Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wilkerson v. State | 401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981) |
Appellant was charged with violating Florida's Cruelty to Animals statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 828.12 (1979). He pleaded nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's order, which denied his motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The supreme court affirmed. Appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the statute failed to provide guidance as to what animals were included and what acts were unnecessary. The supreme court concluded that people of common intelligence would have been able to discern what were and were not animals under the statute and that the legislature clearly intended that a raccoon be included. Additionally, just because the statute did not enumerate every instance in which conduct against an animal was unnecessary or excessive did not render the statute void for vagueness. The conduct prohibited was described in general language. Finally, because appellant's conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute, he did not have standing to make an overbreadth attack. |
Case | |
| UK - Pets - Abandonment of Animals Act 1960 | 1960 c. 43 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. An Act to prohibit the abandonment of animals in circumstances likely to cause unnecessary suffering thereto. |
Statute | |
| OR - Agriculture - § 600.510. Restrictive Confinement of a Pregnant Pig | O.R.S. § 600.150 | 600.150. Restrictive confinement of a pregnant pig, OR ST § 600.150 | This Oregon law makes the restrictive confinement of a pregnant pig illegal in the state to phase out the use of gestation crates in the Oregon farming industry. The law makes it illegal to confine a pregnant pig in a way that prevents them from lying down and fully extending their limbs or turning around freely. There are some exceptions to this law, such as for transportation, veterinary care, or during the slaughtering process. | Statute |
| TX - Facility dog - § 21.012. Presence of Qualified Facility Dog or Qualified Therapy Dog in Court Proceeding | V. T. C. A., Government Code § 21.012 | TX GOVT § 21.012 | Texas enacted a facility dog/courthouse dog law in 2021. Under the law, any party to an action filed in a court in this state in which a proceeding related to the action will be held may petition the court for an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to be present with a witness who is testifying before the court. The court may enter an order authorizing a qualified facility dog or qualified therapy dog to accompany a witness testifying at the court proceeding if: (1) the presence of the dog will assist the witness in providing testimony; and (2) the party petitioning for the order provides proof of liability insurance coverage in effect for the dog. A handler must accompany the qualified facility dog (as defined in the law). | Statute |
| Pearson v Janlin Circuses Pty Ltd | [2002] NSWSC 1118 |
The defendant deprived an elephant in a circus of contact with other elephants for years. On a particular day, the defendant authorised three other elephants to be kept in the proximity of the elephant for a number of hours. It was claimed that this act constituted an act of cruelty as it caused distress to the elephant. On appeal, it was determined that mens rea was not an element of a cruelty offence under the statute. |
Case | |
| New Books |
New BooksRandall S. Abate (editor), What Can Animal Law Learn From Environmental Law? Environmental Law Institute (2015). |
Basic page | ||
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton | 240 F.Supp.2d 1090 (D.Ariz. 2003) |
This lawsuit arises out of the Fish and Wildlife Service's ("FWS") designation of approximately 30% of the critical habitat originally proposed for the Mexican spotted owl (Strix occidentalis lucida ) under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). In analyzing the FWS's decision under both the standard of review for the APA and the deference afforded by the Chevron standard, the court found that the FWS's interpretation of "critical habitat" was "nonsensical." It is not determinative whether the habitat requires special management, but, pursuant to the ESA, it is whether the habitat is "essential to the conservation of the species" and special management of that habitat is possibly necessary. Thus, defendant's interpretation of the ESA received no deference by the court and the court found defendant's application of the ESA unlawful, as Defendant and FWS have been repeatedly told by federal courts that the existence of other habitat protections does not relieve Defendant from designating critical habitat. The court found that the FWS's Final Rule violated both the ESA and the APA in implementing its regulations. |
Case | |
| CA - Theft - § 487e. Grand theft; dog exceeding value of $950 | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 487e, 487f, 487g, 491 | CA PENAL § 487e, 487f, 487g, 491 | These provisions of the California Penal Code deal with stealing companion animals. A person who feloniously steals, takes, or carries away a companion animal of another which is of a value exceeding nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) is guilty of grand theft. If a person steals or maliciously takes an animal of another for purposes of sale, medical research, slaughter, or other commercial use (or does so by fraud or false representation), he or she commits a public offense punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding 1 year or in the state prison. | Statute |
| AU - Cruelty - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (VIC) | Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Version No. 080) |
The purposes of this Act are to promote the responsible care and use of animals; provide standards for the care and use of animals that achieve a reasonable balance between the welfare of animals and the interests of persons whose livelihood is dependent on animals; and to allow for the effect of advancements in scientific knowledge about animal biology and changes in community expectations about practices involving animals; to protect animals from unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable pain; to ensure the use of animals for scientific purposes is accountable, open and responsible. |
Statute | |
| Soucek v. Banham | 524 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. App., 1994) |
Dog owner brought action for damages against city and police officers that shot his dog, seeking punitive damages. The court observed that under Minnesota law dogs are personal property, and thus, the proper measure of compensatory damages for destroying an animal is the fair market value of the animal. The court further held Soucek cannot recover punitive damages for the loss of his pet because he only suffered property damage. Compensatory damages for the loss of Soucek's pet are limited to the fair market value of the animal. |
Case |