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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
FL - Facility dog - § 92.55. Judicial or other proceedings involving victim or witness under the age of 18 West's F.S.A. § 92.55 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.55 This statute allows any party at a judicial proceeding to protect a victim or witness under the age of 18 from severe emotional or mental harm due to the presence of the defendant. With respect to facility dogs, the law states that the court may set any other conditions it finds just and appropriate, including the use of a service or therapy animal that has been evaluated and registered according to national standards, in any proceeding involving a sexual offense. When deciding whether to permit a child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness to testify with the assistance of a registered service or therapy animal, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the age of the child victim or witness; (2) the age of the sexual offense victim or witness at the time the sexual offense occurred; (3) the interests of the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness; (4) the rights of the parties to the litigation; and (5) any other relevant factor that would facilitate the testimony by the child victim or witness or sexual offense victim or witness. Statute
ME - Disaster - Chapter 307. State of Maine Animal Response Team. 7 M.R.S.A. § 1901 - 1902 ME ST T. 7 § 1901 - 1902 The Commissioner of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources is directed to develop a State of Maine Animal Response Team to support a network that protects human and animal health through preparation, response and recovery for animal emergencies. The Team is to facilitate a response to a natural or man-made disaster and minimize the economic and environmental impacts of animal emergencies. The Treasurer of State is mandated to establish the State of Maine Animal Response Team Fund to pay costs incurred by the Team. Statute
Habitat for Horses v. Salazar 745 F.Supp.2d 438 (S.D.N.Y., 2010) 2010 WL 4151863 (S.D.N.Y.)

Prior to October 2010, the North Piceance Herd Area served as a home to approximately 60 wild horses. The horses, however, were removed by the BLM, giving rise to this litigation. Plaintiffs assert that the BLM’s decision to remove the wild horses violates the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, NEPA, the Information Quality Act, and the FLPMA. The District Court concluded that, while Plaintiffs did establish irreparable harm, they were not likely to succeed on the merits.

Case
Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska App., 2007) 2007 WL 2965781 (Alaska App.)

Krystal R. Allen pleaded no contest to two counts of cruelty to animals after animal control officers came to her home and found 180 to 200 cats, 3 dogs, 13 birds, and 3 chickens in deplorable conditions. She was sentenced to a 30-day jail term and was placed on probation for 10 years. One of the conditions of Allen's probation prohibits her from possessing any animals other than her son's dog. In first deciding that its jurisdictional reach extends to claims not just based on the term of imprisonment, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by restricting Allen's possession of animals during the term of her probation.  

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Ohio v. George 2014-Ohio-5781 (App. Ct, 2014) Clayton George was convicted of raping two children of his girlfriend, age six and eight at the time of the crime. Among assignments of error on appeal was that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing Avery, a facility dog, to accompany the two children during their testimony without a showing of necessity. On appeal, the defense argued that (1) unlike the facility dogs in Tohom, Spence, and Dye, Avery was “recognizable on the record while he was in court,” (2) the prosecution failed to show necessity for having Avery at trial, and (3) the standards set in Tohom, Spence, and Dye should have applied to determine whether Avery was permitted at trial. The appellate court noted that the defense had not objected to the presence of the dog during the trial nor had he made these three points at trial, meaning that the appellate court did not need to consider them for the first time on appeal under Ohio appellate law. The assignments of error were all overruled and the judgement of the trial court was affirmed. Case
IL - Hunting - 5/48-3. Hunter or fisherman interference 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-3 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-3 A person commits hunter or fisherman interference when he or she intentionally or knowingly obstructs or interferes with the lawful taking of wildlife or aquatic life by another person with the specific intent to prevent that lawful taking. This includes things such as blocking or impeding the person hunting, using objects or barriers, using artificial or natural stimuli to hinder the lawful taking, or even using a drone in a way that interferes with another person's lawful taking of wildlife or aquatic life. A first violation is a Class B misdemeanor with enhacements for subsequent offenses. Statute
UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Young 380 F.Supp.2d 1166 (2005, D.Hawai'i) 2005 WL 1907675 (D.Hawai'i)

Some parasail operators brought an action against state officials challenging validity of a state law that banned parasailing in navigable waters. Defendants argued that the court's order should be reconsidered in light of an intervening change in federal law that they say allows for the seasonal parasailing ban.  After vacation of summary judgment in favor of operators, 2005 WL 1910497, the state moved for relieve from final judgment.  The District Court held that the federal law permitting Hawaii to enforce state laws regulating recreational vessels for purpose of conserving and managing humpback whales did not violate separation of powers doctrine, and federal law did not violate Equal Protection Clause.

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Cornett v. Red Stone Group, Inc. Cornett v. Red Stone Group, 41 N.E.3d 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)

Cornett filed suit against Red Stone Group, Inc. alleging negligence and premise liability. Cornett argued that Red Stone Group maintained a defective gate and fence that led to the Red Stone Group's horses escaping and trampling Cornett which caused her serious injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Red Stone Group on the basis of that it was immune from liability under the equine activities statute. Cornett appealed the court’s decision and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ultimately, the court of appeals needed to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was immune from liability under the statute. In order to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was covered under the statute, the court of appeals looked to the language of the statute. After looking at the language of the statute, the court of appeals found that Cornett was an “equine activity participant” at the time of her injury and therefore Red Stone Group could not be liable for her injuries. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and granted summary judgment for Red Stone Group.

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FL - Impound - Abandonment of animals by owner; procedure for handling West's F. S. A. § 705.19 FL ST § 705.19 This Florida statute provides that any animal placed in the custody of a licensed veterinarian or bona fide boarding kennel that is abandoned by its owner or for a period of more than 10 days after written notice is given to the owner may be turned over to the custody of the nearest humane society or dog pound in the area for disposal as such custodian may deem proper. This provisions immunizes such facilities from liability resulting from this action. Statute

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