Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ME - Dog, Dangerous - Maine Dangerous Dog Laws | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3951 - 3955; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3961 - 3964; 7 M. R. S. A. § 3907 | ME ST T. 7 § 3951 - 3955; ME ST T. 7 § 3961 - 3964; ME ST T.7 § 3907 | This Maine statutory sections outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. It first provides that any person may lawfully kill a dog if necessary to protect that person, another person or a domesticated animal during the course of a sudden, unprovoked assault. A person who owns or keeps a dangerous dog commits a civil violation for which the court shall adjudge a fine of not less than $250 and not more than $1,000. The dog may be ordered to be muzzled, or euthanized if it has killed, maimed or inflicted serious bodily injury upon a person or has a history of a prior assault. Notably, if a dog whose owner refuses or neglects to comply with the order wounds any person by a sudden assault or wounds or kills any domestic animal, the owner shall pay the person injured treble damages and costs to be recovered by a civil action. The statute sets out the specific procedure for declaring a dog dangerous and the statutory definition of dangerous is also provided by reference to a companion statute. | Statute | |
| Motta v. Menendez | 46 A.D.3d 685 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2007) | 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09778, 2007 WL 4328459 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.), 847 N.Y.S.2d 612 |
This New York case arose following an incident that occurred on December 13, 2003, in which the appellant's two pit bull terriers entered the petitioner's property, and one of appellant's dogs ("Duke") attacked and injured the petitioner's pet dog. Following a special proceeding, the lower court determined that appellant's pit bull terrier named “Duke” was a dangerous dog and directed that it be destroyed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that the dangerous dog statute in effect on December 13, 2003, did not provide that one dog attacking another was conduct subject to the penalty of destruction (Agriculture and Markets Law former §§ 108, 121). |
Case | |
| Smith v. Lane | 832 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2005) | 358 Ill.App.3d 1126; 295 Ill.Dec. 497; 2005 WL 1714281 |
In this Illinois case, the passenger of horse-drawn carriage brought action in negligence and strict liability against driver of carriage and owner of horse and carriage for injuries passenger received when carriage went off road and overturned. The lower court dismissed all of passenger's counts. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that, as matter of first impression, the passenger was not subject to provisions of EALA, and the alleged facts sufficient to state cause of action under state Animal Control Act. |
Case | |
| TX - Initiatives - Proposition 6, Right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife | Proposition 6 (2015) |
This proposed constitutional amendment recognizes the right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife subject to laws that promote wildlife conservation. It was a legislative referendum originally proposed as Senate Joint Resolution 22 (attached below). The measure passed in November 2015 with 82% of the vote. |
Statute | ||
| US - Service Animals - Part 35. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local | 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 to .139 | The purpose of this part is to effectuate subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The section defines "service animal" as any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. | Administrative | ||
| IL - Ecoterrorism - 5/48-2. Animal research and production facilities protection | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-2 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-2 | This new law replaces the Illinois' Animal Research and Production Facilities Protection Act, which was repealed in 2013. Under the new law, it is unlawful for any person to release, steal, or injure an animal held at a facility; to damage or vandalize any property; to obtain access to an animal facility by false pretenses for the purpose of performing unauthorized acts; to enter into an animal facility with an intent to destroy, alter, duplicate, or obtain unauthorized possession of records; or to enter or remain on an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act. Violation of any of these acts is a felony, with classification based on the amount of property damage. | Statute | |
| Anderson v. Christopherson | 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) | 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.) |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails | 834 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla. 1993) |
This case arose out of the seizure of some 15,538 lobster tails of the species Panulirus argus, more commonly known as "spiny lobster," imported into the United States by the Claimant Lista Enterprises Seafood, Inc. from the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean. The court held the government had probable cause to seize the lobster tails based on the weight criteria established under Turks and Caicos law. Under the Lacey Act, anyone who "knowingly" imports fish or wildlife taken in violation of foreign law may be assessed a penalty of $10,000 per violation, where "knowingly" refers to situations where the violator knew or should have known that the wildlife was taken in violation of law. |
Case | ||
| Tighe v. N. Shore Animal League Am. | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 142 A.D.3d 607, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 |
In this New York case, the defendant appeals denial of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries after the dog she adopted from defendant-North Shore Animal League America bit plaintiff's face causing severe personal injuries. Plaintiff alleges causes of action that include negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interposed a claim for punitive damages. After defendant opposed the filing, plaintiff submitted evidence that the dog previously had been returned to defendant animal shelter after biting another individual in the face. This court noted that, under long-standing rule, the owner of a domestic animal who knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities is liable for harm. However, here, even if defendant failed to disclose the dog's vicious propensities, that breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In fact, the dog showed aggressive behavior during the three-and-a-half months the plaintiff owned the dog (including a previous bite to plaintiff's hand). This, in effect, placed the plaintiff on notice of the dog's vicious propensities. The court found that the lower court erred by not granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. With regard to the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found that even if a transaction from an animal shelter is subject to the warranty, the plaintiff failed to notify defendant of the "nonconformity of the goods" (to wit, the dog) within a reasonable period of time. The order was reversed. |
Case | |
| Map of Veterinary Reporting Laws for Animal Cruelty | This map links to laws related to reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians (note that other animal care professionals and government employees may also have duties to report suspected cruelty). As of 2023, the majority of U.S. states have laws that either mandate or allow reporting (permissive reporting) of suspected animal cruelty by veterinary professionals OR have standalone laws that provide immunity for reporting of suspected cruelty. In most states with a mandatory or voluntary reporting law, a companion immunity provision is also provided. Such an immunity statute protects a veterinarian from any civil liability (and sometimes criminal) arising from the reporting of the abuse. About 23 states have MANDATORY reporting by veterinarians or veterinary professionals (note that some states are mandatory only for animal fighting or aggravated cruelty and Pennsylvania's regulation only applies to reporting abuse by other licensed veterinarians). Approximately 12 states have NO LAWS that deal with veterinary reporting of cruelty or immunity for reporting suspected cruelty. | State map |