Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brown v. Muhlenberg Tp. | 269 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2001) |
Pet owners were unreasonably deprived of their Fourth Amendment rights to their pet by police officer. Pennsylvania Court would recognize a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the killing of a pet. |
Case | |
| MS - Veterinarian License - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. Mississippi Veterinary Practice Act. | Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-77 | MS ST § 73-39-77 (formerly MS ST § 73-39-19) | This Mississippi statutes provides the terms under which a veterinarian can lose his or her license to practice veterinary medicine. | Statute |
| AL - Dog Fighting - Activities relating to fighting of dogs prohibited; violations; confiscation; | Ala. Code 1975 § 3-1-29 | AL ST § 3-1-29 | This Alabama statute constitutes the state's dogfighting law. Under the law, it is a class C felony for any person to own, possess, keep or train any dog with the intent that such dog shall be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog; for amusement or gain, to cause any dog to fight with another dog, or cause any dogs to injure each other; or to permit any of the above acts. The law also makes it a class C felony to knowingly be present or be a spectator at dogfights. | Statute |
| Animal Law Volume 13 Part 2 Index |
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Policy | ||
| Clyncke v. Waneka | 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007) | 2007 WL 570412 (Colo.) |
In this Colorado case, an inexperienced horse rider who was injured in fall from horse during a horse roundup, brought an action under the Colorado Equine Activities Statute against the owners of riding stable. The lower court, after a jury trial, entered a judgment for the stable owners. On appeal at the Supreme Court, the Court found that the Equine Statute places a two-pronged duty on sponsors; a sponsor is liable when he or she fails to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant's ability to engage in the equine activity or a participant's ability to manage a particular horse. Here, a new trial was in order because the result may have been different if court had properly instructed the jury regarding the exception from civil liability for the sponsor. |
Case |
| State v. Hershey | 401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017) | 286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807 | In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed. | Case |
| United States v. Hess | 829 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3878221 (8th Cir.,2016) | This case stems from a United States Fish and Wildlife Service's investigation into illegal trafficking of rhinoceros horns and ivory called "Operation Crash." Defendant James Hess, a taxidermist in Maquoketa, Iowa, agreed to sell a pair of lack rhinoceros horns in 2011 to another individual involved in the trafficking operation. As a result of his role, he was charged with one count of Lacey Act Trafficking for knowingly engaging in conduct involving the sale and purchase of wildlife with a market value exceeding $350 that was transported and sold in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Hess was ultimately sentenced to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Hess first argued that the District Court made an “unsustainable finding on the record presented” when it stated that Hess "helped establish a market for these black rhino horns, and that is a serious offense against the planet." Because Hess failed to object at sentencing, this issue was reviewed for plain error. This court found no plain error, as the record supported the statement that Hess' action contributed to furthering a market for black rhinoceros horns. As to defendant's argument that his sentence was unreasonable, the court found that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness in his bottom of the guidelines sentencing range. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case |
| CR - Welfare - BIENESTAR DE LOS ANIMALES (Law 7451 on Animal Welfare) | Law 7451 |
(Text in Spanish). The law that regulates animal welfare in Costa Rica; its terms are based on the results of the OIE conference in Australia in 1994. |
Statute | |
| PA - Pittsburgh - CHAPTER 635: Other Animals And Fowl ( Article 3: Dogs, Cats, and Other Animals) | Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Code of Ordinances, Article 3: Dogs, Cats, and Other Animals, Secs. 635.03 - 635.08 |
These Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ordinances prohibit any person from riding or driving any animal-drawn conveyance on any street or sidewalk within the city except by permit or by authorization from the Director of the Department of Public Works. Whoever violates this provision will be fined $100 for the first offense and $300 for any subsequent offenses. Additionally, these ordinances provide provisions related to rodeos and whoever violates these provisions will be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000, imprisonment of up to 30 days, or both. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge | Expte. N° HC-656/21 | Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. | Case |