Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NM - Licenses - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | N. M. S. A. 1978, § 77-1-15.1 | NM ST § 77-1-15.1 | This New Mexico statute provides that every municipality and each county may provide by ordinance for the mandatory licensure of dogs over the age of three months. License fees shall be fixed by the responsible municipality or county. Further, pursuant to this statute, every municipality and each county shall provide for the impoundment of rabies-suspect animals. | Statute |
| Animal Legal and Historical Center Website |
On this site you will find a comprehensive repository of information about animal law, including: over 1200 full text cases (US, historical, and UK), over 1400 US statutes, over 60 topics and comprehensive explanations, legal articles on a variety of animal topics and an international collection. |
Basic page | ||
| ME - Fish and Wildlife Management Research - Chapter 925. Fish and Wildlife Management and Research | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12701 to 12708 | ME ST T. 12 § 12701 to 12708 | The following statutes give the Maine Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife the authority to make regulations for hunting, fishing, trapping or other public use of any wildlife management area or wildlife sanctuary. These statutes also provide civil and criminal penalties for violating the rules regulating state-owned wildlife management areas, state game farms, and scientific permits, while also detailing prohibited activity in wildlife sanctuaries. Additionally, these statutes also reveal the wildlife management areas and wildlife sanctuaries that are under the commissioner's authority. | Statute |
| U.S. v. McDougall | 25 F.Supp.2d 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) |
Defendants Goodfriend and Benney, commercial fishermen licensed pursuant to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"), are charged with catching and failing to return substantial quantities of eel and walleye from Lake Ontario and New York waters in violation of New York law that prohibits commerce in these fish because of health and conservation concerns. Aware of the ban prohibiting the sale of eel and walleye taken from these waters, Goodfriend and Benney subsequently sold the eel and walleye to a host of fish wholesalers and retailers, located within and outside New York. Defendant truck driver's alleged filing of false Canadian customs forms relating to eel and walleye he was transporting from the U.S. to his Canadian employer were violations of the Lacey Act, regardless of whether these acts violated Canadian law. |
Case | |
| James S. Cable, Plaintiff v. Burrows, Defendant |
This California judgment awarded no money to plaintiff on his claims. |
Pleading | ||
| Roalstad v. City of Lafayette | 363 P.3d 790 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | --- P.3d ---- 2015 WL 5895396 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) | The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed. | Case |
| MT - Veterinary - CHAPTER 18. VETERINARY MEDICINE | MCA 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | MT ST 37-18-101 to 37-18-807 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| IL - Domesticated Wild Animals Act - Chapter 510. Animals. | 510 I.L.C.S. 60/0.01 - 60/3 | IL ST CH 510 § 60/0.01 - 60/3 | All birds and wild animals in domestication, or kept in enclosures and reduced to possession, are declared to be objects of ownership and absolute title. When fur bearing animals are raised in captivity for breeding, such animals are considered domestic animals. The animals and the products made from them are agricultural products. | Statute |
| Klitzka ex rel. Teutonico v. Hellios | 810 N.E.2d 252 (Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2004) | 284 Ill.Dec. 599 (2004); 2004 WL 1109781 |
In this Illinois case, the Appellate Court considered, as a matter of first impression, under what circumstances does a landlord owe a duty of care to his tenant's invitees to prevent injury from an attack by an animal kept by the tenant on the leased premises? A minor invitee (Alexus) of the tenants was bitten by tenants' dog and brought a negligence action against residential landlords. It was undisputed that the tenants held exclusive control over the premises and paid $700 a month in rent to the landlords. The Appellate Court held that even if landlords knew tenants' dog was dangerous, the landlords had no duty to protect the tenants' invitee because landlords retained no control over the leased premises where injury occurred. "Here, the tenants' affirmative conduct of bringing the dog into the living space of the home, an area over which the landlords had no control, is what might have been the proximate cause of Alexus' injuries." |
Case |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar | 729 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Mont.,2010) | 2010 WL 3084194 (D.Mont.,) |
In February of 2008, Defendant, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (the "Service"), issued a final ruling to delist the Rocky Mountain gray wolf species, removing the ESA’s protections throughout the northern Rocky Mountain distinct population segment ("DPS"), except in Wyoming. Twelve parties challenged the final ruling, arguing, foremost, that the decision violates the ESA by only partially protecting a listed population. The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued two findings: (1) the ESA does not allow the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to list only part of a species as endangered, or to protect a listed distinct population segment only in part; and (2) the legislative history of the ESA does not support the Service’s interpretation of the phrase "significant portion of its range," but instead supports the long-standing view that the ESA does not allow a distinct population to be subdivided. Accordingly, the Service’s ruling to delist the Rocky Mountain gray wolf was vacated as invalid and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was granted. |
Case |