Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States of America v. Lawrence J.Romano | 929 F.Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996) |
On July 7, 1995, a grand jury returned an eight-count indictment against the defendant charging him with violations of the Lacey Act; defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The court found that the Lacey Act embodies Congress' valid exercise of commerce power even when applied to a recreational hunter who purchased hunting guide services in violation of state law. |
Case | |
| OH - Endangered Species - Chapter 1518. Endangered Species. | R.C. § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | OH ST § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | These Ohio statutes protect both endangered plants and animals as defined by the State of Ohio as well as those species listed on the federal ESA list. Taking of an endangered or threatened animal species constitutes a misdemeanor and the person is required upon pleading guilty to the offense, in addition to any fine, term of imprisonment, seizure, and forfeiture imposed, to make restitution for the minimum value of the wild animal illegally held, taken, or possessed. Notably, if the aggregate value of the animal(s) taken exceeds $1,000, a person is guilty of a felony. | Statute |
| MI - Cruelty, neglect - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | MCL 750.50 | MI ST 750.50 | This statute sets out the Michigan duty of care for all vertebrate animals, including what constitutes sufficient food, water, shelter, sanitary conditions, exercise, and veterinary medical attention in order to maintain an animal in a state of good health. Also explained are the penalty and forfeiture provisions for violations of the statute. The exclusions under the statute include those animals used in hunting, fishing, trapping, horse racing, farming, pest control, zoos, lawful killing under the Animal Industry Act, and scientific research. In 2019, the penalty provisions were revised. A first violation with one animal is a 93 day/$1,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involves two or three animals or the death of any animal, the penalty increases to a 1-year/$2,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involved 4 or more animals but fewer than 10 animals or the person had one prior conviction, it becomes a 2-year/$2,000 felony. If the violation involved 10 or more animals but fewer than 25 animals or the person had two prior convictions, it becomes a 4-year/$5,000 felony. If the violation involved 25 or more animals or the person has had 3 or more prior convictions, it becomes a 7-year/$10,000 felony. Finally, if the person is an operator of a pet shop and he or she has had 5 or more prior convictions, it is a 2-year/$5,000 felony. | Statute |
| Motta v. Menendez | 46 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09778, 2007 WL 4328459 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 847 N.Y.S.2d 612 |
This New York case arose following an incident that occurred on December 13, 2003, in which the appellant's two pit bull terriers entered the petitioner's property, and one of appellant's dogs ("Duke") attacked and injured the petitioner's pet dog. Following a special proceeding, the lower court determined that appellant's pit bull terrier named “Duke” was a dangerous dog and directed that it be destroyed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that the dangerous dog statute in effect on December 13, 2003, did not provide that one dog attacking another was conduct subject to the penalty of destruction (Agriculture and Markets Law former §§ 108, 121). |
Case |
| Galindo v. State | --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 4128054 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2018) | Appellant Galindo pleaded guilty to cruelty to nonlivestock animals and a deadly-weapon allegation from the indictment. The trial court accepted his plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him to five years in prison. The facts stem from an incident where Galindo grabbed and then stabbed a dog with a kitchen knife. The indictment indicated that Galindo also used and exhibited a deadly weapon (a knife) during both the commission of the offense and flight from the offense. On appeal, Galindo argues that the deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient because the weapon was used against a "nonhuman." Appellant relies on the recent decision of Prichard v. State, 533 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), in which the Texas Court of Appeals held that a deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient where the sole recipient of the use or exhibition of the deadly weapon is a nonhuman. The court here found the facts distinguishable from Prichard. The court noted that Prichard left open the possibility that a deadly-weapons finding could occur when the weapon was used or exhibited against a human during the commission of an offense against an animal. Here, the evidence introduced at defendant's guilty plea and testimony from sentencing and in the PSIR are sufficient to support the trial court's finding on the deadly-weapons plea (e.g., the PSI and defense counsel stated that Galindo first threatened his girlfriend with the knife and then cut the animal in front of his girlfriend and her son). The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. | Case | |
| WA - Wolf - Chapter 16.001. Wolf-Livestock Management | West's RCWA 16.76.005 - .030 | WA ST 16.76.005 - .030 | These statutes create the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management grant within the department of agriculture. Further, a four-member advisory board is established to advise the department on the expenditure of the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management grant funds. The board must help direct funding for the deployment of nonlethal deterrence resources, including human presence, and locally owned and deliberately located equipment and tools. In addition, the northeast Washington wolf-livestock management account is created as a nonappropriated account in the custody of the state treasurer. | Statute |
| Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. | 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1110, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,068, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7152, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9715 |
This is a record review case in which the Appellants, an assortment of environmental organizations, challenge six biological opinions (BiOps) issued by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The BiOps in question allowed for timber harvests in specified Northwest forests and also authorized incidental "takes" of the Northern spotted owl, a threatened species under the ESA. With regard to appellants' challenge of the jeopardy analysis under the ESA, the court concluded that the jeopardy analysis conducted by the FWS in the six BiOps at issue in this case was permissible and within the agency's discretion. However, the critical habitat analysis in the six BiOps was fatally flawed because it relied on an unlawful regulatory definition of "adverse modification." The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the district court to grant summary judgment to the Petitioners on the critical habitat inquiry. |
Case |
| Mongelli v. Cabral | 632 N.Y.S.2d 927 (City of Younkers Ct. 1995) | 166 Misc.2d 240 (1995) |
A couple boarded their pet bird with a couple who groomed and boarded birds while the wife underwent extensive medical treatment. There was a dispute between the owners and the boarders over whether the bird was a gift or the subject of long-term boarding. The court found that the boarders had not established that the bird had been a gift. |
Case |
| IN RE: SEMA, INC. | 49 Agric. Dec. 176 (1990) | 1990 WL 320952 (U.S.D.A.) | Inspectors have considerable discretion in selecting their methods of inspection and way in which they document their observations, and photographic documentation obtained during normal business hours in reasonable manner that does not disrupt ongoing research must be construed as within boundaries of such discretion; interference with inspectors' reasonable efforts to take photographs to enhance inspection violates § 2146(a). | Case |
| NE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 10) | Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1001 - 1020 | NE ST § 28-1001 to 1020 | This Nebraska statutory section comprises the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty provision provides that a person who abandons or cruelly neglects an animal is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. Intentional animal cruelty results in a Class I misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class IV felony for any subsequent offense, unless such cruel mistreatment involves the knowing and intentional torture, repeated beating, or mutilation of the animal where such an act automatically results in a Class IV felony. Animal means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, but does not include an uncaptured wild creature (which appears to exclude otherwise heinous, intentional acts to wildlife). | Statute |