Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uganda - Cruelty - Chapter 220 Animal Act | Consolidation of 1988 of Ordinance No. 25 of 1957 as amended last by L.N. No. 224 of 1962 | This Uganda act, in English, provides provisions for the offense of animal cruelty. The act also allows the court to order the destruction of an animal when the animal's owner has been convicted of an offense of animal cruelty if the court is satisfied it would be cruel to keep the animal alive. The court may also deprive a person convicted of cruelty ownership of the animal and order for the animal to be disposed as it thinks fit. It is also illegal to permit a diseased animal to be at large in public places; a court may also order a diseased animal at large in any public place to be destroyed. No appeal can be made against either order of destruction. The sale of poisoned grain that is to be used as feeding stuff is also an offence. Also included in this act are provisions about experiments. | Statute | |
| Brockett v. Abbe | 206 A.2d 447 (Conn.Cir.A.D. 1964) | 206 A.2d 447 |
Defendant-farmer filed a counterclaim for damages for the erroneous determination by the veterinarian that certain cow was not pregnant (plaintiff veterinarian used a "punch test" - where a fist is struck against the abdomen of a cow to determine pregnancy rather than the industry-standard rectal examination). As a result, defendant-farmer sold the cow for $170 versus the $550 he could have received for a pregnant cow. The Court found that it was erroneous for the circuit court to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, as diagnoses and scientific treatment are improper subjects for the doctrine. The mere proof that the diagnosis later on turned out to be erroneous is insufficient to support a judgment, the court stated. |
Case |
| Ott v. Pittman | 463 S.E.2d 101 (S.C.App.,1995) | 320 S.C. 72 (1995) |
In this South Carolina case, a dog owner brought a negligence action against a hog farmer who shot two of the owner's champion "Treeing Walker Coonhound" dogs. The farmer counterclaimed, alleging damages for the dogs' action and malicious prosecution. The lower court ordered judgment for the dogs' owner (Ott) in the amount of $19,800, finding Pittman 90% liable. On the farmer's appeal, this court upheld the $19,800 award, finding sufficient support based on expert testimony about the specific qualities of the breed. |
Case |
| IN - Animal Testing - THE BREEDING OF AND EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS (CONTROL AND SUPERVISION) RULES, 1998 | 1843. G.S.R. 1074(E), dated 15th December, 1998 | The Rules, drafted under the powers conferred by section (1)(1-A) and (2) of Section 17 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate the breeding and testing of animals in laboratories. It sets up an 'Institutional Animal Ethics Committee' that ensures the performance of experiments of animals in an establishment in a humane manner. The Rules specify the conditions that breeders are allowed to raise these animals in for testing, and the manner in which these animals must be treated in establishments where they are used for testing. | Statute | |
| VA - Disaster - § 44-146.18. Department of Emergency Services continued as Department of Emergency Management; | VA Code Ann. § 44-146.18 | VA ST § 44-146.18 | In Virginia, the State Department of Emergency Management must develop an emergency response plan to address the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals in the event of a disaster (subsection (B)(18)). | Statute |
| OK - Licenses - § 22-115. Animals running at large--Regulation and taxation | 11 Okl. St. Ann. § 22-115 to 115.1 | OK ST T. 11 § 22-115 to 115.1 | This Oklahoma statute provides that the municipal governing body may regulate or prohibit animals from running at large. The governing body may also regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and authorize the killing of dogs which are found at large in violation of any ordinance regulating the same. | Statute |
| United States v. Gideon | United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292 (1856). |
The Defendant was convicted in the District Court of Hennepin county for the unlawfully malice killing of a dog. The Defendant appealed the descision to the Supreme Court of Minnesota to determine whether a dog has value and thus would be cover by the Minnesota cruelty to animal statute. The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that a dog has no value and would not be covered by the statute. |
Case | |
| Smith v. City of New York | 889 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2009) | 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 08969 |
This New York appeal reversed the lower court's judgment finding Officer Smith strictly liable for dog-bite injuries sustained by infant plaintiffs. The court found that, in the limited time the officer spent with the dog, the dog acted friendly, playful, and "rambunctious." He did not see the dog growl or lunge at the plaintiff and her family, who were sitting in the precinct house. The testimony adduced at trial did not establish that Officer Smith knew or should have known of the dog's vicious propensities. Further, the court found the evidence was insufficient to show that Officer Smith owned the dog. Rather, he took temporary custody of the abandoned dog with the intention to transport him to the ASPCA, and the dog was in his possession for, at most, a few hours. |
Case |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught | 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) | Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. | Case | |
| TN - Domestic Violence - Part 6 Domestic Abuse | T. C. A. § 36-3-601 - 606 | Under Tennessee's Domestic Abuse Act, the definition section states that "abuse" includes inflicting, or attempting to inflict, physical injury on any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by an adult or minor. Section 606(9) allows the court to direct the care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the household. Further, in no instance shall the animal be placed in the care, custody, or control of the respondent, but shall instead be placed in the care, custody or control of the petitioner or in an appropriate animal foster situation. | Statute |