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Displaying 91 - 100 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. One Bell Jet Ranger II Helicopter | 943 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) |
Sam Jaksick, Michael Boyce, and Chris Christensen were charged with conspiring to violate both the Airborne Hunting Act (AHA), 16 U.S.C. 742j-1 and the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. They were also charged with knowingly using a helicopter to harass bighorn sheep in violation of the AHA. After a jury acquitted of the last two charges, the government, still convinced that the bighorn sheep had been harassed by the hunters, then brought this forfeiture action. While the court denied the forfeiture based for the most part on actions by the government in the case, it did hold that defendants' use of the helicopter to get as close as possible to identify the best trophy ram constituted sufficient intent for harassment under the Airborne Hunting Act. |
Case | |
| Pearson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | Slip Copy, 2011 WL 559083 (C.A.6,2011) |
Petitioner seeks review of the decision and order of the Secretary of the USDA, terminating his license to own and exhibit wild animals (82 lions, tigers, and bears), issuing a cease and desist order, and imposing civil sanctions in the amount of $93,975 in violation of the AWA. In 2006, inspection showed 280 incidents of non-compliance. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first held that there was no abuse of discretion in failing to grant the continuance after a fire at Petitioner's home because he is unable to resulting establish prejudice. Further, the Court discounted Petitioner's challenge that the revocation of his license was not supported where the court found the evidence "substantial, perhaps overwhelming." |
Case | |
| R v. Menard | R v. Menard 1978 CarswellQue 25 | R v. Menard (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 458 | The accused in R v. Menard had a business euthanizing animals by use of motor exhaust which caused pain and burns to the mucous membranes of the animals he was euthanizing. In a decision written by future Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice, Lamer J. overturned a decision from the lower courts and reinstated the original conviction. Lamer J. statements about the animal-human relationship have been influential in Canadian Animal case law. | Case |
| GA - Alligators - Article 7. Feeding of Wild Alligators | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-170 | GA ST § 27-3-170 | This Georgia law makes it illegal to willfully feed or bait any wild alligator not in captivity. Violation is a misdemeanor with a fine of up to $200 or confinement up to 30 days, or both. | Statute |
| CA - Cats - Consolidated Cat Laws | West's Ann. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 31750 - 31766; West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4150 - 4151 | CA FOOD & AG § 31750 - 31766; CA FISH & G § 4150 - 4151 | These statutes comprise California consolidated cat laws. Among the provisions include possession requirements for non-domestic cats, vaccination and impound procedures for domestic cats, and legislative policy statements about feral cats. | Statute |
| IN RE: S.S. FARMS LINN COUNTY, INC., JAMES W. HICKEY, MARIE HICKEY, JAMES JOSEPH HICKEY AND SHANNON HANSEN | 50 Agric. Dec. 476 (1991) | 1991 WL 290584 (U.S.D.A.) | Reliance is to be no longer placed on "severe" sanction policy set forth in prior decisions; rather, sanction in each case will be determined by examining nature of violations in relation to remedial purposes of regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant circumstances, always giving appropriate weight to recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose. | Case |
| Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2024) | 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D.Mo., 2024) | Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy organization and a plant-based meat alternative producer, filed this case to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the misrepresentation of a product as meat that is not derived from livestock or poultry. Plaintiffs bring four constitutional claims against the statute: violation of the First Amendment, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, violation of Due Process, and Declaratory Judgment. For the First Amendment violation, plaintiffs specifically argue that the statute is an unlawful restriction on truthful commercial speech. However, the court finds that the statute does not restrict truthful commercial speech, since plaintiffs are still able to accurately indicate what sort of products they are selling to consumers. For the Dormant Commerce Clause argument, the court finds that the statute does not discriminate in purpose or effect, and that the statute passes the Pike balancing test. For the Due Process claim, the court finds that the statute provides sufficiently specific guidance to both the public and prosecutors as to what actions are prohibited, so it does not violate Due Process. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claims and motion for summary judgment. | Case |
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef v. United States Department of Agriculture | 517 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.,2007) | 2007 WL 1020786 (D.D.C.,2007) | Creekstone Farms Premium Beef (Creekstone) sought to independently test their slaughtered cows so they could more safely provide meat to consumers. Creekstone requested testing kits from the USDA, the same kits that USDA inspectors use to test for BSE. The district court ruled that Creekstone could perform the tests. | Case |
| Sentencia T-146/16 | Sentencia T-146/16 | Plaintiffs, a family that owned a howler monkey named "bebé" or "King Kong," filed "Amparo" seeking the protection of their rights to life and health, arguing that such rights had been violated by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca's" (CAR) refusal to return "bebé" to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that "bebé" was a member of their family, and not having him affected the family's emotional and physical health. Finally, they argued that the sadness and depression were so severe that they took group therapy with a psychologist. The monkey was stolen from the family's property and rescued was assisted by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca," who sent the monkey to "Fundación Bioandina." However, the defendants reported the monkey to be completely "humanized." He was so stressed that he did not eat and had to be relocated to the Medellin Zoo to be rehabilitated. The Second Chamber of Review of the Constitutional Court determined that wildlife is not subject to property by individuals and that the state of freedom of wildlife should be privileged. According to article 248 of the National Code of Renewable Natural Resources, the court stated that wildlife belongs to the nation. Therefore, the defendant's actions did not violate the family's well-being, as the forfeiture of wildlife is necessary to ensure their conservation protection as it is a constitutional mandate to protect biodiversity and environmental integrity. The court noted that the monkey had completed his rehabilitation process and had been reintroduced to his natural habitat. | Case | |
| CA - Burro - § 53074.5. Undomesticated burros; removal by officer or employee of local | West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 53074.5 | CA GOVT § 53074.5 | This California law allows an officer or employee of a local animal control agency to remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto private land at the request of the landowner. Such officer can also remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto a public roadway to ensure public safety. | Statute |