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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt | 961 F.3d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2020) | Appellants consisting of conversation organizations and a safari guide challenged a series of actions of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) governing imports of sport-hunted animal trophies from Africa. The Appellants challenged certain findings that the Service made allowing animal trophies to be imported. The Court had reviewed a similar set of findings in another case and concluded that they were legislative rules illegally issued without notice and comment. FWS subsequently withdrew all its findings that were issued without notice and comment including the ones that were challenged by the Appellants in a subsequent memorandum. The Appellants still desired to contest the withdrawn findings. The Appellants alleged that it was illegal for the FWS to abandon its prior findings without engaging in APA informal rulemaking and that it was illegal for the FWS to announce its intent to the make the necessary findings through informal adjudications in the future. The Appellant’s claims fell into three categories: (1) challenges to the 2017 Zimbabwe findings that sport-hunting of elephants would enhance the survival of the species; (2) challenges to the memorandum by the FWS withdrawing their prior findings; and (3) challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intends to making findings on a case-by-case basis when considering individual permit applications. The Court found that since the FWS had withdrew the 2017 findings, they no longer caused the appellants any injury which made any challenges to them moot. The Appellants attempted to argue that the flaws in the 2017 Zimbabwe elephant finding were capable of repetition yet would evade review. The Court rejected this argument. As for the second challenges regarding the memorandum’s withdrawal of its prior findings, the Court found that the withdrawal caused no injury to the Appellants. The Court rejected the challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intended to make findings on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. | Case | |
| Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Birmingham | 737 N.W.2d 670 (2007) | 479 Mich. 206 (2007) |
In this Michigan case, a property association brought an action against the city of Birmingham to enforce a deed restriction. The association alleged that the city's plan to build a dog park violated the residential use restriction in the deed. The Circuit Court of Oakland County granted the city's motion for summary disposition; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the city's use of the lot as a “dog park" (a fenced area where dogs could roam unleashed with their owners) did indeed violate the deed restriction limiting use of land to “strictly residential purposes only.” Further, despite the association's failure to contest the previous use of the land as a vacant park, the association could contest the dog park violation because the former use was deemed a "less serious" violation. |
Case |
| Demeo v. Manville | 68 Ill.App.3d 843 (1979) | 386 N.E.2d 917 (Ill.App. 2 Dist., 1979) |
This is an Illinois' small claims action involving the death of plaintiffs' show dog. Plaintiff alleged that defendant ran over the dog while it was tied up near the driveway. Defendant denied plaintiff’s allegations that defendant ran over the dog and used a cover-up story. The court upheld an award of five-hundred dollars although the purchase price was two-hundred. Plaintiff testified that he paid $200 for his dog when it was a puppy, but it had appeared in four shows, winning first prize in each. Evidence was considered for commercial value and special qualities in that case. |
Case |
| Canada - Manitoba Statutes. The Animal Liability Act | S.M. 1998, c. 8 [C.C.S.M., c. A95], as am. S.M. 2002, c. 24, s. 4; 2002, c. | This set of laws comprises the Manitoba Animal Liability Act. Under the Act, the owner of an animal is liable for damages resulting from harm that the animal causes to a person or to property, but the damages awarded can be reduced depending upon the contributory fault or negligence of the plaintiff. In addition, no animal may run at-large under this law. Any person who finds a dog,wild boar, or prescribed animal worrying, injuring or killing livestock on the premises of the owner or possessor of the livestock that person may destroy the dog, wild boar or prescribed animal. | Statute | |
| OR - Animal Racing - Chapter 462. Racing. | O.R.S. § 462.010 - 990 | OR ST §§ 462.010 - 990 | Oregon created a Racing Commission that has the authority license, regulate, and supervise all race meets within the state and shall cause the race tracks that hold races to be inspected at least once each fiscal year. A race meet is not to be held unless a license is obtained from the Oregon Racing Commission. All employees of the race track as well as any public training facility or kennel for greyhounds involved in racing are also required to obtain a license from the Commission prior to engaging in their duties. The Commission may require each applicant to obtain a recommendation in writing of the board of county commissioners of the county in the event a race meet is to be held outside of a city and of the governing body of such city if the race meet is to be held within a city. The Commission is tasked with determining the number and classes of race meets to be held in any fiscal year and the total number of racing dates to be granted to a licensee, not to exceed 350 days in any metropolitan area in any fiscal year. The Commission is entitled to require chemical testing of the urine, blood, saliva, or other bodily substances of animals participating in races. Animals are prohibited from participating in races if they have been administered a drug that is prohibited by the Commission, prohibited drugs have been detected in the animal's system, and the animal has been stimulated or depressed in any way by a mechanical device not sanctioned by the Commission. | Statute |
| RI - Endangered Species - Chapter 37. Endangered Species of Animals and Plants. | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-37-1 to 5 | RI ST § 20-37-1 to 5 | These Rhode Island statutes set out the legislative policy and definitions related to state endangered species law, including the definition of "animal" and what constitutes an "endangered species." By statute commerce is strictly prohibited, as it it illegal to "buy, sell, offer for sale, store, transport, import, export, or otherwise traffic in any animal or plant or any part of any animal or plant whether living, dead, processed, manufactured, preserved, or raw if the animal or plant has been declared to be an endangered species by either the United States secretaries of the interior or commerce or the director of the Rhode Island department of environmental management." Violation of the Act results in fines from $500-5,000 or up to one year imprisonment, or both. | Statute |
| AL - Sterilization - Chapter 9. Sterilization of Dogs and Cats. | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-9-1 to 4 | AL ST § 3-9-1 to 4 | These statutes require animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies to sterilize dogs and cats acquired from other animal shelters, animal control agencies, and humane societies. For purposes of this statute, the term "sterilization" refers to the surgical removal of the reproductive organs of a dog or cat in order to render the animal unable to reproduce. Adoptive animals must be sterilized by a licensed veterinarian before the animal is released to the new owner, or the new owner must enter into a written agreement with the facility certifying that sterilization will be performed by a licensed veterinarian within 30 days after acquisition of the animal or within 30 days of the sexual maturity of the animal. | Statute |
| MT - Ordinance - Chapter 23. Domestic Animal Control and Protection. | MCA 7-23-2108 | MT ST 7-23-2108 | This Montana statute provides that the governing body of the county may regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of dogs by the adoption of an ordinance which substantially complies with state law provisions related to licensing. Violation of an ordinance adopted is a misdemeanor. Additionally, the county governing body is authorized to impound, sell, kill, or otherwise destroy dogs found at large contrary to ordinances. | Statute |
| State v. Claiborne | State v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732 (Kan. 1973) |
Animals -- Cruelty to Animals -- Cockfighting -- Gamecocks Not Animals -- No Statutory Prohibition Against Cockfights -- Statute Not Vague. In an action filed pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1701 in which the state seeks a construction of K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 21-4310 (cruelty to animals) making its provisions applicable to cockfighting, the record is examined and for reasons appearing in the opinion it is held: (1) Gamecocks are not animals within the meaning or contemplation of the statute. (2) There is no clear legislative intent that gamecocks be included within the category of animals protected by the statute. (3) The statute does not apply to or prohibit the conducting of cockfights. (4) As construed, the statute is not so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to violate the requirements of due process. |
Case | |
| State v. Agee | --- N.E.3d ---- , 2019 WL 3504010 (Ohio App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-3107 | The Humane Society brought this action in response to a complaint regarding a dog tangled in a tether. Three German Shepherds were discovered that belonged to the Defendant, Shawn Agee, Jr. The dogs were suffering from maltreatment. All three had been restrained without access to water or food and one of the dog’s tethers was wrapped so tightly that its leg had started to swell. Two of the dogs were suffering from fly strike. The State charged the Defendant with 12 criminal misdemeanors relating to the treatment of the three animals. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of 10 of those counts because of his unrebutted testimony that he had been out of town for the weekend and had left the dogs in the care of his mother. The Defendant was found guilty to two second-degree misdemeanors relating to the two dogs suffering from fly strike because those particular injuries were long time, very painful injuries that were not being treated and the Defendant was the dogs’ “confiner, custodian, or caretaker.” The Defendant was sentenced to community control, a fine of $100, a suspended jail sentence of 180 days, the surrender of the two dogs with fly strike, and the proviso that the remaining dog be provided with regular vet appointments and various other conditions. This appeal followed. The Defendant asserted that the Court erred by finding that he had in fact violated the statute that he was found guilty of and that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Defendant argued that he did not qualify as the type or class of persons subject to criminal liability merely as an owner. The Court noted that the trial court did not impose liability due to his status as the dogs’ owner, but rather due to this having served as the two dogs’ confiner, custodian, or caretaker when they developed fly strike and should have been but were not properly treated. As for the second assignment of error, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant had violated the statute. The Defendant had admitted that he knew that the two dogs had fly strike “two or three weeks before he left town for the weekend.” The dogs were not treated before he left town. The Court ultimately affirmed both convictions. | Case |