Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y. | 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) |
In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. |
Case | ||
| PA - Hunting, Internet - § 7641. Computer-assisted remote harvesting of animals | 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7641 | 18 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 7641 (West) | This statute prohibits computer-assisted remote hunting and the operation of computer assisted hunting facilities in the state of Pennsylvania. Violation is a misdemeanor of the third degree. | Statute | |
| LA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | LSA-R.S. 13:5544 - 45; LSA-R.S.3:2451 - 2778; LSA-R.S. 56:124.1, 141; LSA-R.S. § 40:1269.1 - 4; LSA-R.S. 49:165 | These statutes comprise Louisiana's dog laws. Included among the provisions are dangerous dog laws, impoundment provisions, and the relevant licensing requirements. | Statute | ||
| DE - Exotic Pets - CHAPTER 72. POSSESSION OF MAMMALS OR REPTILES EXOTIC TO DELAWARE | 3 Del.C. § 7201 - 7203 | DE ST TI 3 § 7201 - 7203 | This Delaware law requires a permit to possess, sell, or import any non-native wild animal. No such permits will be granted for non-native venomous snakes. | Statute | |
| Raymond v. Bujold | 199 A. 91 (N.H.,1938) |
A finder of a lost dog did not become the "keeper" of the dog when he tied it up and summoned the owner to retrieve it. The finder was therefore entitled to sue the owner for damage caused by the dog. |
Case | ||
| Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc. | 634 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.App., 2006) | 2006 WL 1550709 (Ga.App.), 280 Ga.App. 629 (2006) |
In this Georgia case, the Court of Appeals held that, on issue of first impression, an alligator farm was not a "farm" within meaning of the state statute that exempted "farm laborers" or their employers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (Gill was bitten while cleaning out a pen and subsequently developed both a bone infection and salmonella). In construing the relevant statutes, the court found that in the chapter on Employment Security Law (ESL), the legislature meant that individuals who raise or tend wildlife perform "agricultural labor," but only when they do so on a "farm," which is "used for production of stock, dairy products, poultry, fruit, and fur-bearing animals." Accordingly, the court concluded that when Gill cleaned out the alligator pens, he was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor." However, his employer, an alligator farm, was not a "farm" because alligators are "wildlife," not "[live]stock ... [or] fur-bearing animals." |
Case | |
| Commonwealth v. Russo | 218 N.E.3d 116, review granted, 493 Mass. 1104, 223 N.E.3d 741 (2023) | 103 Mass.App.Ct. 319, 2023 WL 5962931 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 14, 2023) | This is a case regarding an animal cruelty charge brought against defendant, the owner of an elderly, terminally ill dog. First, defendant’s family brought the fourteen-year-old dog to an animal hospital. The staff at the hospital examined the dog, which had a large mass on his side, and recommended that the dog have surgery to remove the mass. Defendant did not authorize the surgery, and instead took the dog home. Three weeks later, defendant brought the dog back to the animal hospital, where the staff noticed that his condition had worsened significantly. At this point, the veterinarian recommended humane euthanasia to end the dog’s suffering, but defendant declined and requested the surgery. The veterinarian declined, claiming the dog would not survive the surgery, and defendant took the dog home saying they would have another vet euthanize the dog. The veterinarian reported defendant to the Animal Rescue League of Boston, who conducted a welfare check on the dog and found it in very poor health. When the Animal Rescue League asked defendant to euthanize the dog or get him medical attention, defendant declined and insisted the dog would die at home. Defendants were charged with violating the animal cruelty statute, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, and this appeal followed. The question on appeal is whether defendant’s conduct in refusing to euthanize the dog constitutes animal cruelty under the statute. The Commonwealth argues that the animal cruelty statute covers the conduct of one who has charge of an animal but, rather than inflicting the harm directly, “authorizes or permits” the animal “to be subjected to” harm, and that keeping the dog in a state of suffering rather than euthanizing the dog fits this definition. However, after examining case law, the court could not find a case in which a person's failure to euthanize an animal was interpreted as “subjecting” an animal to harm, and did not want to extend the statute that far. The court affirmed the holding of the lower court. | Case | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations | 2000 WL 1214 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 99-33632 |
This interim final rule allows the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations fully complying with the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP). It also allows U.S. vessels to set their purse seines on dolphins in the ETP. The standard for the use of "dolphin-safe" labels for tuna products also is changed. |
Administrative | |
| IA - Dog License - 351.27. Right to kill tagged dog | I. C. A. § 351.27 | IA ST § 351.27 | This Iowas statute makes it lawful for any person to kill a dog, wearing a collar with a rabies vaccination tag attached, when the dog is caught in the act of worrying, chasing, maiming, or killing any domestic animal or fowl, or when such dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person. | Statute | |
| CA - Cockfighting - § 597i. Cockfighting implements; prohibitions; penalties | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597i | CA PENAL § 597i | This statute makes it unlawful for anyone to manufacture, buy, sell, barter, exchange, or have in his possession any of the implements commonly known as gaffs or slashers, or any other sharp implement designed to be attached in place of the natural spur of a gamecock or other fighting bird. The section also provides for forfeiture of such items, in addition to any sentence imposed by the court. | Statute |