Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Beam | 244 Mich.App. 103 (2000) | 244 Mich.App. 103 (2000) |
Defendant was charged with owning a dog, trained or used for fighting, that caused the death of a person and filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that M.C.L. § 750.49(10); MSA 28.244(10) was unconstitutionally vague. The court granted defendant's motion, finding the terms "without provocation" and "owner" to be vague, and dismissed the case. The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Reversed. |
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| NY - Horse Racing - Section 4043.2. Restricted use of drugs, medication and other substances | 9 NY ADC 4043.2 | 9 NYCRR 4043.2 | This regulation states which drugs and medications are permitted to be used in racehorses in New York, and how and when they may be administered. | Administrative | |
| MI - Ferrets - Chapter 287. Ferrets | M. C. L. A. 287.891 - 901 | MI ST 287.891 - 901 | This chapter concerns ownership of ferrets in Michigan. A person shall not own or harbor a ferret over 12 weeks of age unless the ferret has a current vaccination against rabies with an approved rabies vaccine. A person may engage in hobby breeding of ferrets provided all requirements are met under Section 287.893. A person shall not release a ferret into the wild or abandon a ferret. | Statute | |
| ME - Lost Property - Chapter 21. Lost Goods and Stray Beasts. | 33 M. R. S. A. § 1051 - 1060 | ME ST T. 33 § 1051 - 1060 | This section comprises Maine's Lost Goods and Stray Beasts Act. | Statute | |
| US - Disability - Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) | 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, 12102, 12132; 2 U.S.C.A. § 1311 | Following are excerpted sections from the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 that relate to assistance animals. Also included is § 1311 of the Civil Rights Act that defines discriminatory practices and outlines the remedies for such violations. | Statute | ||
| People v. Romano | 908 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2010) | 2010 WL 3339158 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term) |
Defendant appealed a conviction of animal cruelty under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for failing to groom the dog for a prolonged period of time and failing to seek medical care for it. Defendant argued that the term “unjustifiably injures” in the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the Court held the term was not because a person could readily comprehend that he or she must refrain from causing unjustifiable injury to a domestic pet by failing to groom it for several months and seeking medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal needs such care. |
Case | |
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
Case | |
| Sentencia C-115/06 | Sentencia C-115/06 | In this opportunity, the Court held that bullfighting represents a cultural manifestation and artistic expression of human beings that the legal system must protect. Therefore, bullfighting could not be considered a violent act in terms of article 12 of the Constitution because the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment presumes an act to be violent when it is against a human being. In turn, bullfighting cannot be considered a violent act because here, there is no treatment that is incompatible with human dignity. | Case | ||
| Hendrickson v. Grider | 70 N.E.3d 604 (2016), appeal not allowed, 2017-Ohio-7843 | 2016-Ohio-8474, 2016 WL 7626329, 2016-Ohio-8474 (2016) |
A car accident occurred and Plaintiffs, Jo Ellen Hendrickson and her husband were injured when her vehicle hit two horses that were on the roadway. Defendant Randall D. Grider owned the horses and Defendant Gartner owned the lot where Grider kept the horses. Defendant Cope is Gartner's son-in-law and acted as an intermediary between Gartner and Grider. The Hendrickson’s filed a complaint against Grider, Cope, and Gartner and alleged that they were owners and/or keepers of horses under statute R.C. Chapter 951 and that they negligently allowed the horses to escape. Hendrickson sought damages for her injuries and a loss of consortium claim on her husbands’ behalf. The Common Pleas Court, granted summary judgment for the Defendants. The Hendrickson’s appealed. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District affirmed the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reasoned that: (1) neither defendant was “keeper” of horses within the meaning of the statute which governed liability for horses running at large on public roads; (2) even if the lot owner breached their duty by allowing the owner of the horses to keep the horses on her property before fencing was installed, such breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) the lot owner could not have reasonably foreseen that the horses would escape from a fenced-in lot and injure the motorist and, thus, she could not be held liable in negligence for the motorist's resulting injuries. |
Case | |
| New York Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York | 143 F.Supp.3d 50 (E.D. New York,2015) | 2015 WL 7017388 (E.D. New York,2015) |
(Aff'd on appeal to 2nd Circuit: New York Pet Welfare Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs, a non-profit group trade association of pet stores ("NYPWA"), dog and cat breeders and dealers, veterinarians, and pet owners, brought this action against New York City, the city council, and council members, alleging that defendants have adopted laws that violate the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as New York law that governs veterinary medicine, the treatment of animals, and equal protection. The challenged law relate to the sale of dogs and cats in the city that require pet stores to obtain pets from Class A USDA licensees in good standing and that the pet stores spay and neuter the pets before selling them. In rejecting NYPWA's federal preemption claim, the court found that the AWA specifically contemplates local regulation in § 2143(a)(8) and previous cases have found no conflict even where the local legislation bans what is otherwise allowed under the AWA. The court also found no conflict with state law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 753–d) or other laws concerning veterinary licensing, pet shops, and animal cruelty. In dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection argument, the court was not persuaded that pet stores and shelters/rescues are "similarly situated" to support the claim. Additionally, the court found a rational basis to support any differential treatment. NYPWA also alleged that the Pet Shop Laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause, arguing that the laws impermissibly regulate extraterritorially and favor local interests. The court found that even if plaintiff's factual allegations were true, the law was not economic protectionism, but an attempt to curb problems with homeless animals and euthanasia. Finally, the court found not due process violations (substantive or procedural) where there is no interference with a constitutionally protected right. NYPWA's motion to dismiss the claims is granted and the motion for preliminary injunction was denied. |
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