Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karnail Singh and others v. State of Haryana | CRR-533-2013 High Court of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh | The fact of the case arose in 2004 and related the transportation of cows from one province to another in violation of restrictions on the export of cows for meat slaughter. An opinion on that case was given in 2013, then a revised petition was submitted to this court, and several years later this opinion was given. Much of the 100 pages did not deal with the events of the case, but with the jurisprudence of animal rights. The ultimate holding of the judge directed a state agency to enforce a number of very specific standards for the transportation of animals. The Punjab and Haryana High Court declared, in this exceptional judgment, that animals and birds have legal rights, just as humans. It further declared citizens as the “guardians of [the] animal kingdom” with a duty to ensure their welfare and protection. Justice Rajiv Sharma, in his order, said, “All the animals have honour and dignity. Every specie[s] has an inherent right to live and is required to be protected by law. The rights and privacy of animals are to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks. The Corporations, Hindu idols, holy scriptures, rivers have been declared legal entities, and thus, in order to protect and promote greater welfare of animals including avian and aquatic, animals are required to be conferred with the status of legal entity/legal person. The animals should be healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, able to express innate behaviour without pain, fear and distress. They are entitled to justice. The animals cannot be treated as objects or property.” | Case | |
| OH - Lakewood - Breed - 506.03 PIT BULL DOGS OR CANARY DOGS | LAKEWOOD, OH., ORDINANCES § 506.03 (2008) |
No person may keep, harbor or own pit bull dogs or canary dogs in Lakewood, Ohio, with exceptions for dogs in the city on the effective date. A dog may be allowed to stay provided it has a microchip for identification, has been sterilized, the owner has liability insurance of $100,000, and the dog is properly confined or secured. Failure to comply could result in the removal or impoundment of the dog. The owner may also be charged with a misdemeanor. |
Local Ordinance | |
| EU - Transport - 2004/544/EC: Council Decision on the signing of the European Convention for the protection of animals during in | 2004/544/EC |
This Council Decision directs the signing the of the European Convention for the protection of animals during international transport. |
Statute | |
| Fandrey v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company | 80 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. 2004) | 2004 WL 1207668 (Wis.), 272 Wis.2d 46 |
Dog bite victim sued homeowners insurer. Held: courts may factor traditional public policy to bar a claim under the dog bite statute, and in this case, public policy precludes imposing liability on homeowners even though the dog bite statute appears to impose strict liability. |
Case |
| GA - Liens, veterinary - Article 8. Liens. Part 9. Veterinarians and Boarders of Animals. | Ga. Code Ann., § 44-14-490 to 494 | GA ST § 44-14-490 to 494 | This section of Georgia laws deals with veterinary liens. Every licensed veterinarian in Georgia has a lien on each animal or pet treated, boarded, or cared for by him or her while in his or her custody and under contract with the owner of the animal or pet for the payment of charges for the treatment, board, or care of the animal or pet. The veterinarian has the right to retain the animal or pet until the charges are paid. There is a ten-day hold period after demand for payment (made in person or by registered or certified mail) until the pet is deemed abandoned and may be disposed of by the veterinary facility. | Statute |
| American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus | 2008 WL 3411666 (D.D.C.) |
On Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The United States District Court, District of Columbia, determined that “master schedules” and “performance reports” were not documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain audio tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health status of any Asian elephants in Defendants’ custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants’ operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without being given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs’ mere speculation that Defendants hired an outside consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee’s efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any further judicial action. |
Case | |
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
Case |
| TN - Dangerous Animals - § 39-17-101. Dangerous snakes or reptiles; handling | T. C. A. § 39-17-101 | TN ST § 39-17-101 | This Tennessee law makes it an offense for a person to display, exhibit, handle, or use a poisonous or dangerous snake or reptile in a manner that endangers the life or health of any person. Violation is a Class C misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke | 868 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2017) | 17 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8478 (9th Cir. 2017) | In this case, the Center for Biological Diversity and Maricopa Audubon Society (collectively “CBD”) challenged the determination of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle (“desert eagle”) is not a distinct population segment (“DPS”) eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act. There are two requirements for DPS status: (1) the discreteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs, and (2) the significance of the population segment to the species to which it belongs. Here, the parties agreed that the desert eagle population is discrete, but they disputed whether the population is significant. CBD argued that if FWS found that a population segment satisfies any of the four listed significance factors, it is required to conclude that the population segment is significant. The court held that FWS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the desert eagle did not satisfy significance requirement for being a DPS, even though it found that the desert eagle satisfied the persistence requirement and one significance factors. The district court's grant of summary judgment to FWS was affirmed. | Case |
| Moore v. Knower | 214 So.3d 165 (La.App. 4 Cir., 2017) | 2016-0776 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/17) | Bruce Moore and Amy Knower were in a relationship and decided to adopt a dog together. Bruce alleged that they both jointly adopted Abby, a Boston Terrier in 2010. The couple jointly shared expenses for the care and management of the dog. After the parties broke up, they agreed to an arrangement in which each party alternated possession of Abby every week. The parties continued this arrangement even during their brief reconciliation up until July of 2015 when Amy Knower refused to exchange the dog with Bruce Moore. Moore filed suit and the trial court found for him and awarded him the use and management of Abby. Knower alleged that she was the sole owner of Abby. Knower appealed, alleging five assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding that she failed to support her claim of full ownership; (2) the trial court erred in finding that she co-owned Abby with Moore; (3) the trial court erred in failing to accept the testimony of Sheila Ford of the Mississippi Boston Terrier Rescue; (4) the trial court erred by stating that there was no basis in law for her to decide the custody of a dog and then doing just that; (5) the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determined that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction over the matter. The Court did not find any errors in the trial court’s findings. It concluded that Abby was indeed co-owned by Moore and Knower and ultimately held that Knower had no right to unilaterally end the arrangement. Knower did not supply sufficient proof to support her claim of full ownership. Moore was awarded Abby and the right to solely determine use and management of the dog. | Case |