Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WV - Hunting - § 20-2-2a. Interference with hunters, trappers and fishermen | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-2a | WV ST § 20-2-2a | This law reflects West Virginia's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, a person may not willfully obstruct or impede the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping. Violation is a misdemeanor with a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $500 or imprisonment for 10 - 100 days, or both. Subsequent violations within two years of any prior violation result in a fine of up to $1000 and imprisonment for up to one year, or both. A violator is also liable to the person for damages. | Statute | |
| People v. Garcia | 777 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. 2004) |
Defendant was convicted for violating the anti-cruelty statute toward animals. On appeal, the Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague when applied to defendant's crimes. Motion denied. |
Case | ||
| Burgess v. Taylor | 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001) | 91 A.L.R.5th 749 (Ky. 2001) |
Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive. |
Case | |
| Jon H. Hammer v. The American Kennel Club and Brittany Club of America, a/k/a The American Brittany Club, Inc. |
Plaintiff, the owner of a Brittany Spaniel dog with an undocked tail, sought to enter his dog into AKC competitions. However, AKC standards stated that any tail substantially over four inches long would be "severely penalized." Plaintiff contended the practice of docking a dog’s tail (which oftentimes occurs without anesthesia or even under the proper care of a veterinarian) constituted an act of cruelty in violation of Agriculture and Markets Section 353 and was an arbitrary and capricious discriminatory standard. Plaintiff sought both declaratory relief declaring that the practice is illegal and discriminatory, and injunctive relief to enjoin the practice form being applied in New York and elsewhere. |
Pleading | |||
| Isted v. CPS | (1998) 162 J.P. 513 | [1998] Crim. L.R. 194; [1998] C.O.D. 86; (1998) 162 J.P.N. 663; The Times, December 11, 1997 |
The appellant was a keeper of livestock who had shot and injured a neighbor's dog that had strayed into the appellant's pig pen. He had been convicted of doing an act causing unnecessary suffering to the dog contrary to the Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(a) (second limb). Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that the local justices were entitled to find as a matter of fact that it had not been reasonably necessary to shoot the dog. |
Case | |
| US - Primate - Animal Welfare; Draft Policy on Environment Enhancement for Nonhuman Primates | Doc. No. 98-121-1 |
Under the Animal Welfare Act, our regulations require that dealers, exhibitors, and research facilities that maintain nonhuman primates develop and follow a plan for environment enhancement adequate to promote the psychological well-being of the nonhuman primates. We have developed a draft policy to clarify what we believe must be considered and included in the plan in order for dealers, exhibitors, and research facilities to adequately promote the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates. |
Administrative | ||
| State v. Crow | 429 P.3d 1053 (2018) | 294 Or. App. 88, 2018 WL 4353388 | This Oregon case discusses whether 11 miniature horses, multiple cats, and a dog are separate victims for purposes of merger into one conviction. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for 13 counts of unlawful possession of an animal by a person previously convicted of second-degree animal neglect. The facts are not at issue: Defendant was previously convicted of multiple counts of second-degree animal neglect involving dogs and miniature horses and was subsequently found to be in possession of those animals. On appeal, defendant's primary argument is that "the public is the single collective victim" for purposes of the violation, so the trial court erred in entering 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. In support, defendant analogizes it to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, where the public is deemed the collective victim for purposes of merger. The State counters with the fact animals are living beings, unlike firearms, and that living beings can be victims of crimes. Further, the State contends that the language of ORS 161.067(2) and legislative history demonstrate an intent to protect individual animal victims. The court found that the text of statute shows an intent to protect individual animals of the same genus as previous crimes rather than protection of the public, generally. The court was not persuaded by defendant's contention that established links between animal cruelty and domestic violence show that the legislature intended to protect the public rather than individual animals when it enacted ORS 167.332(1). Legislative testimony for amendments to ORS 167.332 from animal experts detailed how difficult it was for judges to impose bans on possession before the passage of the amendment due to the way the law was previously written. Thus, the court concluded that the principal purpose of ORS 167.332(1) was to protect individual animals from further abuse and neglect, and to deter animal abuse and neglect where those individuals convicted show "an identifiable threat to a particular genus of animal." Here, in defendant's case, the trial court did not err when it entered 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. Affirmed. | Case | |
| VA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | Va. Code Ann. §§ 3.2-6500 - 6590; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361; § 18.2-144.1 | These Virginia statutes set forth Title 3.2, the Comprehensive Animal Care laws, which include the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. For the purposes of Sec. 3.2-6570, the operative animal cruelty law, animal means any nonhuman vertebrate species including fish except those fish captured and killed or disposed of in a reasonable and customary manner. The section has a misdemeanor animal cruelty law as well as a felony provision related to torture or willful infliction of cruelty. The section requires companion animal owners to provide adequate care. | Statute | ||
| Phillips v. North Carolina State University | 697 S.E.2d 433 (N.C.App.,2010) |
University operated a horse breeding management facility. Industrial Commission found that University was negligent in broodmare's death that occurred during transport. The Court of Appeals held that mare’s owners were entitled to lost profit for a single breeding cycle. |
Case | ||
| Minter-Smith v. Florida | 864 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003) |
Defendant was convicted of unlawfully owning, possessing, keeping or training a dog or dogs with intent that such dog engage in dogfighting and he appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) statute under which appellant was convicted was not unconstitutionally vague; (2) testimony of investigator was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant was in violation of the statute that was not unconstitutional on ground that it was ex post facto as applied to defendant; (3) evidence as to poor conditions of dogs and their vicious propensities was relevant to issue of defendant's intent to fight the dogs; and (4) evidence gained by police officer pursuant to search warrant was not inadmissible. Affirmed.
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