Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Wildlife - Chapter 23. National Wilderness Preservation System. | 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 - 1136 | Under this Act, Congress established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilderness areas", and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness; and no Federal lands shall be designated as "wilderness areas" except as provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act. | Statute | ||
| SIRMANS v. THE STATE | 244 Ga. App. 252 (2000) |
Criminal defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The motion to suppress was properly denied, because the search was authorized under the "plain view" doctrine and any objections regarding photographs were subsequently waived when they were tendered into evidence without objection. The trial court did not have authority to deprive defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were neglected or abused, because such animals were not contraband or evidence of a crime. |
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| Haberman v. United States | 26 Cl. Ct. 1405 (1992) | 38 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 76,420 |
The U.S. Claims Court upheld its jurisdiction over an action brought by individuals who had their Private Maintenance and Care Agreements (PMCA) revoked by the Bureau of Land Management and their adopted wild horses repossessed when the agency learned that the individuals intended to sell the horses to slaughter once they obtained full legal title to them under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act. The court found that the PMCA agreement constituted a contract between the government and the adopter, and thus that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Though the court noted that individual adopters would have to overcome the suggestion that they violated the terms of the PMCA by intending to sell the horses to slaughter. |
Case | |
| Sentencia 10013-103027-2023-00229-00 (0327) | Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala Mixta, Sentencia del 6 de octubre de 2023, Rad. 10013-103027-2023-00229-00 (0327) | This is the case of “Simona,” the dog in a family that went through a divorce in 2021. The husband, acting as the plaintiff, filed a lawsuit in the third Family Court to establish a visitation arrangement for their beloved companion, “Simona,” who lived with his ex-wife. The plaintiff argued that Simona was an integral part of their family and that both Simona and him had been emotionally impacted since the separation, as the defendant contended that visitations were distressing for Simona. The plaintiff further contended that Simona used to sleep with him and watch movies, but since she could no longer do so, Simona had become depressed and refused to eat. The family court dismissed the case, stating that it fell under the civil court’s jurisdiction. The Superior Tribunal of Bogotá resolved the jurisdictional conflict between the third Family Court and the twenty-seventh Civil Circuit Court. | Case | ||
| Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell | 130 F. Supp. 3d 205 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5442639 (D.D.C., 2015) | Finding the number of horses too high to maintain ecological balance and sustain multipurpose land use in Colorado's White River Resource Area, the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) invoked its authority under the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”), to declare those horses to be “excess animals” and scheduled to remove them from the land. Plaintiffs—organizations challenged BLM's “excess” determinations and its decision to remove these horses. They asked the district court to enjoin BLM's planned gather. Because the Wild Horses Act authorized BLM's excess determination and BLM appeared to have used reasonable methods to estimate the total wild-horse population, the Court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their Wild Horses Act claims. And because the record reflected that BLM considered the cumulative effects of the proposed gather and permissibly relied on the Environmental Assessment written for a previous East Douglas HMA gather, the Court found that Plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail on their National Environmental Policy Act claims. The Court further found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the gather and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of BLM. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. | Case | |
| AL - Importation, wildlife - 220-2-.26. Restrictions On Possession, Sale, Importation | AL ADC 220-2-.26 | AL ADC 220-2-.26 | This Alabama regulation provides that no person, firm, corporation, partnership, or association shall possess, sell, offer for sale, import, or bring into the state any of the listed species including piranha, mongoose, non-native coyote, fox, black bear, and others. It is also unlawful for any person to have in possession any live, protected wild bird or wild animal or live embryo, eggs, or sperm of these protected wild birds or animals. | Administrative | |
| ID - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 70. Trespass and Malicious Injuries to Property. | I.C. § 18-7015, 7037, 7040, 7041, 7042 | ID ST § 18-7015, 7037, 7040, 7041, 7042 | These laws comprise Idaho's animal enterprise interference/"ecoterrorism" laws. The state has a provision specific to trespass into enclosures for fur-bearing animals such as foxes. Additionally, § 18-7037 prohibits the unauthorized release of an animal, a bird, or an aquatic species which has been lawfully confined for agriculture, science, research, commerce, public propagation, protective custody, or education. This offense is a misdemeanor and the actor is liable for restitution that includes replacement costs, property damage, and even costs of repeating an experiment. Section § 18-7040 defines the crime of interference with agricultural research where a person knowingly damages property, obtains property with the intent of hinder the research; obtains access to the facility by misrepresentation to perform acts to damage or hinder the research; enters the facility with the intent to damage, alter, or duplicate data or records; or the release of an animal or injury to an animal at the facility. Violation is a felony with punishment of up to 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $10,000. The state also has a separate section on damage to aquaculture operations. | Statute | |
| CA - Crimes - § 597y. Violations; methods of killing; penalty | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597y | CA PENAL § 597y | A violation of Section 597u [Animals; prohibited killing methods] or 597v [Newborn dog or cat; methods of killing] is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink | 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir., 2011) |
Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands. Plaintiff argued that the 2006 Regulations violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals found for the plaintiff, holding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory changes. BLM also violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. The FLPMA claim was remanded. |
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| Merced v. Kasson | 577 F.3d 578 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) | 2009 WL 2343172 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2009) |
Plaintiff José Merced, a Santeria Oba Oriate, or priest, brought action against the City of Euless alleging that city ordinances prohibiting the keeping of animals for slaughter and the slaughtering of animals prevented him from performing animal sacrifices essential to Santeria religious practice. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the city, but denied its request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the city and affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The court found that the city did not prove that the burden it placed on the plaintiff advanced a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so. In fact, the Court noted that prior to the ban, Merced had performed these sacrifices for sixteen years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals. The City's purported interest was further undermined by the fact that hunters are allowed to butcher dead animals at their homes. Thus, Euless failed to assert a compelling governmental interest in support of its ordinances that burden Merced's religious conduct. |
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