Results
Displaying 81 - 90 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Cruelty - § 286.5. Sexually assaulting animal; misdemeanor | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 286.5 | CA PENAL § 286.5 | This California law, amended in 2019, provides that every person who has sexual contact with an animal is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any authorized officer investigating a violation of this section may seize an animal that has been used in the commission of an offense to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, and to obtain evidence of the offense | Statute | |||||||
| BD - Cruelty - THE CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1920 | Cruelty to Animals Act, 1920 (Act No. I of 1920) |
This Act constitutes Bangladesh's prevention of cruelty to animals act. The act defines "animal" as "any domestic or captured animal." Any person who: overdrives, cruelty or unnecessarily beats, or otherwise ill-treats any animal; binds or carries an animal in a position as to subject the animal to unnecessary pain or suffering; offers or has in his possession an animal that is suffering because of mutilation, thirst, starvation or other ill-treatment shall be punished for every such offence with fine up to one hundred Taka, or imprisonment up to three months, or with both. Overloading an animal is also punishable with a fine or jail term, and animal fighting results in a fine. |
Statute | ||||||||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE PUDUCHERRY PREVENTION OF COW SLAUGHTER | 6 of 1968 | The Act, specific to the Union Territory of Puducherry, prohibits the slaughter of cows, bulls and bullocks. Bulls and bullocks may be slaughtered in certain specific circumstances. The sale of beef is banned. | Statute | ||||||||
| Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue | 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir., 2019) | 2019 WL 5091876 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2019) | The Plaintiff, Jamie and Sandra Swartz, acquired several horses, goats, and a donkey to keep on their farm in Indiana. In April of 2013, the county’s animal control officer, Randy Lee, called a veterinarian to help evaluate a thin horse that had been observed on the Swartzes’ property. Lee and the veterinarian visited the Swartzes’ on multiple occasions. The veterinarian became worried on its final visit that the Swartzes’ were not properly caring for the animals. Lee used the veterinarian’s Animal Case Welfare Reports to support a finding of probable cause to seize the animals. Subsequently, the Superior Court of Indiana entered an order to seize the animals. On June 20, 2014, the state of Indiana filed three counts of animal cruelty charges against the Swartzes. However, the state deferred prosecuting the Swartzes due to a pretrial diversion agreement. The Swartzes filed this federal lawsuit alleging that the defendants acted in concert to cause their livestock to be seized without probable cause and distributed the animals to a sanctuary and equine rescue based on false information contrary to the 4th and 14th amendments. The district court dismissed the Swartzes' claims to which, they appealed. The Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Swartzes’ claims. The Court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by those who lose in state court challenging state court judgments. Due to the fact that the Swartzes’ alleged injury was directly caused by the state court’s orders, Rooker-Feldman barred federal review. The Swartzes also must have had a reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in state court for the bar to apply. The Court, after reviewing the record, showed that the Swartzes had multiple opportunities to litigate whether the animals should have been seized, thus Rooker-Feldman applied. The case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine at the outset. The Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. | Case | |||||||
| Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2185180 (D.Hawai'i) |
Plaintiffs sued the Navy over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life. This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material. The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged. |
Case | ||||||||
| Contact us |
Welcome to the Animal Law Web Center - contact us at Michigan State University College of Law648 North Shaw Lane East Lansing, MI 48824-1300 Primary Contact: animallaw@law.msu.edu Professor David Favre, Editor-in-Chief |
Basic page | |||||||||
| CT - Exotic - Sec. 26-55-6. Importation, possession or liberation of wild birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibians and invertebrates | CT ADC § 26-55-6 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 26-55-6 | This Connecticut regulation (effective March 1, 2012) places restrictions on who may import or possess certain categories of wild animals in the state. The regulation puts wild animals into one of four categories: Category One, Two, Three, or Four Wild Animals. With regard to Great Apes, a member within the family Hominidae (including, but not limited to, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan) is a Category One Animal. No person, except a municipal park, zoo, public nonprofit aquarium, nature center,museum, exhibitor licensed or registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, laboratory registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, or research facility registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, shall import or possess any Category One Wild Animal. | Administrative | |||||||
| AL - Ordinances - Article 4. General Police Powers | Ala. Code 1975 § 11-47-110, 117, 118 | AL ST § 11-47-110, 117, 118 | This set of statutes authorizes all cities and towns to enact local ordinances to prevent dangerous, unwholesome, or offensive conditions and to abate public nuisances. | Statute | |||||||
| Pete Mansour v. King County, a municipal corporation; King County Animal Control; King County Licensing and Regulatory Services | In this Washington case, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a King County Animal Control decision declaring a dog vicious and ordering her removed from the county. This decision overrides the practice of a dog being presumed guilty until proven innocent in that county. The court found that for Mansour or any other pet owner to prove effectively present his or her case and rebut the evidence against him or her, due process requires that he or she be able to subpoena witnesses and present records. Mr. Mansour was prejudiced in his case because he was not allowed to do so and was not given sufficient notice for the hearing. | Pleading | |||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 1 |
|
Policy |