Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commonwealth v. Arcelay | 190 A.3d 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) | 2018 PA Super 161, 2018 PA Super 161, 2018 WL 2927748 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) | The appellant Arcelay appeals his conviction for the summary offense of cruelty to animals after he left his two small Yorkie dogs were found inside of his vehicle on an 87 to 90 degree day for approximately two hours at Willow Grove Naval Air Station. The dogs were rescued from the car and survived (law enforcement gave the dogs water and placed them inside an air conditioned building). After receiving a citation for leaving the animals, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and appeared for the Magisterial Judge. He was found guilty and assessed fines and costs of $454.96. At a Summary Appeal de novo hearing, the officers who responded to the scene presented evidence, including testimony on the dogs being in the car for two hours and photographs of the area showing no shade was available. Appellant testified that he was retired from the Reserves and was at the base to set up for a family picnic. During the morning, he indicated that he checked on the dogs every fifteen minutes. Appellant testified that "he believes the public overreacts when they see dogs in a car" and he was upset that someone had gone into his vehicle to remove the dogs. The court ultimately found appellant guilty of the summary offense, but put appellant on a probation for three months in lieu of fines and costs, taking into account Appellant's lack income. On the instant appeal, appellant first questions whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to hear this matter since it occurred on a military installation. Appellant also raises whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law for the cruelty to animals conviction. As to the jurisdictional argument, the court here found the issuance of the summary citation at the military base was appropriate. The court observed that it is well-settled that military and non-military courts may exercise concurrent subject matter jurisdiction for criminal matters. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction, where his conduct in leaving the dogs in a closed car on a hot, summer day presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| State v. Overholt | 193 P.3d 1100 (Wash. App. Div. 3,2008) |
Defendant was convicted of several counts of second degree unlawful hunting of big game after a game agent (“agent”) followed vehicle tracks to Defendant’s home upon finding fresh cow elk gut piles, and Defendant showed the agent two cow elk carcasses hanging in Defendant’s shed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 found that because the agent was in fresh pursuit of criminal activity and did not enter Defendant’s property with the intent to obtain consent to search in order to evade a search warrant, the agent was not obligated to issue Ferrier warnings, and that suppressing the seized carcasses from evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case in light of the substantial evidence obtained prior to seizing the carcasses. |
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| VT - Cruelty - § 5784. Forcible entry of motor vehicle to remove unattended child or animal | 12 V.S.A. § 5784 | VT ST T. 12 § 5784 | This Vermont law, enacted in 2016, provides that any person who forcibly enter a motor vehicle for the purpose of removing a child or animal from the motor vehicle shall not be subject to civil liability for damages arising from the forcible entry if certain steps are followed. | Statute |
| Schindler v. Mejias | 100 A.D.3d 1315 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 5950370 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 955 N.Y.S.2d 252 |
This appeal is an appeal of the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought an action against Hector L. Mejias Jr., an employee of defendant Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, claiming that Mejias falsely accused him of misrepresenting himself as the Ulster County District Attorney during a sworn deposition. The statement occurred during an incident at the SPCA where Plaintiff-Schindler was trying to pick up a dog owned by his client. The particular issue on appeal is whether the supreme court erred in determining that Mejias's supporting deposition constitutes libel per se. The court found that the alleged act was sufficiently egregious because such a claim would suggest professional misconduct on an attorney's part and invites both disciplinary action and damage to an attorney's professional reputation. Further, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing an absence of malice. The order was affirmed. |
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| UT - Trusts - § 75-2-1001. Honorary trusts--Trusts for pets | U.C.A. 1953 § 75-2-1001 | UT ST § 75-2-1001 | This Utah statute provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Trusts under this section shall be liberally construed to presume against the merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the general intent of the transferor. | Statute |
| NY - Exotic Pets - Chapter 69 Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 370 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 370 | This New York law provides that any person who owns or possesses a wild animal or reptile capable of inflicting bodily harm upon a human being, who fails to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack by such wild animal or reptile, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The punishment for violation is imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both. The second part of the law imposes strict liability upon owners of dangerous wild animals. | Statute |
| Dreyer v. Cyriacks | 112 Cal.App. 279 (1931) | 297 P. 35 (1931) | Plaintiffs brought action against Defendant for damages after Defendant shot and killed Plaintiffs’ dog. The Trial Court set aside a jury verdict granting Plaintiffs $100,000 in actual and $25,000 in punitive damages, on the ground that the verdict was excessive. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California, affirmed the Trial Court decision, finding that the Trial Court was justified in holding that both the actual and punitive damages awards were grossly excessive, given the circumstances under which the incident occurred. In making its decision, the Court of Appeal pointed out that, although this particular dog had been in the motion picture industry, dogs are nonetheless considered property, and as such, are to be ascertained in the same manner as other property, and not in the same manner as human life. | Case |
| Webb v. Avon | [2017] EWHC 3311 | This case addressed the power of the court to make a contingent destruction order under Section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended). These orders allow dangerous dogs to be released and kept under strict conditions. The court held that the 19991 Act is not clear as to the breadth of who these conditions apply to, but considered that dangerous dogs may only be released to their owners or other persons properly identified as being in charge. The case was remitted to the Crown Court for further determination. The court also addressed other aspects of the 1991 Act along with the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015. | Case | |
| Com. v. Kneller | 971 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.,2009) | 2009 WL 215322 (Pa.Super.), 2009 PA Super 18 | Defendant appealed a conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after Defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit Defendant’s child. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, finding the relevant animal cruelty statute to be ambiguous, thus requiring the reversal under the rule of lenity. Concurring and dissenting opinions were filed, in which both agreed that the statute is unambiguous as to whether a dog owner may destroy his or her dog by use of a firearm when that dog has attacked another person, but disagreed as to whether sufficient evidence was offered to show that the dog in fact attacked another person. (See Supreme Court order - Com. v. Kneller, 978 A.2d 716, 2009 WL 5154265 (Pa.,2009)). | Case |
| State v. Cochran | 365 S.W.3d 628 (Mo.App. W.D., 2012) | 2012 WL 1499893 (Mo.App. W.D.) |
Prompted by a phone call to make a return visit to the defendant's house, the Missouri Department of Agriculture and Animal Control were asked, by the defendant, to wait at the door. After waiting by the door for some time, the officers discovered the defendant in the backyard, where she housed at least eleven dogs, trying to remove dog excrement from a pen and trying to remove ice from dog bowls. After further investigation, the defendant was charged with one count of animal abuse and with one count of violating a city ordinance for failure to vaccinate. At the trial, the defendant was convicted on both accounts. On appeal, however, the defendant was found guilty of animal abuse, but was cleared from the ordinance violation. |
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