Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN RE: TERRY LEE HARRISON AND PAMELA SUE HARRISON, RESPONDENTS | 51 Agric. Dec. 234 (1992) | 1992 WL 17132 (U.S.D.A.) | Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements. | Case |
| Dirty cages where FUCEP housed night monkey | Slideshow Images | |||
| Colombia - Slaughter - Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500, 2007, establishes the technical regulations that create the standards for inspection, supervision, and control in the meat production chain. This decree focuses on the sanitary and health aspects involved in the slaughter phase of livestock. However, there are some provisions that directly or indirectly address animal welfare. Some of these provisions include raising animals in facilities that pose a minimum risk for animal production and welfare. Primary production farms must implement good practices in animal feeding and animal welfare. Transportation vehicles must have adequate physical separation mechanisms to prevent overcrowding, crowding, and animal aggression during transport. In addition, vehicles must have adequate conditions for animal welfare, biosecurity, biocontainment, and sanitary management. Article 31 Num 3 establishes that animals must be slaughtered by non-cruel methods, which ensure that they are rendered unconscious before being slaughtered. The National Institute for Food and Drug Supervision -INVIMA- is the authority in charge of establishing and overseeing compliance with slaughter methods. | Statute | |
| Australia - Kangaroos - Shooting for Non-Commerical Purposes | The National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies for Non-commercial Purposes sets an achievable standard of humane conduct and is the minimum required of persons shooting kangaroos and wallabies for reasons other than commercial utilisation of kangaroo products (skins and meat). This Code has been produced to ensure that all persons intending to shoot free-living kangaroos or wallabies for non-commercial purposes undertake the shooting so that the animal is killed in a way that minimises pain and suffering. | Statute | ||
| DE - Property - § 3050F. Dogs deemed personal property; theft; penalty | 16 Del.C. § 3050F | DE ST TI 16 § 3050F | Dogs are considered personal property in Delaware. | Statute |
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
Case |
| US - Divorce/Custody - Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act. Section 307. Part III Dissolution. Section 307 Disposition of Property. | ULA Marr & Divorce s 307 | Uniform act created to address division of marital property upon divorce in equitable distribution jurisdiction. Two alternatives are given, directing equitable apportionment in one and division in just proportions in the other. | Statute | |
| WILDEARTH GUARDIANS vs. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE | 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 93169 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
In this case, the WildEarth Guardians brought a suit against the National Park Service for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act (RMNP)'s ban on hunting. The district court and the appeals court, however, held that the NPS did not violate NEPA because the agency articulated reasons for excluding the natural wolf alternative from its Environmental Impact Statement. Additionally, since the National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA)'s detrimental animal exception and the RMNP's dangerous animal exception apply to the prohibition on killing, capturing, or wounding—not the prohibition on hunting, the use of volunteers to cull the park’s elk population did not violate the RMNP or the NPSOA. |
Case |
| Caswell v. People | 536 P.3d 323 (Colo., 2023) | 2023 CO 50 (Colo., 2023) | This case concerns several charges of animal cruelty against petitioner Caswell. A welfare check was conducted by a deputy at the Lincoln County Sheriff’s office in response to a report on Ms. Caswell. After two welfare checks were conducted, the deputies executed a search warrant at the Caswell residence, resulting in the seizure of sixty animals. These animals lacked sufficient food or water, were kept in enclosed spaces filled with feces and urine, and many of the animals were underweight or had untreated medical problems. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, charged Ms. Caswell with forty-three class six counts of cruelty to animals, which were charged as felonies because Ms. Caswell had prior convictions of misdemeanor animal cruelty on her record. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts and sentenced her to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. An appeal followed and the holding was affirmed. Petitioner filed for certiorari and the Supreme Court of Colorado granted. Here, petitioner argues that the use of her prior convictions for animal cruelty to enhance her charges to felonies violates the Sixth Amendment and article II of the Colorado Constitution. The court first considered whether the legislature meant to make the statutory provision used to enhance Caswell’s sentence as an element versus a sentence enhancer. The court here listed five factors to consider whether a fact is an element or sentencing factor: (1) the statute's language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5) the statute's legislative history. Four of these five factors signaled a legislative intent to designate it a sentence enhancer, so the court concluded that the legislature intended to designate the fact of prior convictions as a sentence enhancer rather than an element. The court also concluded that the sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the holding of the lower court. | Case |
| IN - Animal Sacrifice - RAJASTHAN ANIMALS AND BIRDS SACRIFICES (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1975 | Act No. 21 of 1975 | The law, specific to the North Indian state of Rajasthan, prohibits the sacrifice of animals and birds in temples or places of public religious worship. No person shall sacrifice an animal or birds or officiate at such a sacrifice—doing so is a criminal offence and violators may be imprisoned or fined. The Executive Magistrate may issue a prohibitory order if they receive information from a police officer that an animal sacrifice is going to be made | Statute |