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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Youngstown v. Traylor | 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 914 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio,2009) | 2009 WL 2634570 (Ohio), 2009 -Ohio- 2971 | Defendant was charged with two misdemeanors after his unrestrained Italian Mastiff/Cane Corso dogs attacked a wire fox terrier and its owner. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that YCO 505.19(b) is unconstitutional and a violation of his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Youngstown municipal ordinance was constitutional because it was “rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in protecting citizens from vicious dogs,” provided “the dog owner with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the dog's classification,” and did not “label dogs as dangerous or vicious” solely based on their breed type. | Case | |
| ME - Fish and Wildlife - Chapter 7. Regulations for Wildlife in Captivity | 09-137 CMR Ch. 7, § 7.00 - 7.18 | 09-137 CMR Ch. 7, § 7.00 - 7.18 | This set of Maine regulations concerns the keeping of captive wildlife. A permit is generally required for importation, possession, propagation, rehabilitation, and exhibition of wildlife in the state. Wildlife held in captivity must be confined, contained, controlled, and sheltered in such a way as to protect it, and to protect property of others and the health and safety of the public. Section 7.11 provides the conditions and restrictions under the permit. Section 7.12 states that no primate shall be permitted unless the applicant/permit holder demonstrates a physical aide legitimate need for physical aide from a primate, and the animal in question is specifically trained for such purposes ( or the applicant must be providing foster care or training for the primate under direction or supervision of a recognized authority for same). | Administrative | |
| CO - Rehabilitation, wildlife - Chapter 14. Wildlife Rehabilitation. | 2 CO ADC 406-14 | 2 CCR 406-14:1400 to 1407 | This set of Colorado rules concerns wildlife rehabilitation licensing. Requirements for wildlife holding enclosures are outlined. The care, treatment, and disposition of wildlife requirements are detailed as well as provisions for releasing wildlife. | Administrative | |
| NJ - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | NJSA 4:22-10 to 4:22-61; NJSA 2C:33-31 - 32 | NJ ST 4:22-10 to 4:22-61; 2C:33-31 - 32 | These New Jersey statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. According to the definitional section, "animal" or "creature" includes the whole brute creation. Exclusions under the act include state regulated scientific experiments, state sanctioned killing of animals, hunting of game, training of dogs, normal livestock operations, and the killing of rats and mice. With regard to livestock practices, no person may be cited or arrested for a first offense involving a minor or incidental violation of any provision of this title involving alleged cruelty to domestic livestock unless that person has first been issued a written warning. | Statute | |
| Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T - Ecuador | Sentencia 09333-2022-00667T | Este es el caso de cuatro gatos llamados Luna, Manchas, Sonic y Tiger y dos perros, Pantera y Noah que estaban dentro de las propiedades confiscadas por las autoridades en un caso de tráfico de drogas. El abogado Kevin Prendes Vivar presentó un recurso de habeas corpus en representación de los cuidadores de los animales, alegando que los animales estaban siendo retenidos ilegalmente por el "Secretario Técnico de Gestión Inmobiliaria del Sector Público" o "Inmobiliar", la agencia gubernamental que confiscó las propiedades. El demandante argumentó que los animales, como sujetos de derechos según la decisión de la Corte Constitucional 253-20-JH/22, estaban en un estado de soledad que los ponía en riesgo de problemas de salud y bienestar, ya que estos animales tenían un apego emocional a sus cuidadores. Los animales son seres sensibles diferentes de otros objetos, y su detrimento se refleja en su salud física y emocional, causando condiciones como depresión y ansiedad, condiciones que podrían poner fin potencialmente a su vida. Los animales estaban siendo retenidos por 'Inmobiliar', y los demandantes no habían recibido ninguna información sobre la condición de los animales. Además, los demandantes estaban preocupados por la condicion de los animales ya que no tenian conocimiento acerca de su alimentacion. Especialmente porque 'Inmobiliar' no tenía presupuesto para alimentar a los animales sujetos a confiscaciones. Según loa demandante, los animales eran miembros de su familia, y sus hijos sufrían sin ellos. El tribunal provincial de Guyanas concedió el habeas corpus, sosteniendo que los animales son sujetos de derechos, encontrando que 'Inmobiliar' había violado los derechos de los animales al considerarlos propiedad personal embargable. Por lo tanto, el tribunal determinó que su confiscación era ilegal, arbitraria e ilegítima. Para proteger sus derechos a la vida, la libertad y la integridad, ordenó a 'Inmobiliar' devolver los animales a sus cuidadores. En su análisis, el tribunal afirmó que, según el caso de Estrellita, los animales no deberían ser protegidos únicamente desde una perspectiva del ecosistema o desde la perspectiva de las necesidades humanas, sino más bien desde su individualidad y su valor intrínseco. El tribunal también instruyó a la entidad gubernamental a no considerar más a las "mascotas" como semovientes en futuros procedimientos judiciales, y a distribuir, a través del correo electrónico institucional, a todos sus funcionarios la decisión de la corte constitucional 253-20-JH/22, ordenándoles leerla y analizarla. Esta decisión fue apelada por 'Inmobiliar' y la sala especializada en lo penal de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de Guyanas anuló la decisión que otorgaba el habeas corpus a favor de los animales, afirmando que este mecanismo legal no era apropiado en el caso de animales domésticos. En su fallo, el tribunal ordenó la devolución de los animales a "Inmobiliar". Esta decisión ha sido enviada a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión. Si la corte la selecciona, decidirá si un recurso de habeas corpus es apropiado en casos relacionados específicamente con animales de compañía. | Case | ||
| US - Migratory Bird - Migratory Bird Treaty Act | 16 USC 703 - 712 | This law implements the treaties that the US has signed with a number of countries protecting birds that migrate across our national borders. It makes illegal the taking, possessing or selling of protected species. | Statute | ||
| Mejia v. State | 681 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App. 1984). |
Rooster fighting case. Testimony from the defendant's witness, a sociologist that argued cockfighting is not generally thought of as an illegal activity, was irrelevant in cruelty to animals conviction. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. |
Case | ||
| Sickel v. State | 363 P.3d 115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7873714 (Alaska Ct. App., 2015) | Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a) after one of her horses was found starving, without shelter, and frozen to the ground (it later had to be euthanized). On appeal, defendant claims that she did not act with the requisite "criminal negligence" under the statute unless she had a duty of care to prevent the specified harm. The court noted that while the statute does not specify the exact nature of this duty to care for particular animals, common law fills the gap. In looking to similar laws and cases from other states, the court found that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) applies only to people who have assumed responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise. The jury instructions taken as a whole and the prosecutor's argument and rebuttal demonstrated that Sickel assumed the duty of care with regard to the horses and was the person tending the horses in the last three days before the now-deceased horse collapsed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case | |
| State v. Cleve | 980 P.2d 23 (N.M. 1999) |
Defendant was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals, two counts of unlawful hunting, and negligent use of firearm. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "any animal," within meaning of animal cruelty statute, applied only to domesticated animals and wild animals previously reduced to captivity, and thus, the animal cruelty statute did not apply to defendant's conduct in snaring two deer. The court also held that even if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, New Mexico's laws governing hunting and fishing preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to the taking of deer by Cleve in this case. |
Case | ||
| MS - Leash, Impound - Chapter 19. Health, Safety, and Welfare | Miss. Code Ann. § 21-19-9 | MS ST § 21-19-9 | This Mississippi law grants broad powers to local units of government for animal control, including the power to prevent or regulate the running at large of animals of all kinds, and to cause such as may be running at large to be impounded and sold to discharge the costs and penalties provided for the violation of such regulations and the expense of impounding and keeping and selling the same; to regulate and provide for the taxing of owners and harborers of dogs, and to destroy dogs running at large, unless such dogs have proper identification. | Statute |