Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 Núm 2 |
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Policy | ||||||||||
| U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. | 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999) |
Defendant on appeal contends that its conduct of electrocuting migratory birds does not fall within the ambit of either the MBTA or the BGEPA because each statute is directed at the more traditional "physical" takings of migratory birds through hunting and poaching. The court disagrees, finding the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate an intent to include electrocutions. The court further delineates the differences in intent under each statute, finding that while the MBTA is a strict liability crime, the BGEPA is not. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |||||||||
| IL - Exotic pets - Act 68. Herptiles-Herps Act | 510 ILCS 68/1-1 to 510 ILCS 68/110–5 | IL ST CH 510 § 68/1-1 to IL ST CH 510 § 68/110–5 | Under the Herptiles-Herps Act reptiles and amphibians are exempt from the definition of “aquatic life” under the Fish and Aquatic Life Code. All rules and enforcement actions under the Illinois Conservation Law and the dangerous animals statutes related to reptiles and amphibians are now covered exclusively by this Act. | Statute | ||||||||
| People v. Johnson | 305 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. 1981) | 104 Mich. App. 629 (Mich. 1981) |
Defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of cruelty to animals, arguing that there was not proof that the horses were under his charge or custody. While the court agreed and reversed his conviction because he could not be convicted under the statute merely as the owner of the horses, absent proof of his care or custody of the horses, it further explained that the "owner or otherwise" statutory language was designed to punish cruelty to animals without regard to ownership. |
Case | ||||||||
| Newsome v. Erwin | 137 F.Supp.2d 934 (S.D. Ohio 2000) |
Plaintiff brought § 1983 action against county sheriff and others alleging that defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they shot and killed his pet lioness. |
Case | |||||||||
| WI - Montello - Breed - § 117-17 Pit Bull Dogs. | MONTELLO, WI., CODE § 117-17 (1989) |
In Montello, Wisconsin, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, provided that dogs previously registered may be kept subject to certain requirement. These requirements are keeping the dog properly confined or on a leash and muzzle, posting a "Beware of Dog” sign, keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking photographs for identification purposes. Sale or transfer of ownership of pit bulls is prohibited. Failure to comply may result in the seizure and impoundment of the dog, a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 30 days. |
Local Ordinance | |||||||||
| CA - Vehicle - § 23117. Transportation of animals; enclosure or restraint requirements | West's Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code § 23117 | CA VEHICLE § 23117 | This California law prohibits any person from transporting any animal in the open back of a vehicle on a highway unless the vehicle has sides that extend 46" vertically, or the animal is secured in a cage and cross-tethered to prevent it from jumping out of the vehicle. The law targets the transporting of dogs in the back of pickup trucks. Exclusions include the transportation of livestock and farm dogs. | Statute | ||||||||
| Beasley v. Sorsaia | 880 S.E.2d 875 (2022) | 247 W.Va. 409 (W.Va., 2022) | Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded. | Case | ||||||||
| Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hospital, Ltd. | 510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). |
Plaintiff dog owners sought review of an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Illinois), which dismissed their complaint against defendants, animal hospital and veterinarians, with prejudice. The trial court held that plaintiffs' complaint to recover damages for the loss of companionship they experienced as a result of the death of their dog failed to state a cause of action. The court affirmed the order of the trial court that dismissed the complaint filed by plaintiff dog owners against defendants, animal hospital and veterinarians. The court held that the law did not permit a dog owner to recover for the loss of companionship of a dog. |
Case | |||||||||
| US - Service Animals - Part 35. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local | 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 to .139 | The purpose of this part is to effectuate subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The section defines "service animal" as any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. | Administrative |