Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com'n | 838 So.2d 492(Fla. 2003) | 28 Fla. L. Weekly S46, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S134 |
The petitioners' challenge is whether the Legislature can require the newly created Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when adopting rules or regulations in respect to those species of marine life that are defined as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern. The petitioners are not-for-profit groups and individuals who allege several statutory sections unconstitutionally usurp the constitutional authority of the FWCC to regulate marine life. The FWCC and the Attorney General (respondents) disagree and argue that the Legislature can require the application of the APA and that the statutes that delineate power to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are constitutional. The issue was whether the creation of the FWCC also gave it power to regulate endangered, threatened, and species of special concern or whether that power remained with the DEP. The court found that such power remained with the DEP regarding endangered and threatened species of marine life. However, it could discern no statutory basis in effect on March 1, 1998, for the DEP having regulatory or executive power in respect to a category of marine species designated "of special concern" so that portion of the challenged statutes was held unconstitutional. |
Case |
| Cascadia Wildlands v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife | 455 P.3d 950 (Or.App., 2019) | 300 Or.App. 648 (Or.App., 2019) | Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Respondent") removed the species Canis lupus (gray wolf) from the list of species protected under the Oregon Endangered Species Act (OESA). Cascadia Wildlands, Center for Biological Diversity, and Oregon Wild ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the amendment to Oregon law. The Petitioners contended that the decision to delist exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and did not comply with applicable rulemaking procedures. After the Petitioners filed their petition, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill 4040 which ratified the administrative rule that the Respondent promulgated delisting the gray wolf. The Respondents argued that the passage of the bill made the Petitioners' petition for judicial review moot. The Petitioners argued that the Oregon law ratifying the administrative rule had no legal effect and was merely an expression of legislative agreement. The Court held that the legislature using the word “ratify” in the statute indicated that they intended to confirm that the Commission’s rule delisting the gray wolf was legally satisfied, therefore, rendering judicial review moot. The Petitioners also contended that the statute violated the separation of powers because the statute performed an entirely judicial function by neither appealing nor amending the statute. Petitioners asserted that evaluating whether a particular agency satisfied requirements of law is a fact-specific inquiry which is reserved for the court. The Court held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. The Court ultimately held that the Petitioners' rule challenge was moot. The petition for judicial review was ultimately dismissed. | Case |
| RI - Shark - § 20-1-29. Trade in shark fins | Gen.Laws 1956, § 20-1-29 | RI ST § 20-1-29 | This Rhode Island law, effective in 2017, prohibits the possession, sale, offering for sale, trading, or distribution of shark fin. “Shark fin” means the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached fin or the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached tail of a shark. Even if a person holds a license to take sharks, he or she must immediately destroy any shark fin separated from the shark unless used by the person for the purposes of taxidermy and subsequent display. Violation incurs a fine or not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 imprisonment of up to 90 days, or both. | Statute |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-3 | RI ST § 4-13-3 | This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. | Statute |
| NC - Fur/Dealer Licenses - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-273 | NC ST § 113-273 | Defines "dealer" and all rules applicable to obtaining a dealer license. Defines "fur-dealer license" and "fur dealers" as those involved in the lawful buying and selling of wild animals or their skins, pelts, or fur. Defines "controlled hunting preserve operator licenses," "game bird propagation licenses," "furbearer propagation licenses" and "taxidermy licenses." | Statute |
| Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n | 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) | 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order. |
Case |
| Alvarez v. Clasen | 946 So.2d 181 (La.,2006) |
Plaintiff sued neighbors who trapped cat outside and brought it to an animal shelter where it was euthanized. This court held that private parties trapping a stray cat were not liable for conversion because local ordinances permitted animal shelters to hold stray cats. |
Case | |
| Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake County | 566 F.3d 1236 (C.A.10 (Utah),2009) |
The plaintiffs-appellants (Utah Animal Rights Coalition (UARC) and five individuals) filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for alleged violations of their First Amendment rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble after the individual plaintiffs attempted to protest a circus in South Jordan, Utah. The district court entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs. On appeal, this court held that, without a showing of harm, the UARC did not meet its burden to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court did find that the individuals properly pleaded harm to establish standing. With regard to the § 1983 action, this court ruled that the district court correctly determined that county officials were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
Case | |
| Bolivia - Cruelty - Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, is the animal cruelty statute of Bolivia. This law lays out the rules for the defense of animals against cruelty committed by humans. Animals are considered part of mother earth, and therefore, their life has to be defended and respected. This law punishes physical, psychological, emotional and sexual mistreatment, and prohibits the breeding of domestic animals for commercial purposes. It also prohibits sport hunting and overworking animals, especially those of an older age. | Statute | |
| NY - Racing - § 220. Licenses for participants and employees at race meetings | McKinney's Racing, Pari Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 220 | NY RAC PARI-M § 220 | The state racing and wagering board issues licenses to owners, trainers, assistant trainers and jockeys, jockey agents, and stable employees for horse races, including steeplechases. | Statute |