Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Merced v. Kasson | 577 F.3d 578 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) | 2009 WL 2343172 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) |
Plaintiff José Merced, a Santeria Oba Oriate, or priest, brought action against the City of Euless alleging that city ordinances prohibiting the keeping of animals for slaughter and the slaughtering of animals prevented him from performing animal sacrifices essential to Santeria religious practice. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the city, but denied its request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the city and affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The court found that the city did not prove that the burden it placed on the plaintiff advanced a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so. In fact, the Court noted that prior to the ban, Merced had performed these sacrifices for sixteen years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals. The City's purported interest was further undermined by the fact that hunters are allowed to butcher dead animals at their homes. Thus, Euless failed to assert a compelling governmental interest in support of its ordinances that burden Merced's religious conduct. |
Case |
| WY - Livestock - Chapter 30. Offenses Concerning Livestock and Other Animals. | W. S. 1977 § 11-30-101 to 115 | WY ST § 11-30-101 to 115 | This Wyoming chapter of laws covers such offenses from misbranding livestock to a prohibition on the desertion and abandonment of sheep. Specific horse offenses are detailed, such as taking possession of any horse or mule found running at large on the open range with the intent of working or riding it, and the use of horses by a stable keeper without consent of the owner. The chapter also makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $750 and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months for willfully or maliciously killing a wild horse. | Statute |
| SC - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Code 1976 § 16-13-60; Code 1976 § 23-1-100; Code 1976 § 23-23-140; Code 1976 § 1-1-655; Code 1976 § 47-3-10 - 990; Code 1976 § 47-5-10 - 210; Code 1976 § 47-7-10 - 170; Code 1976 § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780, and § 51-3-145; Code 1976 § 50-19-960 | ST SC § 16-13-60; ST SC § 23-1-100; SC ST § 1-1-655; SC ST § 47-3-10 - 990; SC ST § 47-5-10 - 210; SC ST § 47-7-10 - 170; SC ST § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780; § 51-3-145; § 50-19-960 | These statutes comprise South Carolina's state dog laws. Among the provisions include laws concerning damage done by dogs (especially to livestock), rabies control provisions, and registration requirements. | Statute |
| Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | Slip Copy, 2018 WL 1420239 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2018) | This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants. | Case | |
| Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, | In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. | Pleading | ||
| State of Florida v. Peters | 534 So.2d 760 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1988). | This is an appeal from an order of the county court invalidating a City of North Miami ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs. The ordinance in question, City of North Miami Ordinance No. 422.5, regulates the ownership of pit bulls by requiring their owners to carry insurance or furnish other evidence of financial responsibility, register their pit bulls with the City, and confine the dogs indoors or in a locked pen. The court dismissed defendants claims that the ordinance violates equal protection and due process, and that the ordinance's definition of a pit bull is on its face unconstitutionally vague. | Case | |
| Jones v. Butz | 374 F.Supp. 1284 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) |
This action involves a challenge, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, to the Humane Slaughter Act and in particular to the provisions relating to ritual slaughter as defined in the Act and which plaintiffs suggest involve the Government in the dietary preferences of a particular religious (e.g., Orthodox Jews) group. The court held that there is no violation of Establishment Clause because no excessive governmental entanglement and by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other. |
Case | |
| State v. Smith | 54 A.3d 638 (Conn.App.) | 139 Conn.App. 107 |
A defendant was charged and convicted of one count of permitting a dog to roam at large. Upon appeal, the defendant argued the statute he was convicted under was unconstitutionally vague and that he was convicted under insufficient evidence. Defendant contended that simply having his dog off-leash did not mean that it was roaming at large and not under his control where the dog responded to verbal commands. The court rejected both of defendant's arguments, finding that the plain language of the statute clearly prohibits an owner allowing a dog to move freely on another's property unrestrained and not under the owner's direct influence. |
Case |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6549. Releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters; confinement and disposition of companion ani | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6549 | VA ST § 3.2-6549 | This Virginia statute outlines the requirements for releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters. Included in the provisions are recordkeeping requirements, a requirement that each agency receives a signed statement from each of its directors, operators, staff, or animal caregivers specifying that each individual has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment, and owner notice provisions. | Statute |
| OH - Dog - Chapter 955. Dogs (Consolidated dog laws) | RC §§ 955.01 - 99; § 9.62; § 1533.19 - 221 | This is the Ohio statute that regulates dogs in general, outlining rules and regulations for dog owners. The state leash requirement appears limited to rabies quarantines (Sec. 955.26). It also gives the definition of what is considered a dangerous or vicious dog, the rules and regulations for owners of these dogs, and penalization for breaking these rules. | Statute |