, claiming that the defendant performed unwanted sterilization surgery on the plaintiff's dog, a Lhasa Apso. The court held that there is also a question of fact regarding whether performing an unwanted operation on the dog is, under the circumstances, actionable as reckless conduct. However, the court observed that, at the time of the trial it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will be able to recover, as an element of damages, any alleged emotional distress they may have experienced as a result of the surgery on their dog. |
Case |
| Beck v. Cornell University | 42 A.D.3d 609 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2007) | 2007 WL 1931363 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 839 N.Y.S.2d 575 |
Plaintiff was a temporary employee in the dairy barns at defendant's Animal Science Teaching and Research Center, where a population of feral cats had been living. The Center had previously cared for the cats, but adopted a new policy to reduce the population for health and safety reasons. Despite the Center's directions not to feed the cats, the plaintiff continued to feed the cats with his own cat food and was fired. Plaintiff brought a suit for negligence and prima facie tort, which Supreme Court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and the appellate court affirmed. |
Case |
| Stephens v. Target Corp. | 482 F.Supp.2d 1234 (2007) |
Lamp owners sued the lamp’s manufacturer and seller under Washington Products Liability Act, alleging that lamp caused a fire that injured their dog. The District Court held that Plaintiffs could not recover damages for emotional harm arising from injury to their dog. The appropriate measure of damages for personal property is market value, but if it has none, then the value to the owner is the proper measure. Plaintiffs' recovery was limited to the actual or intrinsic value of the dog. |
Case | |
| Salazar v. Kubic | 370 P.3d 342 (Col. Ct. App. Div. VI, 2015) | 2015 WL 5895438 (Col. Ct. App. Div. VI); 2015 COA 148 | At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed. | Case |