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Displaying 121 - 130 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
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| VT - Fur - Chapter 173. Domestic Fur-Bearing Animals | 6 V.S.A. § 3071 - 3073 (Repealed by 2015, No. 61, § 13) | VT ST T. 6 § 3071 - 3073 (Repealed by 2015, No. 61, § 13) | Note: §§3071 to 3073. Repealed by 2015, No. 61, § 13, eff. June 17, 2015. Under these Vermont statutes, the owner of domestic fur-bearing animals enjoy the same property rights as any other domestic animal. No one may enter the enclosure of, or knowingly and wilfully kill, trap, or injure a fur-bearing animal without permission from the owner. A violation may result in a fine of up to $200 and/or imprisonment up to six months. | Statute | |||||||
| Cantore v. Costantine | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 7560690 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2023) | No. 2022-00077, 622356/19, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 05708 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Nov. 15, 2023) | This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted. | Case | |||||||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE WEST BENGAL ANIMAL SLAUGHTER CONTROL ACT, 1950 | 22 of 1950 | The law, specific to the state of West Bengal, regulates the slaughter of bulls, bullocks, cows, calves, male and female buffaloes, buffalo calves and castrated buffaloes. Persons may not slaughter these animals without a certificate stating that the animal is over fourteen years of age and unfit for work or breeding, or that the animal has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or incurable disease. Animals under this Act may be slaughtered only in specific places. | Statute | ||||||||
| Knaust v. Digesualdo | 589 Fed.Appx. 698 (5th Cir. 2014) | Appellant operated a USDA-licensed exotic animal business in Texas. In February 2010, a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service agent visited the business on a routine inspection and cited Appellant for several USDA regulation violations. After several subsequent inspections, several other violations were discovered and Appellant was presented with a Notice of Intent to Confiscate Animals. The next day, the animals were confiscated. Using Bivens, Appellant argued the agents violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by (1) seizing her property without providing a method for challenging the seizure and (2) not allowing sufficient time to cure the cited violations prior to seizing her property. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because the Appellant failed to assert factual allegations showing how each defendant, by his or her own individual acts, violated her constitutional rights. | Case | ||||||||
| TN - Hunting, Internet - Part 5. Computer-Assisted Hunting from Remote Locations | T. C. A. § 70-4-501 - 504 | TN ST § 70-4-501 - 504 | This set of Tennessee laws prohibits computer-assisted remote hunting or providing or operating facilities for computer-assisted remote hunting if the wildlife being hunted is located in this state. Computer-assisted remote hunting is defined as "the use of a computer or any other device, equipment or software, to control remotely the aiming and discharge of a rifle, shotgun, handgun, bow and arrow, cross-bow or any other implement to hunt wildlife." | Statute | |||||||
| Dillon v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction | 211 N.E.3d 746 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2023) | 2023-Ohio-942 | Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 4 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| US - Marine Mammals, Endangered - Establishment of Species of Concern List, Addition of Species to Species of Concern List, Desc | 2004 WL 791908 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-8593 |
NMFS establishes a species of concern list, places 45 species on this list, describes the factors it will consider when identifying species of concern, and revises the candidate species list. NMFS also solicits information and comments concerning the status of, research and stewardship opportunities for, and the factors for identifying species of concern. |
Administrative | |||||||
| WA - Shark - 77.15.770. Unlawful trade in shark fins--Penalty | RCWA 77.15.770 | WA ST 77.15.770 | Under this Washington statute, it is unlawful to trade in shark fins, with exceptions. A person is guilty in the second degree (gross misdemeanor) if s/he sells, purchases, or processes a shark fin for commercial purposes. A person is guilty of unlawful trade in shark fins in the first degree (class C felony) if the act involves shark fins with a total market value of $250 or more, or acted with knowledge that the shark fin originated from a shark that was illegally caught. | Statute | |||||||
| PA - Ordinances - § 459-1201. Applicability to cities of the first class, second class, second class A and third class | 3 P.S. § 459-1201 | PA ST 3 P.S. § 459-1201 | This Pennsylvania statute provides that cities of the first and second class are not affected by state dog licensing programs; existing city-level programs remain in effect. With cities of the third class, certain provisions of the state article on dog licensing shall not apply if the city has established a licensing program by ordinance. | Statute |