Results
Displaying 21 - 30 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thurston v. Carter | 92 A. 295 (Maine, 1914) | L.R.A. 1915C,359, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, Am.Ann.Cas. 1917A,389 | This action of trespass is brought for the recovery of damages for the killing of the fox hound of plaintiff by defendant. Defendant claimed that he shot and killed the plaintiff's dog while it was chasing and worrying a cat belonging to and upon the land of the defendant. After the introduction of all the evidence, the court ordered a verdict for defendant. To this direction, plaintiff filed his bill of exceptions in which it is stipulated that if a cat is a domestic animal, the ruling below is to stand, otherwise judgment is to be entered for plaintiff in the sum of $50. | Case | |
| NV - Exotic Wildlife - NAC 504.471 Restrictions on shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife | NV ADC 504.471 | NAC 504.471 | This administrative provision restricts the shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife subject to limited exceptions. | Administrative | |
| ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds | 12 M. R. S. A. § 11215 | ME ST T. 12 § 11215 | This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime. | Statute | |
| BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) | S15G1184, 2016 WL 3144352, (Ga. June 6, 2016) | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. | Case | |
| NM - Licenses - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | N. M. S. A. 1978, § 77-1-15.1 | NM ST § 77-1-15.1 | This New Mexico statute provides that every municipality and each county may provide by ordinance for the mandatory licensure of dogs over the age of three months. License fees shall be fixed by the responsible municipality or county. Further, pursuant to this statute, every municipality and each county shall provide for the impoundment of rabies-suspect animals. | Statute | |
| ME - Fish and Wildlife Management Research - Chapter 925. Fish and Wildlife Management and Research | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12701 to 12708 | ME ST T. 12 § 12701 to 12708 | The following statutes give the Maine Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife the authority to make regulations for hunting, fishing, trapping or other public use of any wildlife management area or wildlife sanctuary. These statutes also provide civil and criminal penalties for violating the rules regulating state-owned wildlife management areas, state game farms, and scientific permits, while also detailing prohibited activity in wildlife sanctuaries. Additionally, these statutes also reveal the wildlife management areas and wildlife sanctuaries that are under the commissioner's authority. | Statute | |
| Galgano v. Town of North Hempstead | 41 A.D.3d 536 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 840 N.Y.S.2d 794, 2007 WL 1704612 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 05223 |
In this New York Case, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint for personal injuries and damages due to a dog bite. The court reaffirmed New York law that to recover in strict liability in tort for a dog bite or attack, the plaintiff must establish that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner knew or should have known of the dog's propensities. The fact that the subject dog was brought to the animal shelter because another dog in the owner's household did not get along with it is not indicative that it had vicious propensities. |
Case | |
| Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County | 227 P.3d 907 (Idaho 2010) | 2010 WL 337939 (Idaho), 148 Idaho 653 (2010) |
After Gooding County adopted an ordinance regulating confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), cattle ranching and dairy associations brought suit challenging the constitutionality and validity of provisions within the ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the county, and the associations appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings. |
Case | |
| Roalstad v. City of Lafayette | 363 P.3d 790 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | --- P.3d ---- 2015 WL 5895396 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed. | Case | |
| MT - Veterinary - CHAPTER 18. VETERINARY MEDICINE | MCA 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | MT ST 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |