Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lieberman v. Powers | 873 N.E.2d 803 (Mass.App.Ct., 2007) | 70 Mass.App.Ct. 238 (2007), 2007 WL 2768668 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
In this Massachusetts case, Noah Lieberman sustained injuries when he was scratched and bitten by a cat while visiting a “cat lounge” at the Sheldon branch animal shelter, which was operated by the Animal Rescue League of Boston (ARL). Plaintiff alleged that his injuries resulted from the defendants' negligent design and maintenance of the cat lounge. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence, in the form of expert opinion, that an ordinarily prudent person in the circumstances of this case-which include the defendants' knowledge regarding the behavior (and potential for aggression) of cats-would have taken additional steps to ensure the safety of visitors to the cat lounge. At the very least, the defendants should have foreseen that the small size of the room, as well as the set-up (one food bowl, one litter box, two perches) and unsupervised operation of the cat lounge was such that it was more likely than not to increase stress in cats, which in turn made it more likely than not that the cats would behave aggressively. |
Case |
| In re: SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN | 56 Agric. Dec. 1419 (1997) | 1997 WL 730380 (U.S.D.A.) | Proof of respondent's willful violations of Animal Welfare Act and regulations and standards is not necessary for revocation or suspension of respondent's license where respondent received notice in writing of facts or conduct that might warrant suspension or revocation of his license, and respondent had opportunity to achieve compliance with requirements of Act and regulations and standards. | Case |
| Laws Banning Cosmetics Testing on Animals | This map contains links to the twelve (12) states that ban cosmetics testing on animals as of 2024. These laws generally prohibit manufacturers from importing or selling cosmetic products where the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer. These laws have some exceptions and typically include civil remedies for violation. | State map | ||
| In re: JOHN D. DAVENPORT, d/b/a KING ROYAL CIRCUS. | 57 Agric. Dec. 189 (U.S.D.A. May 18, 1998) | 1998 WL 300096 | Since 7 USCS § 2140 requires that exhibitors make their records identifying animals available for inspection at all reasonable times, it is not unreasonable to expect that records be with animals as they are transported | Case |
| MA - Leash - § 174B. Restraint of dogs in public highway rest areas; penalty | M.G.L.A. 140 § 174B | MA ST 140 § 174B | This Massachusetts law states that whoever is the owner or keeper of a dog shall restrain said dog by a chain or leash when in an officially designated public highway rest area. Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100. | Statute |
| US - Exotic Birds - Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act | 16 USC 4901 - 4916 | The Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act addresses the population threat to non-indigenous wild birds due to the demand the from U.S. as the number one importer of exotic birds (e.g., the "pet" bird trade). Exceptions under the statute include qualified breeding facilities, scientific or zoological study, and people returning the U.S. who have been out of the country for more than a year (limited to two birds). | Statute | |
| Rowlette v. Paul | 466 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1995) | 219 Ga.App. 597 (Ga. 1995) | This Georgia case involved a dog bite to a person who went to went to the Pauls' house in order to verify and update information for the Oglethorpe County Tax Assessor's Office. The court held that in the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to the victim even though the dog's presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation of the county leash law. In order to support an action for damages under OCGA § 51-2-7, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious or dangerous and that the owner had knowledge of this fact. | Case |
| Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua | 304 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D. Hawaii, 2003) |
Condominium resident filed a complaint alleging the housing authority violated the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act by failing to waive the "no pets" as a reasonable accommodation for his handicap. The court held that where the primary handicap is mental or emotional in nature, an animal "must be peculiarly suited to ameliorate the unique problems of the mentally disabled," and granted the housing authority's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the housing authority's failure to make a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. |
Case | |
| Wolf Timeline hmtl |
Pre 1930’s |
Article | ||
| Zimmerman v. Wolff | 622 F.Supp.2d 240 (E.D. Pa. 2008) | Plaintiff initiated this action against defendant in his official capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, asking the Court to enjoin defendant from seizing plaintiff's dogs and from preventing him from operating his dog kennel under his federal license. Plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The State moved for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Since the Animal Welfare Act did not create a private cause of action, the district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims were also dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought against state actors directly. Plaintiff’s motions were therefore denied and defendant’s motion was granted. The court went on to address whether it would be appropriate to grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to bring the Commerce and Supremacy clause claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and found that it would be futile for both. | Case |