Results
Displaying 101 - 110 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. McIntosh | 682 S.W.3d 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) | 2024 WL 302430 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2024) | This case is an appeal following the defendant's conviction of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of animal abuse due to insufficient evidence showing that he purposely caused suffering to the dog he allegedly abused. The event that led to defendant's conviction was witnessed by a neighbor, who saw the defendant in his backyard swinging a small dog through the air by its leash and collar. The neighbor also saw defendant climb on top of the dog to choke it and slam its head into the ground. The neighbor testified at trial about these events, and the trial court found defendant guilty of animal abuse and assault in the fourth degree. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence, consisting of the neighbor's testimony, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. | Case |
| Leider v. Lewis | 243 Cal. App. 4th 1078 (Cal. 2016) | 2016 WL 164343 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016) | Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the late Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant exhibit and to prevent construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo's conduct violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The case went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the exhibit. On appeal by both sides, this court first took up whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Court found the issue was previously decided and "is not defeated by raising a new argument that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful argument." Further, refusing to apply this Civil Code section barring injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Court also found the order to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code section 597t (a law concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the exhibit constituted animal cruelty under state law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under section 526a (a law that concerns actions against state officers for injuries to public property) because the injury prong could not be satisfied. As stated by the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard by which to measure this type of harm in order to justify closing a multi-million dollar public exhibit." | Case |
| IN - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | I.C. 35-46-3-0.1 - 15; 36-8-3-18; IC 35-38-2-2.8 | IN ST 35-46-3-.05 to 15; IN ST 36-8-3-18 | These Indiana statutes set forth the anti-cruelty laws. As used in this chapter, "animal" does not include a human being. Among the provisions include anti-neglect, anti-animal fighting, and anti-abuse provisions. A person having a vertebrate animal in the person's custody who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally abandons or neglects the animal commits cruelty to an animal, a Class A misdemeanor. A person who knowingly or intentionally purchases or possesses an animal for the purpose of using the animal in an animal fighting contest commits a Level 6 felony. A person who knowingly or intentionally abuses a vertebrate animal commits cruelty to an animal, a Class A misdemeanor, which may become a Level 6 felony under described circumstances. | Statute |
| CO - Ordinances - Animal control officers--Article 15. Regulation Under Police Power. | C. R. S. A. § 30-15-105 | CO ST § 30-15-105 | This Colorado statute provides that personnel engaged in animal control may issue citations or summonses and complaints enforcing the county dog control resolution or any other county resolution concerning the control of pet animals or municipal ordinance. Officers assigned to this capacity may be referred to as "peace officers." | Statute |
| Johnson v. Wander | 592 So. 2d. 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) |
Petitioner pet owner alleged that respondent veterinarian took her dog to be spayed, and left the animal on heating pads, which resulted in serious burns, so petitioner filed a claim for damages on the basis of gross negligence, damage to property, and emotional distress. The trial court entered partial summary judgments on the claims for punitive damages and emotional distress and, on a subsequent motion, transferred the case to the county court as a claim for less than the circuit court jurisdictional amount. The appellate court held that there remained a jury question on the issues of gross negligence and physical and mental pain and suffering as claimed by petitioner. |
Case | |
| R v. Menard | R v. Menard 1978 CarswellQue 25 | R v. Menard (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 458 | The accused in R v. Menard had a business euthanizing animals by use of motor exhaust which caused pain and burns to the mucous membranes of the animals he was euthanizing. In a decision written by future Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice, Lamer J. overturned a decision from the lower courts and reinstated the original conviction. Lamer J. statements about the animal-human relationship have been influential in Canadian Animal case law. | Case |
| GA - Alligators - Article 7. Feeding of Wild Alligators | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-170 | GA ST § 27-3-170 | This Georgia law makes it illegal to willfully feed or bait any wild alligator not in captivity. Violation is a misdemeanor with a fine of up to $200 or confinement up to 30 days, or both. | Statute |
| CA - Cats - Consolidated Cat Laws | West's Ann. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 31750 - 31766; West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4150 - 4151 | CA FOOD & AG § 31750 - 31766; CA FISH & G § 4150 - 4151 | These statutes comprise California consolidated cat laws. Among the provisions include possession requirements for non-domestic cats, vaccination and impound procedures for domestic cats, and legislative policy statements about feral cats. | Statute |
| Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2024) | 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D.Mo., 2024) | Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy organization and a plant-based meat alternative producer, filed this case to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the misrepresentation of a product as meat that is not derived from livestock or poultry. Plaintiffs bring four constitutional claims against the statute: violation of the First Amendment, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, violation of Due Process, and Declaratory Judgment. For the First Amendment violation, plaintiffs specifically argue that the statute is an unlawful restriction on truthful commercial speech. However, the court finds that the statute does not restrict truthful commercial speech, since plaintiffs are still able to accurately indicate what sort of products they are selling to consumers. For the Dormant Commerce Clause argument, the court finds that the statute does not discriminate in purpose or effect, and that the statute passes the Pike balancing test. For the Due Process claim, the court finds that the statute provides sufficiently specific guidance to both the public and prosecutors as to what actions are prohibited, so it does not violate Due Process. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claims and motion for summary judgment. | Case |
| Sentencia T-146/16 | Sentencia T-146/16 | Plaintiffs, a family that owned a howler monkey named "bebé" or "King Kong," filed "Amparo" seeking the protection of their rights to life and health, arguing that such rights had been violated by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca's" (CAR) refusal to return "bebé" to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that "bebé" was a member of their family, and not having him affected the family's emotional and physical health. Finally, they argued that the sadness and depression were so severe that they took group therapy with a psychologist. The monkey was stolen from the family's property and rescued was assisted by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca," who sent the monkey to "Fundación Bioandina." However, the defendants reported the monkey to be completely "humanized." He was so stressed that he did not eat and had to be relocated to the Medellin Zoo to be rehabilitated. The Second Chamber of Review of the Constitutional Court determined that wildlife is not subject to property by individuals and that the state of freedom of wildlife should be privileged. According to article 248 of the National Code of Renewable Natural Resources, the court stated that wildlife belongs to the nation. Therefore, the defendant's actions did not violate the family's well-being, as the forfeiture of wildlife is necessary to ensure their conservation protection as it is a constitutional mandate to protect biodiversity and environmental integrity. The court noted that the monkey had completed his rehabilitation process and had been reintroduced to his natural habitat. | Case |