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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
CA - Rodeos - § 596.7. Rodeos; veterinarians present at performances; violation of section West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 596.7 CA PENAL § 596.7 This statute regulating rodeos requires that animals involved have access to veterinary care and mandates treatment of injured rodeo animals. This statute forbids the use of an electric prod once an animal is in the holding chute, unless necessary to protect participants or spectators. Violations of this section are infractions punishable by a fine. Statute
Brazil - Constitutional Provision - Animal TITLE Vlll, CHAP. VI, ART. 225

Article 8 of the Constitution provides for legal concern about animals.(See, VII. of Paragraph 1.) 

Statute
Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne 531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir., 2008) 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7939, 2008 WL 2522202 (C.A.9 (Or.)) The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. Case
DE - Invasive/non-native - § 802. Non-native wildlife injurious to native wildlife, agriculture, and other interests 7 Del.C. § 802 DE ST TI 7 § 802 This Delaware statute leaves to the discretion of the state whether to authorize an entity or persons to take, harvest, or capture any species of non-native wildlife that is or has the potential to become injurious to native wildlife. Statute
State v. Warren 439 P.3d 357 (Mt. 2019) 2019 MT 49; 395 Mont. 15; 2019 WL 926113 (Mt. 2019) Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Case
AL - Cruelty - Alabama Consolidated Cruelty Statutes Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-11-14 - 16; § 13A-11-240 to 247; § 13A–11–260 to 264; § 13A-12-4 - 6; § 3-1-8 to 29; § 2-15-110 to 114 AL ST § 13A-11-14 to 16; § 13A-11-240 to 247; § 13A–11–260 to 264; § 13A-12-4 - 6; § 3-1-8 to 29; § 2-15-110 to 114 These Alabama provisions contain the state's anti-cruelty laws. The first section (under Article 1 of Chapter 11) provides that a person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he or she subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, neglect (as long as he or she has custody of the animal), or kills or injures without good cause any animal belonging to another. However, if any person intentionally or knowingly violates Section 13A-11-14, and the act of cruelty or neglect involved the infliction of torture to the animal, that person has committed an act of aggravated cruelty and is guilty of a Class C felony. The next section (Article 11 of Chapter 11 entitled, "Cruelty to Cats and Dogs"), provides that a person commits the crime of cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree if he or she intentionally tortures any dog or cat or skins a domestic dog or cat or offers for sale or exchange or offers to buy or exchange the fur, hide, or pelt of a domestic dog or cat. Cruelty to a dog or cat in the first degree is a Class C felony. Statute
Robert Zauper, Plaintiff v. Michael Lababit and Jane Doe Lababit, and the marital community comprised thereof; and Does 1-10, De

This Kitsap County, Washington judgment summary, findings of fact, and conclusions of law found defendants liable for five claims including simple negligence, strict liability, private nuisance, public nuisance, and gross negligence. In the award of damages, plaintiff received a total judgment in the amount of $75,501.09, which included $50,000 for intrinsic value and $25,000 for emotional distress.

Pleading
Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) 29 Cal.App.4th 1620 (Cal.App.3.Dist.)

This California case concerned a personal injury action arising from a collision between the plaintiff's car and defendant's black Angus bull, which was lying on the highway at night. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeal held that the open range law does not itself define the duty owners of cattle owe nor does it exempt them from the duty of ordinary care.

Case
Chile - Fishing - Ley 430, 1991 Ley 430, 1991 This is the general law of fisheries and aquaculture. It establishes the guidelines for the preservation of hydrological resources, extractive fishing activities, and research activities in terrestrial waters, sea beaches, inland waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and adjacent areas. This law also regulates transformation and processing fishing activities and storage, transportation, or commercialization of hydro-biological resources. Statute
Canada - Saskatchewan - Dangerous Animals S.S. 2005, c. M-36.1, s. 374 - 380 This set of laws comprises the Saskatchewan, Canada dangerous animal laws. Under the Act, any person who owns an animal for the purpose of fighting, or trains, torments, badgers, baits or otherwise uses an animal for the purpose of causing or encouraging the animal to make unprovoked attacks on persons or domestic animals is guilty of an offence. In addition, a peace officer or designated officer may destroy any animal that he or she finds injuring or viciously attacking a person or a domestic animal. The Act outlines the actions that result in an animal being declared dangerous (i.e., chased a person in a vicious or threatening manner, bit a person or domestic animal without provocation, etc.) and the procedure to declare such an animal dangerous. Statute

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