Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Groody | 785 F.Supp. 875 (D. Mont. 1991) |
In a Lacey Act prosecution for conspiracy to engage in conduct prohibited by the Act, the prosecution need not allege that all the defendants involved committed the underlying substantive violation of the Lacey Act to charge the defendants with conspiracy. Moreover, the alleged overt acts need not be criminal in nature. |
Case | ||
| NJ - Domestic Violence - Chapter 25. Domestic Violence | N. J. S. A. 2C:25-26, 27,28, 29 | NJ ST 2C:25-26, 27,28, 29 | On January 17, 2012, Governor Christie signed the Domestic Violence Pet Protection Law . The law authorizes courts to include pets in domestic violence restraining orders. The court is allowed to enter an order " . . . directing the possession of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household. Where a person has abused or threatened to abuse such animal, there shall be a presumption that possession of the animal shall be awarded to the non-abusive party." This is listed in N. J. S. A. 2C:25-29(b)(19). Other sections are provided for definitions and background to section 29. | Statute | |
| Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc. | 577 F.Supp.2d 82 (D.D.C., 2008) | 2008 WL 4148500 (D.D.C.) |
In relevant part, the District of Columbia’s Freedom from Cruelty to Animal Protection Act allows any humane officer to take possession of any animal to protect the animal(s) from neglect or cruelty. Plaintiffs, all of whom had their dogs seized under the Act, brought a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition for a count alleging that the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as customarily enforced. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, finding the parties’ briefs in connection to the motion insufficient to determine whether an issue exists as to the Act‘s constitutionality. |
Case | |
| MO - Hunting, Internet - 3 CSR 10-7.410. Hunting Methods | 3 MO ADC 10-7.410 | 3 Mo. Code of State Regulations 10-7.410 | In paragraph (R) of this Missouri regulation, the state prohibits computer-assisted, remote hunting. "Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, wildlife may be taken only in the immediate physical presence of the taker and may not be taken by use of computer-assisted remote hunting devices. . ." | Administrative | |
| Dogs in Restaurant Patio Laws | State map | ||||
| Ammon v. Welty | 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.,2002) |
In this Kentucky case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the county dog warden for shooting their dog. Before the statutorily imposed 7-day waiting limit had expired, the warden euthanized the dog by shooting him in the head. The Court of Appeals held that while a family dog can be beloved by a family, loss of the pet does not support an action for loss of consortium. Further, the dog warden was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions did not rise to the outrageous level where the dog was not shot in the presence of the family and there was no evidence that Brewer intended to inflict emotional harm. |
Case | ||
| SD - Health - 12:68:06:09. Importation of cats and dogs. | S.D. Admin. R. 12:68:06:09 | SD ADC 12:68:06:09 | This South Dakota regulation states that no person may import into the state any dog or cat over three months of age without certification of a current rabies vaccination. Other health requirements for importation are detailed. | Administrative | |
| WildEarth Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service | 342 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D. Mont. 2018) | 2018 WL 5313770 | In 2007, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (The Service) issued regulations implementing the CITES Program for certain Appendix II species that are in the United States which include bobcats, gray wolves, river otters, Canada lynx, and brown grizzly bears. Under the regulations, certain requirements must be met prior to the species exportation from the Unites States. The Service annually distributes export tags to approved states and tribes which are then distributed to trappers, hunters, and other individuals seeking to export furbearer species. The Service drafted an incidental take statement setting a cap on the amount of Canada lynx that are allowed to be killed or injured while bobcats are hunted. Plaintiffs brought this action claiming that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not adequately analyzing the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the CITES Program and by not preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). It is further alleged that the 2001 and 2012 Biological Opinions and Incidental Take Statement referenced and incorporated in the Environmental Assessment that the Service conducted is deficient under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Center for Biological Diversity filed a separate action raising similar NEPA claims. The two actions were consolidated into one and the WildEarth case was designated as the lead case. The Service and the intervenors challenged the Plaintiff's standing to bring their claims. The District Court found that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. As for the NEPA claims, the Court held that the only time an EIS is necessary is when a specific agency action alters the status quo. In this case, the Court found no identifiable agency action that would alter the status quo. The Service has administered the CITES Export Program since 1975 and it does not propose "any site-specific activity nor call for specific action directly impacting the physical environment." As for the EPA claims, in the Incidental Take Statement drafted by the Service, the authorized level of take is set as follows: "two (2) lynx may be killed and two (2) injured annually due to trapping over the 10-year term of th[e] biological opinion." The Plaintiffs argued that the use of the word "and" in the "Two and Two" standard was ambiguous. The District Court agreed and held that as currently worded, the "two and two" fails to set an adequate trigger for take because it is not clear whether one or both are necessary to exceed the trigger. The Plaintiffs also argue that the terms "annually" and "injury" are ambiguous. The District Court held that "annually" was ambiguous, however, it was not enough to independently make the statement arbitrary and capricious. The Court also held that the Service's use of the word "injury" was both overbroad and underinclusive. The Service's interpretation and use of the term is arbitrary and capricious in the context of this case. The Court found that the reporting requirements were arbitrary and capricious and that the take statement does not set forth reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the impact of incidental taking on the species. The Service provides states and tribes with a brochure with information on lynx identification and other information every time bobcat tags are issued, however the brochures are not required to be given out by states and tribes, it is merely recommended. The District Court ultimately Denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to their NEPA claims and granted it as to their ESA claims. The incidental take statement was remanded to the Service for further review and clarification. | Case | |
| Porter v. DiBlasio | 93 F.3d 301 (Wis.,1996) |
Nine horses were seized by a humane society due to neglect of a care taker without giving the owner, who lived in another state, notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The owner filed a section 1983 suit against the humane society, the county, a humane officer and the district attorney that alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process, conspiracy, and conversion. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a viable claim. On appeal, the court found that the owner had two viable due process claims, but upheld the dismissal for the others. |
Case | ||
| FL - Definitions - Animal Definitions | West's F. S. A. § 828.02 | FL ST § 828.02 | The word "animal" shall be held to include every living dumb creature. | Statute |