Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Richard B. Rappaport v. Max E. McElroy, D.V.M., Sherwood Veterinary Clinic, Inc. and Does 1 through 30, Inclusive |
In this California case, plaintiff sued a veterinarian for giving his exotic pet (a Serval cat), a flea treatment known to be toxic to cats. The veterinary malpractice action focused on defendant’s negligence in failing to exercise a reasonable level of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others practicing veterinary medicine. In fact, plaintiff contended that it is well known in the field and indicated by the manufacturer of Spotton, that the drug should not be used on felines. Plaintiff prayed for damages in the amount of $25,000, which included lost wages, the commercial value of the cat, and loss of companionship, among other things. |
Pleading | ||
| Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc. | 275 F.R.D. 346 (D.C., 2011) | 2011 WL 3555761 (D.C., 2011) |
Pet owners sued after their pets were seized, detained, injured, or destroyed by the Humane Society. Pet owners’ attempts to certify a class failed because the claims were not typical. The members of the proposed class allegedly suffered a wide range of deprivations, were provided with different kinds of notice, and claimed distinct injuries. The class certification motion was also denied because the proposed members sought individualized monetary relief. |
Case |
| Scott v. Donkel | 671 So.2d 741 (Ala.Civ.App.,1995) |
In this Alabama case, there was an injury to a non-tenant child by a dog bite, and the defendant was a landlord. The attack occurred off the rented premises in the public street. The action was based upon negligence, that is, a failure to protect against a dangerous condition. The key to such a claim is the knowledge of the landlord. Plaintiff presented no evidence of the landlord being aware of the dog let alone that he knew of its vicious propensity. The court did not find a duty to inspect the premises and discover this information. The court did not reach the point that the attack occurred off the premises. The granting of the motion for summary judgment for the landlord was upheld. |
Case | |
| In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER | 48 N.E.3d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct., 2015) |
In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights. |
Case | |
| Swanson v. Tackling | 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) | 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) | This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. | Case |
| NE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 10) | Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1001 - 1020 | NE ST § 28-1001 to 1020 | This Nebraska statutory section comprises the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty provision provides that a person who abandons or cruelly neglects an animal is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. Intentional animal cruelty results in a Class I misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class IV felony for any subsequent offense, unless such cruel mistreatment involves the knowing and intentional torture, repeated beating, or mutilation of the animal where such an act automatically results in a Class IV felony. Animal means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, but does not include an uncaptured wild creature (which appears to exclude otherwise heinous, intentional acts to wildlife). | Statute |
| AU - Cruelty - Queensland Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (QLD) | Queensland Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 |
The purposes of this Act are to promote the responsible care and use of animals; provide standards for the care and use of animals that--achieve a reasonable balance between the welfare of animals and the interests of persons whose livelihood is dependent on animals; and to allow for the effect of advancements in scientific knowledge about animal biology and changes in community expectations about practices involving animals; to protect animals from unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable pain; to ensure the use of animals for scientific purposes is accountable, open and responsible. Attached pdf is the 2003 reprint. |
Statute | |
| FL - Palm Beach County - Chapter 4: Animals (§ 4-24: Animal Care) | Code of Laws and Ordinances Relating to Palm Beach County Government § 4-24 |
This Palm Beach County, Florida ordinance prohibits the act of humane slaughter, as defined by §§ F.S.A. 828.22 and/or 828.23, within earshot or view of the public. A violation of this provision constitutes a civil infraction and is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthorne | 2006 WL 2844232 | 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71137 |
Ten non-profit groups sued the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) alleging that the FWS had not adequately explained why the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies were not a significant area of lynx habitat under the Endangered Species Act, as the FWS had previously been ordered by the court to do. Additionally, the non-profit groups claimed that the FWS had violated Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act by passing regulations which made it easier for federal agencies to thin trees in lynx habitat under the Healthy Forest Initiative. The Court ordered the FWS to explain why the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies were not a significant area of lynx habitat, but found that the challenged regulations making it easier to thin trees in lynx habitat were permissible. |
Case |
| IL - Restaurant - 5/11-20-14. Companion dogs; restaurants | 65 ILCS 5/11-20-14 | IL ST CH 65 § 5/11-20-14 | This law provides that a municipality with a population of 1,000,000 or more may, by ordinance, authorize the presence of companion dogs in outdoor areas of restaurants where food is served, if the ordinance provides for adequate controls to ensure compliance with other Illinois health laws. An ordinance enacted under this Section shall provide that: (i) no companion dog shall be present in the interior of any restaurant or in any area where food is prepared; and (ii) the restaurant shall have the right to refuse to serve the owner of a companion dog if the owner fails to exercise reasonable control over the companion dog or the companion dog is otherwise behaving in a manner that compromises or threatens to compromise the health or safety of any person present in the restaurant. Under this law, "companion dog" means a dog other than one who is assisting a person with disability. | Statute |