|Ley 23.094, 1984||Ley Nacional 23.094/84||This law declares the southern right whale a natural monument within Argentine jurisdictional waters and subject to the rules established by Law No. 22.351, which regulates the concerning procedures for the declaration of national parks, natural monuments, and national reserves.||Statute|
|TN - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974||T. C. A. § 70-8-101 to 112||TN ST § 70-8-101 to 112||These Tennessee statutes comprise the Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974 and includes the legislative intent, definitions, and factors relevant to endangered species investigations. By statute, it is unlawful for any person to take, attempt to take, possess, transport, export, process, sell or offer for sale or ship nongame wildlife, or for any common or contract carrier knowingly to transport or receive for shipment nongame wildlife. Violation constitutes a Class B misdemeanor and incurs warrantless searches and seizure of the wildlife taken and the instrumentalities used in the taking.||Statute|
|City of Pierre v. Blackwell||635 N.W.2d 581 (S.D. 2001)||2001 SD 127||
In this South Dakota case, the owner of a dog declared by an animal control officer to be "dangerous" pursuant to Pierre City Ordinance § 10-3-111 challenged the conviction on the basis that the ordinances themselves were unconstitutional and that his constitutional right to procedural due process has been violated. The court held that the ordinances themselves were constitutional, noting the broad authority municipalities have to regulate pet ownership as a legitimate exercise of police power. The court reversed and remanded for determination on the factual issue of the dog's dangerousness. Specifically, if the City opts for a civil hearing, absent exigent circumstances, the owner of a dog is entitled to a due process hearing on the issue of dangerousness.
|Lopez v. State||720 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1986).||
The court convicted the defendant of cruelty to animals where the defendant left his dog in the car on a hot, sunny, dry day with the windows only cracked an inch and a half. Such action was deemed "transporting or confining animal in a cruel manner."
|RU - Cruelty - Responsible Treatment of Animals||Responsible Treatment of Animals||Responsible Treatment of Animals||The Law on Responsible Treatment of Animals, signed by Vladimir Putin in 2018, prohibits the killing of animals “under any pretext.” The law also outlaws shooting or poisoning stray dogs and cats, which has occurred in Russian cities in recent years according to news sources. Under the law, owners must keep their pets in proper conditions and homeless animals must be taken-up, vaccinated, sterilized, and then released by local agencies. One of the primary purposes of the laws is to ban petting zoos at malls and the practice of bars and restaurants hosting animals. The conducting of animal fights is also banned under the new law.||Statute|
|Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div.||837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016)||This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED.||Case|
|WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.040. Dog bites. Liability and Dangerous dogs and related provisions.||West's RCWA 16.08.010 - 110||WA ST 16.08.010 - 110||This Washington statute outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. Under the law, the owner or keeper of any dog shall be liable to the owner of any animal killed or injured by such dog for the amount of damages sustained in a civil action. Further, there is strict liability for the owner of any dog that bites any person while in a public place or lawfully on a private place including the property of the owner of such dog, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. However, proof of provocation of the attack by the injured person shall be a complete defense to an action for damages.||Statute|
|OR - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes||O. R. S. § 167.305 - 439||OR ST § 167.305 - 439||These Oregon statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty laws. "Animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian or fish. The term "assault," which is generally associated with human crimes, is used to define certain crimes against animals. Animal abuse may be elevated to a felony offense if the act was committed directly in front of a minor child or if the perpetrator was previously convicted of domestic violence.||Statute|
|Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser||(2007) 243 ALR 356||(2007) ATPR 42-189;  FCA 1535||
The applicants held sheep in a pen pending live export. The respondent broke into that pen and put pork products in their feed rendering them unfit for export to countries whose markets had religious proscriptions against eating pork products. The court found that the respondent's conduct did not amount to 'hindering' as defined in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and that his action was for the dominant purpose of environmental protection, which included protecting sheep from the conditions suffered during the live export trade.
|Simpson v. Department of Fish and Wildlife||255 P.3d 565 (Or. App., 2011)||2011 WL 1486081 (Or. App.) ; 242 Or.App. 287 (2011)||
Game ranch owners sought a declaratory ruling from the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) as to whether their animals were property of the state. DFW ruled that the state had only a regulatory interest in the game animals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State's property interest in the animals was not proprietary or possessory. The State's interest was regulatory, based on a state statute and a regulation adopted by the State Fish and Wildlife Commission. It also held that the State's interest in wild game is that of a sovereign.