Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZENIER v. SPOKANE INTERNATIONAL RAILROAD COMPANY | 300 P.2d 494 (Idaho, 1956) | 78 Idaho 196 (Idaho, 1956) |
In Zenier v. Spokane Intern. R. Co ., 78 Idaho 196 (Idaho 1956), a rancher’s mare and colt was killed, and the rancher sought statutory damages and attorney fees. A jury found for the rancher and imposed damages mainly on his testimony as to value. The railroad sought review, stating that the rancher's own negligence in allowing the horses to run barred recovery and there was no objective evidence as to value. The court upheld the award, finding that the animal’s value to the rancher was permitted as a basis for determining damages where personal property has been injured by the willful or negligent act of another. |
Case | |
| SOS Animal |
|
Policy | |||
| State v. Shook (Unpublished) | 2002 WL 31894726 |
Defendant Shook (a non-tribal member) shot and killed a whitetail buck on private property within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation. Under Wildlife and Parks Commission hunting regulations, big game hunting privileges on Indian Reservations are limited to tribal members only, thereby closing the hunting season to non-tribal members. On appeal, Shook contended that the regulation was a violation of equal protection because it discriminated based on race. The court disagreed, finding the classification was political rather than racial because it was established through treaty with the federal government and recognized the unique federal obligation toward Indians. Thus, the court found the regulation was an "entirely rational" means to preserve wildlife populations for hunting by Indians. |
Case | ||
| Travis v. Murray | 977 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 2013) | 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 23405, 42 Misc. 3d 447, 2013 WL 6246374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) |
A short, childless marriage ended in a custody battle over a dachshund after one spouse allegedly took the dog while the other spouse was away on a business trip. After reviewing the progression of the law in New York and in other states, the court decided to apply a “best for all concerned” standard and to give the parties a full, one-day hearing. The plaintiff’s motion to order the defendant to return the couple's dog and to be awarded “sole residential custody” of the dog was therefore granted. |
Case | |
| IN - Wildlife - THE WILD LIFE (PROTECTION) AMENDMENT ACT, 2002 | THE WILD LIFE (PROTECTION) AMENDMENT ACT, 2002, No. 16 of 2003 |
This law comprises India's Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002. According to the amended long title, it is "An Act to provide for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants and for matters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto with a view to ensuring the ecological and environmental security of the country. " The Amendment Act also establishes the National Board for Wild Life. |
Statute | ||
| Song v Coddington | (2003) 59 NSWLR 180 | [2003] NSWSC 1196 |
The appellant was charged and convicted of being a person in charge and authorising the carriage of a number of goats in cages which did not allow those goats to stand upright. The appellant was a veterinary doctor employed by the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service and authorised under the Export Control (Animals) Orders 1987 to certify animals for export. On appeal, it was determined that for the purposes of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 1996, the appellant was not a person in charge of the goats. |
Case | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE GOA ANIMAL PRESERVATION ACT, 1995 | 7 of 1996 | The law, specific to the state of Goa, allows the slaughter of bovines only when they are unlikely to be economical for the purpose of draught, agricultural operations, breeding, giving milk, or bearing offspring. Offences under the Act are cognizable—persons alleged to have committed an offence under the Act can be arrested without warrant. No legal proceedings can be instituted against the government or any officer of the government or local authority for actions done in good faith in pursuance of the Act. | Statute | ||
| Maldonado v. Franklin | Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 4739438 (Tex. App. Sept. 30, 2019) | Trenton and Karina Franklin moved into a subdivision in San Antonio, Texas in September of 2017. Margarita Maldonado lived in the home immediately behind the Franklins’ house and could see into the Franklins’ backyard. Maldonado began complaining about the Franklins’ treatment of their dog. The Franklins left the dog outside 24 hours a day, seven days a week no matter what the weather was like. Maldonado also complained that the dog repeatedly whined and howled which kept her up at night causing her emotional distress. Maldonado went online expressing concern about the health and welfare of her neighbor’s dog, without naming any names. Mr. Franklin at some point saw the post and entered the conversation which lead to Mr. Franklin and Maldonado exchanging direct messages about the dog. Maldonado even placed a dog bed in the backyard for the dog as a gift. In December of 2017, the Franklins filed suit against Maldonado for invasion of privacy by intrusion and seclusion alleging that Maldonado was engaged in a campaign of systemic harassment over the alleged mistreatment of their dog. While the suit was pending, Maldonado contacted Animal Control Services several times to report that the dog was outside with the heat index over 100 degrees. Each time an animal control officer responded to the call they found no actionable neglect or abuse. In June of 2018, Maldonado picketed for five days by walking along the neighborhood sidewalks, including in front of the Franklins’ house, carrying signs such as “Bring the dog in,” and “If you’re hot, they’re hot.” The Franklins then amended their petition adding claims for slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Maldonado, which was ultimately vacated on appeal. Maldonado filed a Anti-SLAPP motion and amended motion to dismiss the Franklins’ claims as targeting her First Amendment rights. The trial court did not rule on the motions within thirty days, so the motions were denied by operation of law. Maldonado appealed. The Court began its analysis by determining whether Maldonado’s motions were timely. Under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) a motion to dismiss must be filed within sixty days of the legal action. The sixty-day deadline reset each time new factual allegations were alleged. Due to the fact that the Franklins had amended their petition three times and some of the amended petitions did not allege any new factual allegations, the only timely motions that Maldonado filed were for the Franklins’ claims for slander and libel. The Court then concluded that Maldonado’s verbal complaints to the Animal Control Service and online posts on community forums about the Franklins’ alleged mistreatment of their dog were communications made in connection with an issue related to a matter of public concern and were made in the exercise of free speech. Therefore, the TCPA applied to the Franklins’ slander and libel claims. The Court ultimately concluded that although Maldonado established that the TCPA applied to the slander and libel claims, the Franklins met their burden to establish a prima facie case on the slander and libel claims. Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the slander and libel claims were properly denied. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case | ||
| New York Revised Statutes 1829: Title 6: Section 26 | N.Y. Rev. stat. tit. 6, 26 (1829) | The law contained in Title 6, Section 26 of the New York Revised Statutes of 1829 concerns the offense of maliciously killing an animal of another. The statute describes the type of animals covered and the punishment for killing, wounding, or maiming such an animal. In addition, the statute also states the punishment for the offense of cruelty to animals. | Statute | ||
| TX- Circus, entertainment animals - Subchapter B. Care of Animals by Circuses, Carnivals, and Zoos | 25 TX ADC § 169.41 - 169.48 | 25 TAC § 169.41 to .48 (§§ 169.41 to 169.48. Repealed eff. Nov. 13, 2016) | [Note: §§ 169.41 to 169.48 were repealed eff. Nov. 13, 2016. This information is provided for historical purposes only.] This set of regulations sets license conditions and fees for circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the Department of Health Services and establishes standards regarding the care of animals maintained by those facilities. All circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture under the Federal Animal Welfare Act are exempt from these regulations. | Administrative |
