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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gregg and Linda Schumacher, and Gregg Schumacher Furs, LLC dba as Schumacher Furs and Outerwear, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland, | In this Opinion, the judge granted the defendants a total of $96,870.85 in attorneys fees. The action stemmed from a lawsuit filed by the Schumachers for $ 6.6 million dollars against the City of Portland and the named defendants seeking damages for alleged illegal protest activities in front of their fur store. The defendants all prevailed on their Motion to Strike. The court observed that awarding of attorney fees is mandatory under Oregon law when a party prevails in an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit. Thus, the issue at hand was the amount of the attorney fees. The court went through the factors under Oregon law in analyzing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. When examining each factor, the court determined that the evidence either was in favor of defendants or was neutral. Notably, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants were not objectively reasonable because the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that the prevailing defendants did anything illegal. | Pleading | ||
| State of Florida v. Peters | 534 So.2d 760 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1988). | This is an appeal from an order of the county court invalidating a City of North Miami ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs. The ordinance in question, City of North Miami Ordinance No. 422.5, regulates the ownership of pit bulls by requiring their owners to carry insurance or furnish other evidence of financial responsibility, register their pit bulls with the City, and confine the dogs indoors or in a locked pen. The court dismissed defendants claims that the ordinance violates equal protection and due process, and that the ordinance's definition of a pit bull is on its face unconstitutionally vague. | Case | |
| CA - Housing - § 4715. Pets within common interest developments | West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 4715 | CA CIVIL § 4715 | This California statute states that no governing documents shall prohibit the owner of a separate interest within a common interest development from keeping at least one pet. | Statute |
| Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund | --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 5075116 (Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2018) | This is an appeal of a dismissal of appellant Landry's claims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“the TCPA”) and the subsequent required awarding of attorney fees and sanction under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009. Landry's is a large corporation that owns and operates more than 500 entertainment properties across the country, including the Houston Aquarium, Inc. The aquarium houses four white tigers in an human-made enclosure known as "Maharaja's Temple." Appellees, including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and its attorneys as well as a radio station owner (Cheryl Conley), asserted a variety of claims in connection with the publication of the notice to intend to sue under the Endangered Species Act due to the care and housing of the tigers. As a result of that notice and the associated publicity, Landry's asserted claims in the trial court for defamation, business disparagement, tortious interference with prospective business relations, abuse of process, trespass, conspiracy to commit each of these torts, and conspiracy to commit theft. Conley and ALDF moved to dismiss the claims under the TCPA, arguing that the claims related to exercise of free speech, petition, and association, and that Landry's could not make out a prima facie case. Additionally, they also argued that the claims were barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The lower court agreed and granted Conley's motion to dismiss. It also awarded $250,000 to ALDF and $200,000 to Conley. On appeal here, Landry again points to the allegedly defamatory statements released on social media (Twitter and Facebook) and through news media regarding the tigers' care. The court noted that many of the statements were non-actionable because they were not shown to be false statements of fact or were opinions. Nonetheless, even on those statements where Landry's met their burden of proving a defamation claim, the statements were protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege. The court was not convinced by Landry's contention that the statements were not made in contemplation of litigation because they were made after the required federal notice for filing suit under the ESA. Additionally, the court also rejected Landry's claim that the ALDF cannot claim attorney immunity because it is not a law firm and instead is comprised of attorneys who hold law licenses. The court observed that law licenses are not issued to business entities, but to individuals. The court also rejected Landry's remaining causes of action. As to the attorneys' fee and sanctions, the court did modify the attorneys' fees because one attorney at the trial court level did not participate in the appeal. Landry's then argued that the $450,000 in sanctions was excessive. The court first noted the TCPA mandates an award of sanctions and attorneys' fees. In reviewing the award for abuse of discretion, this court reviewed arguments by ALDF concerning Landry's hiring of the third largest law firm to defend a relatively small initial action, the filing of a 157-page response, with Landry's unwillingness to concede any points. The court took that in addition to several factors under the TCPA. The court was particularly concerned with Landry's filing of this suit on day 59 of the 60-day notice to file suit under the ESA (which may have been an indication to preempt the federal suit, according to the court). Despite that and more, the court did conclude that sanctions that were 2.4 and 2.8 times the attorneys' fees awards were excessive. The court suggested a remittitur, which would bring those awards respectively to $103,191.26 and $71,295.00. Thus, the lower court's decision to dismiss Landry's claims was affirmed, but the awards for attorneys' fee and sanctions were modified. | Case | |
| VA - Impound - § 3.2-6549. Releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters; confinement and disposition of companion ani | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6549 | VA ST § 3.2-6549 | This Virginia statute outlines the requirements for releasing agencies other than pounds or animal shelters. Included in the provisions are recordkeeping requirements, a requirement that each agency receives a signed statement from each of its directors, operators, staff, or animal caregivers specifying that each individual has never been convicted of animal cruelty, neglect, or abandonment, and owner notice provisions. | Statute |
| OH - Dog - Chapter 955. Dogs (Consolidated dog laws) | RC §§ 955.01 - 99; § 9.62; § 1533.19 - 221 | This is the Ohio statute that regulates dogs in general, outlining rules and regulations for dog owners. The state leash requirement appears limited to rabies quarantines (Sec. 955.26). It also gives the definition of what is considered a dangerous or vicious dog, the rules and regulations for owners of these dogs, and penalization for breaking these rules. | Statute | |
| MT - Great Falls - Title 6: Animals (Chapter 8: Animals) | Great Falls, Montana Code of Ordinances, Chapter 8: Animals, §§ 6.8.070 - 6.8.080, 6.8.310 |
In Great Falls, Montana, it is unlawful for any person, persons, or family to keep, harbor or maintain in or on the same premises a total of more than 2 dogs over 6 months of age or 2 cats over 6 months of age without first obtaining a multiple animal permit. A person found violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, which is punishable by a maximum fine of $500.00. Other penalties may also apply. |
Local Ordinance | |
| BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL | 59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899) | 14 Colo.App. 141 (Colo.App. 1899) |
In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare. |
Case |
| Ley Nº 23.899, 1990 | Ley Nº 23.899 | Ley 23.899, 1990 creates the National Service of Animal Health, and establishes its purposes, responsibilities and organization. According to this law, The National Service of Animal Health executes governmental policy on animal health. The main purpose of NSAH is to prevent, control and eradicate animal diseases and animal diseases transmissible to humans, to exercise hygienic-sanitary control of all products of animal origin, taking into account the advances in health technology and the most modern procedures for its control and the control of the products destined to the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of animal diseases. This entity is formed by an executive structure; a board of directors and provincial or regional commissions. The National Service of Animal is an entity of public private law with National scope, that maintains its relations with the national government through the Undersecretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing of the Nation. | Statute | |
| SD - Trust - 55-1-21. Trust for care of designated animal. | S D C L § 55-1-21 | SD ST § 55-1-21 | South Dakota's pet trust law was enacted in 2006. Amendments to the law in 2018 provide that trusts for the care of a designated animal or animals are valid. | Statute |