Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground | 2002 WL 31789336 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | 114 Wash.App. 1062 (2002) (Not Reported in P.2d) |
In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits. Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs. The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship. In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state. ( Note : publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ). |
Case |
| Mills v. State | 848 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App. 1993). |
In an animal cruelty conviction, the law requires that sentences arising out of same criminal offenses be prosecuted in single action and run concurrently. |
Case | |
| CT - Education - § 10-18d. Animal dissection. Students to be excused from participation or observation | C. G. S. A. § 10-18d | CT ST § 10-18d | This Connecticut law states that a local or regional school district shall excuse any student from participating in, or observing, the dissection of any animal as part of classroom instruction, provided the parent or guardian of such student has requested, in writing, that such student be excused from such participation or observation. A student excused under this law shall be required to complete an alternate assignment to be determined by the local or regional school district. | Statute |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden | 878 F.3d 1184 | 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 142 | In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. Animal rights advocacy organization brought action against the Governor and Attorney General of Idaho, challenging statute that criminalized interference with agricultural production facilities as violative of the First Amendment's free speech protections, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and preempted by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered summary judgment in favor of organization and granted organization's motion to permanently enjoin enforcement of the statute. The court held that 1) Idaho statute criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated First Amendment; 2) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate First Amendment; 3) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate Equal Protection Clause; 4) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel, did not violate First Amendment; 5) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel did not violate Equal Protection Clause; and 6) Idaho statute prohibiting a person from entering a private agricultural production facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations violated First Amendment. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. | Case |
| WI - Hunting - 951.09. Shooting at caged or staked animals | W.S.A. 951.09 | WI ST 951.09 | This Wisconsin statute prohibits the killing or aiding in killing or wounding by use of deadly weapon of any animal that is tied, staked out, caged or otherwise intentionally confined in a man-made enclosure, regardless of size. However, nothing in this section prohibits the shooting of any wild game in its wild state. | Statute |
| PA - Ecoterrorism - § 3311. Ecoterrorism | 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 | PS ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309 - 3311; PS ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 | This collective set of laws comprises Pennsylvania's ecoterrorim and agroterrorism provisions. The state has an agricultural vandalism law (misdemeanor or felony, depending on pecuniary loss) and law prohibiting the destruction of agricultural crops (felony). A person is guilty of ecoterrorism if the person commits a specified offense against property by: intimidating or coercing a person participating in an activity involving animals, plants, or natural resources; or preventing or obstructing a person involved in such an activity. The law has a provision that states a person who is on public property, or on private property with permission, and is peaceable exercising his or her constitutional rights is immune from prosecution and from civil liability under Pa.C.S. Sec. 8319. | Statute |
| Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd | (2008) 244 ALR 161 | (2008) 165 FCR 510; (2008) 99 ALD 534; [2008] FCA 3 |
The applicant, an incorporated public interest organisation, sought an injunction to restrain the respondent Japanese company which owned several ocean vessels engaged in, and likely to further engage in, whaling activities in waters claimed by Australia. It was found that the applicant had standing to bring the injunction and the respondent engaged in activities prohibited by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Orders were entered against against the respondent even though it had no assets in Australia and the likelihood of being able to enforce judgment was very low. |
Case |
| State v. Dicke | 258 Or. App. 678, 310 P.3d 1170 review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) | 2013 WL 5352271, 258 Or. App. 678, review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) |
This case is the companion case to State v. Fessenden,258 Or. App. 639, 310 P.3d 1163 (2013) review allowed, 354 Or. 597, 318 P.3d 749 (2013) and aff'd, 355 Or. 759, 333 P.3d 278 (2014). Defendant was convicted of first-degree animal abuse, ORS 167.320, in association with having allowed her horse to become so severely emaciated that it was at imminent risk of dying. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search of the horse. In affirming the lower court, this court found that the warrant exception that allows officers to assist seriously injured people extends to animals under certain circumstances. Citing Fessenden, this court found that a warrantless seizure will be valid when officers have "objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals that have suffered, or which are imminently threatened with suffering . . ." |
Case |
| Decreto Ley 21080, 1975 | Decreto Ley 21080, 1975 | This Decreto Ley approves and adopts the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) into the Peruvian legal system. The main purpose of this international agreement is to ensure that international trade of specimens of wildlife does not pose a threat to their survival. | Statute | |
| Giardiello v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. | 261 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D. Mass. 2017) | 2017 WL 3610478 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2017) | This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss. | Case |