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Displaying 21 - 30 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| City of Houston v. Levingston | 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tx.App.-Hous.(1 Dist.) 2006) |
This opinion substitutes City of Houston v. Levingston, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)), which is withdrawn. |
Case | ||
| Colombia - Cruelty - LEY 84, 1989, Statue of Animal Protection | LEY 84, 1989 | Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. These exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regard to this law. | Statute | ||
| US - Assistance animals, housing - Subpart D. Prohibition Against Discrimination Because of Handicap. | 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 - 205 | These regulations set out the definitions relating to housing discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing Act. | Administrative | ||
| Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris | 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013) | 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv, 2013 WL 4615131 (9th Cir. 2013) |
Prior to California's Force Fed Birds law—which bans the sale of products that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size—coming into effect, two non-California entities produced foie gras that was sold at a California restaurant. When the law came into effect, all three entities sought to enjoin the state of California from enforcing the law; they argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court, however, denied their motion for preliminary injunction. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction. |
Case | |
| OR - Licenses - 609.060. Notice by publication of election result; dogs running at large prohibited; violations | O. R. S. § 609.060 | OR ST § 609.060 | This Oregon statute provides that if a governing body of a county by ordinance, or a measure approved by the electors in an election prohibits dogs from running at large, the county shall give notice, by publication in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county. If after 60 days from the notice, a keeper violates the running at large ordinance, he or she commits a Class B violation. | Statute | |
| King v. Karpe | 338 P.2d 979 (Ca.,1959) | 170 Cal.App.2d 344 (1959) |
Plaintiff sued for damages after a cow was sent to slaughter after a veterinarian had determined that she was incapable of breeding. The court recognized “peculiar value” of the cow where there was evidence that she was slaughtered before she had completed a course of treatment meant to restore her to brood status, that she could have produced for another five or six years, that the three bull calves she had produced were outstanding, that defendant took a half interest in them as the breeding fee and exhibited them at shows, that the cow's blood line produced calves particularly valuable for inbreeding, that plaintiff needed this type of stock to build up her herd, and that defendant had knowledge of these facts. The value of the bull to which the cow had been bred was also material to the cow’s actual value. |
Case | |
| MO - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 578. Miscellaneous Offenses. Animal Research and Production Facilities | V. A. M. S. 578.405 - 578.412 | MO ST 578.405 - 578.412 | This chapter comprises "The Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act." The act prohibits anyone from releasing, stealing, or otherwise intentionally causing the death, injury, or loss of any animal at or from an animal facility. It also prohibits any person from damaging, vandalizing, or stealing any property in or on an animal facility, or obtaining access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing acts not authorized by the facility. Generally, violation is a misdemeanor if the loss is less than $300 and a felony if it exceeds that amount. Any person who has been damaged by a violation of section 578.407 may recover all actual and consequential damages, punitive damages, and court costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, from the person causing such damage. | Statute | |
| ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds | 12 M. R. S. A. § 11215 | ME ST T. 12 § 11215 | This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime. | Statute | |
| BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) | S15G1184, 2016 WL 3144352, (Ga. June 6, 2016) | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. | Case | |
| NM - Licenses - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | N. M. S. A. 1978, § 77-1-15.1 | NM ST § 77-1-15.1 | This New Mexico statute provides that every municipality and each county may provide by ordinance for the mandatory licensure of dogs over the age of three months. License fees shall be fixed by the responsible municipality or county. Further, pursuant to this statute, every municipality and each county shall provide for the impoundment of rabies-suspect animals. | Statute |