Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Kulka's Estate | 18 P.2d 1036 (1933) | 142 Or. 104 |
This action relates to a court order in an estate case. The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals." The executor refused to pay the legacy. This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands. The court affirmed the payment of the legacy. |
Case |
| People v. Beam | 244 Mich.App. 103 (2000) | 244 Mich.App. 103 (2000) |
Defendant was charged with owning a dog, trained or used for fighting, that caused the death of a person and filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that M.C.L. § 750.49(10); MSA 28.244(10) was unconstitutionally vague. The court granted defendant's motion, finding the terms "without provocation" and "owner" to be vague, and dismissed the case. The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Reversed. |
Case |
| UT - Dog Bite - Title 18. Dogs. Chapter 1. Injuries by Dogs. | U.C.A. 1953 § 18-1-1 to 4 | UT ST § 18-1-1 to 4 | This Utah statute provides that every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought therefor to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or mischievous. This does not apply to dogs used by law enforcement officials. In 2014, a provision for the use of arbitration in personal injury from dog bite cases was added. | Statute |
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| AU - Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 (NSW) | Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 |
This Act deals with the exhibition of animals at marine or zoological parks, circuses and other places. It regulates the exhibition of all vertebrate animals in zoos, circuses or mobile displays regardless of whether they are native, exotic or domestic.
A person must have an approval to keep and exhibit an animal, and this is subject to qualifications, experience or any other term or condition that may be considered necessary |
Statute | |
| IL - Naperville - Title 6: Zoning Regulations (Chapter 2: General Zoning Provisions) | Naperville, Illinois, Code of Ordinances § 6-2-5 |
This Naperville, Illinois ordinance provides the standards to determine whether a business is a veterinary office or a pet care establishment. For a veterinary office, pets are only allowed outside between the hours of 7 AM to 10PM if they are on a leash and handled by a single employee; excrement must be picked up daily and noise levels generated by the animals cannot exceed the city’s noise performance standards. For a pet care establishment, pets are allowed to be outside without a lease or direct employee supervision, but the outside area must be fenced and cleared of excrement daily; pet care establishments are also permitted to provide emergency medical treatment or nonprofessional care associated with an existing medical problem. The zoning provisions associated with either establishment are also included. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Giaconia v. Delaware County Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4442632 (E.D.Pa.) |
Plaintiff brought various claims against Defendants after Plaintiff’s cat was euthanized prior to the standard 72 hour waiting period. On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania found that Defendants were not acting under color of law. Because any and all claims for which the Court had original jurisdiction were being dismissed, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims. |
Case | |
| People v. Romano | 908 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2010) | 2010 WL 3339158 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term) |
Defendant appealed a conviction of animal cruelty under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for failing to groom the dog for a prolonged period of time and failing to seek medical care for it. Defendant argued that the term “unjustifiably injures” in the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the Court held the term was not because a person could readily comprehend that he or she must refrain from causing unjustifiable injury to a domestic pet by failing to groom it for several months and seeking medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal needs such care. |
Case |
| Hollendale Apartments & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel | --- N.Y.S.3d ---- , 2019 WL 2031263 (N.Y. App. Div., 2019) | 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03718 | The Plaintiff owns and operates an apartment complex with a policy that prohibits defendants from keeping a dog on the premises. The Defendant, Bonesteel, began renting an apartment at Plaintiff's complex in 2011 under a one-year lease. Defendant continued to renew his one-year lease for additional one-year terms until 2014. Defendant's therapist sent a letter to the Plaintiff requesting an exception to the no dog policy so that the Defendant could have an emotional support animal. The Plaintiff denied the request but stated that it would allow a bird or cat or an early termination of Defendant's lease. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking a judgment declaring that the Plaintiff's refusal to permit the Defendant to have an emotional support dog was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Human Rights Law (HRL). The Plaintiff subsequently reduced the Defendant's lease renewal term to three months. The Defendant filed counterclaims on grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court of New York also granted a motion allowing the Attorney General to intervene. The Attorney General asserted counterclaims on similar grounds to those raised by the Defendant. After a nonjury trial, the trial court issued a judgment that the Plaintiff's actions did not violate the FHA and the HRL. The Defendant then appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Plaintiff's claims were justiciable even though the matter was not raised by the parties. Since the Plaintiff had already denied the Defendant's request for an exception to the policy when it filed the action and no harm to the Plaintiff occurred or was impending, it was essentially asking the Court to issue an advisory opinion which is not an exercise of judicial function. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment. The Court then considered the Defendant's counterclaims since concrete injuries were alleged. The only two arguments addressed were whether the Defendant actually had a qualifying disability within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL and whether the accommodation requested was necessary to afford the Defendant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. The Court concluded that the Defendant met his burden to establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA and HRL. The Court also found that the Defendant "offered sufficient evidence that having an emotional support dog would affirmatively enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his disability, and thus demonstrated necessity within the meaning of the FHA and the HRL." Lastly, the Court found that the Plaintiff retaliated against the Defendant by reducing his lease renewal terms to three months. Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to judgment in his favor on the retaliation counterclaims. | Case |
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
Case |