Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Allen v. Camp | 70 So. 290 (Ala.App. 1915) | 14 Ala.App. 341 (1915) |
Defendant shot and killed Plaintiff's dog, which had bitten Defendant's daughter several days earlier, for the purpose of sending the dog's head to a laboratory for examination for rabies. The Court of Appeals of Alabama found that Plaintiff's wife's injuries were too remote to be compensable, when the wife was not home at the time of the incident and became excited and hysterical upon hearing of the incident several hours later. The Appeals Court also held that although one may protect himself or his family from injury by a dog or other animal when on his own private property or on public property, the destruction of an animal is wrongful when the danger of attack and subsequent injury by that animal no longer exists, and where the animal is not trespassing. |
Case |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 598d. Sale of horsemeat for human consumption | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598d | CA PENAL § 598d |
This statute prohibits the sale of horsemeat for human consumption. No restaurant, cafe, or other public eating place may offer horsemeat for sale for human consumption. A first time violation is a misdemeanor. |
Statute |
| CR - Welfare - BIENESTAR DE LOS ANIMALES (Law 7451 on Animal Welfare) | Law 7451 |
(Text in Spanish). The law that regulates animal welfare in Costa Rica; its terms are based on the results of the OIE conference in Australia in 1994. |
Statute | |
| American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Lyng | 681 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.,1988) |
This case resulted from a remand by the Court of Appeals after the USDA denied the plaintiff's application for additional rulemaking for the Horse Protection Act to expressly prohibit the use of ten ounce chains and padded shoes in the training of show horses. The use of these materials, argues plaintiff, constitutes soring (the act of deliberately injuring a horse's hooves to obtain a particular type of gait prized at certain horse shows. The object of soring is to cause a horse to suffer pain as its feet touch the ground). This Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, it directed the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture to institute rulemaking procedures concerning the use of action devices on show horses. The Court further held that the existing regulations are contrary to law and that the Secretary ignored his mandate from Congress under the Horse Protection Act. |
Case | |
| OK - Initiative - State Question No. 742 (2008) (Constitutional Right to Hunt) | State Question No. 742 (2008) (Constitutional Right to Hunt) | Oklahoma Question 742 would add a new section to the State Constitution. It gives all people of this state the right to hunt, trap, fish and take game and fish. Such activities would be subject to reasonable regulation. It allows the Wildlife Conservation Commission to approve methods and procedures for hunting, trapping, fishing and taking of game and fish. It allows for taking game and fish by traditional means, and makes hunting, fishing, and trapping the preferred means to manage certain game and fish. The measure was approved by a margin of 80% to 20%. | Statute | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Dyer | 2009 WL 484438 (D.Idaho) |
The plaintiff, Western Watersheds Project (WWP), is an environmental group that brought this lawsuit to ban livestock grazing in certain areas of the Jarbidge Field Office (1.4 million acres of public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management in Idaho and northern Nevada). WWP alleges that continued grazing destroys what little habitat remains for imperiled species like the sage grouse, pygmy rabbit, and slickspot peppergrass (deemed “sensitive species” by the BLM). After ten days of evidentiary hearings, the court found that three sensitive species in the JFO are in serious decline and that livestock grazing is an important factor in that decline. However, the court found that a ban on grazing was not required by law at this point since the Court was "confident" in the BLM's ability to modify the 2009 season in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the existing RMP. |
Case | |
| US - AWA - Animal Welfare Act | 7 USC §§ 2131 - 2159; 18 USC § 49 | 7 USCA §§ 2131 - 2159;18 USCA § 49 |
The AWA is, in the main, a regulatory law that seeks to control who may possess or sell certain animals and the living conditions (for non-agricultural, domestic animals) under which the animals must be kept. The law provides for criminal penalties, civil penalties and revocation of permits for violations of the AWA. For more on the act, see the Topical Introduction to the AWA . |
Statute |
| CA - Historical - 1872: Cruelty to Animals | Cal. Penal Code 597 (1872) | Enacted February 14, 1872 (almost identical with Field's Draft, Section 699), and then read: "Every person who maliciously kills, maims, or wounds an animal, the property of another, or who maliciously and cruelly beats, tortures, or injures any animal, whether belonging to himself or another, is guilty of a misdemeanor." | Statute | |
| NJ - Humane Societies - 40:48-5.1. Contracts with humane societies where no pound established; advertisement unnecessary | N. J. S. A. 40:48-5.1 | NJ ST 40:48-5.1 |
Whenever in any municipality there shall not be established under municipal authority a public pound for the keeping of stray dogs, cats or other domestic pets, and there shall exist in the county wherein such municipality is situated or in any adjoining county, a pound maintained by any humane s |
Statute |
| Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass'n | 387 F.3d 850 (9th Cir., 2004) | 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20, 119 (2004) |
Activist sued a state-created agricultural association under 42 USC § 1983 to challenge a rule that limited demonstrations to “free expression zones” outside a state-owned performance facility. The Court of Appeals held that the association was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It held that the parking lots and walkways were public fora, and thus time, place and manner restrictions on speech had to be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest. The Court held that the state did not have a significant interest in restricting protestors to these zones. The rule was not narrowly tailored enough to promote the association's interest in preventing traffic congestion, and restricted more speech than was necessary. Therefore, the rule unduly infringed free speech on its face. |
Case |