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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor (2015) | The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO. | Pleading | |||
| NM - Property - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-1 | NM ST § 77-1-1 | Dogs, cats and domestic birds are considered personal property in New Mexico. | Statute | |
| MD - Bite - Maryland Dangerous Dog Laws | MD Code, Criminal Law, § 10-619 | MD CRIM LAW § 10-619 | This Maryland statute outlines what is a "Dangerous dog." As defined by statute, it is a dog that, without provocation, has killed or inflicted severe injury on a person, or it is a potentially dangerous dog that bites a person, when not on its owner's real property, kills or inflicts severe injury on a domestic animal, or attacks without provocation. An owner of a dangerous dog must keep the dog securely enclosed on his or her property or must muzzle and restrain the dog. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $2,500. | Statute | |
| Sacco v. Tate | 175 Misc.2d 901 (N.Y. 1998) | 175 Misc.2d 901, 672 N.Y.S.2d 618, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98231 |
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action to recover veterinary expenses incurred by reason of the fact that the dog sold to them by defendant was not healthy. The court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to avail themselves of the remedies afforded by article 35-D of the General Business Law by reason of their failure to comply with the requirements set forth in section 753 thereof (to wit, they did not produce the dog for examination by a licensed veterinarian designated by the dealer, nor did they furnish the dealer with a certification of unfitness of the dog within three days after their receipt thereof). The court, however, noted that the article does not limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law, so the award by the court was affirmed (albeit on a different basis). |
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| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case | |
| MS - Dangerous Animal - Chapter 3. Crimes Against the Person. | Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-45 | MS ST § 97-3-45 | This Mississippi law makes an owner liable for manslaughter if he or she wilfully allows a mischievous animal to go at large, or it goes at large because the owner fails to exercise ordinary care, and the animal, while at large or not confined, kills any human being who took reasonable precautions to avoid the animal. | Statute | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) (unpublished) | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) | In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency. | Case | |
| CT- Pet Shops - Sec. 22-344-21a. Prohibited sales | CT ADC § 22-344-32 - 94 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 22-344-32 - § 22-344-94 | This Connecticut regulation lists the animals of which the exhibition, sale or offer for sale by a pet shop is prohibited. The condition in which commercial kennel facilities, pet shops, grooming facilities, training facilities, and animal shelters must be kept are described including sanitation, health requirements, ventilation, and other structural requirements. | Administrative | |
| IL - Ordinances - 5/7. Remittance of fees; Animal Control Fund; use of fund; self-insurance | 510 I.L.C.S. 5/7 | IL ST CH 510 § 5/7 | This Illinois statute provides that all registration fees collected shall be remitted the county Animal Control Fund. This fund shall be set up for the purpose of paying costs of the Animal Control Program. This includes paying claims for loss of livestock or poultry and for other ordinance enacted measures, including the purchase of human rabies anti-serum, human vaccine, the cost for administration of serum or vaccine, minor medical care; paying the cost of stray dog control, impoundment, education on animal control and rabies; or any county or municipal ordinance as established by ordinance of the County Board. In 2013, the statute was amended to provide different provisions for how the fund shall be used for cities with 3 million or more people and for cities with less than 3 million people. | Statute | |
| Trager v. Thor | 516 N.W.2d 69 (Mich.,1994) | 445 Mich. 95 (Mich.,1994) |
In this Michigan case involving an action for damages after personal injury, the father of the dog’s owner was visiting his son's home when he agreed to supervise the dog while his son and daughter-in-law went shopping. The n eighbor’s child was subsequently bitten by the dog, which had been put by defendant into a bedroom. This court held that the defendant, as a temporary caretaker of the dog, could not be held to the strict liability standard of an owner keeper, but could be liable under theory of negligence. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the father was negligent in fulfilling his duty of care in supervising the dog, which precluded summary judgment in a negligence action. |
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